Reports and Publications

• Air Combat Review
  • Contents
  • Summary
  • Introduction
  • The Setting for the Review
  • The Air Combat Force
  • Description of the Options
  • The Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications
  • Military Operational Implications
  • Financial Implications
  • Conclusions
  • Annex A – Defence Policy Objectives
  • Annex B – Costing Assumptions
  • Glossary

Within this section

• Structure
• The A-4 Skyhawk
• Roles, Tasks and Activities
• Air Combat Force Outputs
• Enhanced Nowra Agreement
• Training and Other Activities
• Costs
• Current Capability
• Suitability of A-4 Skyhawk
• Contribution to Defence Policy Objectives

Review of the Options for an Air Combat Capability
(February 2001)

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The Air Combat Force

Structure

1. The air combat force is currently made up of three squadrons. No. 14 Squadron, based at Ohakea, provides lead-in jet training on 17 Aermacchis (purchased 1991). No. 75 Squadron, also based at Ohakea, provides the operational output using 12 A-4 Skyhawks. No. 2 Squadron is based at Nowra, New South Wales, Australia with a squadron of six A-4s. No. 2 Squadron provides air defence support training for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) under the terms set out in the Enhanced Nowra Agreement (ENA) between the NZDF and the Australian Defence Force (ADF). No. 2 Squadron also provides fighter lead-in flying training for pilots assigned operational roles in No. 75 Squadron.

Flying Personnel Associated with the Air Combat Force (current staffing)

	No. of Aircraft	No. of Pilots (excl trainees)	No. of Ground Trades	Total
14 SQN	17 Aermacchi MB-339CB	11	63	84 (includes 10 trainee pilots)
75 SQN	12 A-4k Skyhawk	9	62	71
2 SQN	4 TA-4k Skyhawk 2 A-4k Skyhawk	6	41	47
Sub-Total		26	166	202

Support Personnel Associated with the Air Combat Force (current staffing)

Base	Function	Total
Ohakea	Air Base Wing Logistics Other	113 351 34
Sub-Total		498
Total		700

The A-4 Skyhawk

2. The A-4 Skyhawk was designed almost 50 years ago to provide the US Navy and US Marine Corps with a carrier-based lightweight attack and ground support aircraft. The New Zealand Government purchased 14 aircraft in 1970 and a second batch of ten second-hand aircraft from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in 1984. The aircraft was re-winged in the late 1980s, and the navigation/attack system was upgraded over the same period.
3. The New Zealand air combat force now has 18 A-4 aircraft, after the tragic accident on 16 February of this year at Nowra resulting in the death of Squadron Leader Murray Neilson. The 1997 Defence White Paper stated that the critical mass for the air combat force was 18 operational aircraft.

Roles, Tasks and Activities

4. The three roles of the New Zealand air combat force are:

   Close Air Support (CAS)

   This role involves support of ground forces against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces in conventional war and the higher end of peace support operations;

   Maritime Strike

   This role involves the targeting and attacking of naval and other surface vessels; and

   Air Interdiction

   This involves the use of aircraft to destroy, disrupt, neutralise or delay the enemies’ military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces.

Air Combat Force Outputs

5. The air combat force provides the following outputs.
   • At the Operational Level of Capability (OLOC), ten A-4s are to be available for deployment for military tasks, with the force sustainable for 12 months. At the current state of a Basic Level of Capability (BLOC), a force of eight A-4s could be deployed with 60 days notice.
   • The provision of air defence support flying for the ADF in accordance with the ENA³.
   • Provide services to the Government, including ceremonial and representational support and responding to EEZ infringements.

Enhanced Nowra Agreement

6. The provision of air defence training assistance by the RNZAF to the RAN commenced in 1991. The Australians are planning to use the newly acquired Hawk fighter lead-in trainer to take over this task.

Training and Other Activities

7. In 1999/00 the A-4s flew 3,819 hours, of which 2,564 contributed to maintaining an operational level of capability and 1,122 hours for training support to the ADF.
8. The air combat force takes part in a range of training activities associated with its operational roles and outputs. In 1999/00, the air combat force participated in the following major exercises.

   • Exercise KAKADU

     - An exercise to practice maritime strike operations from a deployment base in Australia.

   • Exercise VANGUARD 99

     – An exercise to practice deploying rapidly over long distances; in this case to Malaysia.

   • Exercise MALAY-KIWI 99

     - A bilateral exercise with the Malaysian Air Force to practice air combat skills and demonstrate interoperability.

   • Exercise STARDEX 99

     - A major FPDA maritime and air defence exercise involving contributions from all member countries.

   • Exercise WILLOH

     - A bilateral exercise with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) to practice interdiction and air combat skills in a combined environment during a deployment of RAAF F/A-18s to New Zealand.
9. The air combat force also supports the RNZN and New Zealand Army by practising their skills for maintaining operational readiness. This included participation in the Navy’s Fleet Concentration Period, Forward Air Controller training for the Army and training support for the Army’s air defence troop. RNZAF figures show that historically the RNZN has vessels involved in about 20% of the support provided to the RAN under ENA. RNZAF data also shows that training support for the RNZN, excluding that provided by No. 2 Squadron at Nowra, amounted to a total of 560 hours. Training support for the Army runs in the vicinity of 300 hours each year from No. 75 Squadron, while the Aermacchi trainers provide a small amount of miscellaneous support. Training support is also provided during foreign ship visits, enhancing training value associated with such visits to New Zealand.
10. The air combat force also provides services to the community. In 1999/00 this included participation in the Millennium Celebrations, ANZAC Day parades and air shows at Whenuapai, Auckland and Wanaka.

Costs

11. The operating cost of the Air Combat Force Output is about $150 million, GST inclusive, but excluding Capital Charge. The book value of the assets of the air combat force, as of 30 June 2000, is approximately $370 million.

Current Capability

12. The Evaluation Division of the Ministry of Defence undertook an independent evaluation of the air combat output in 1998. It found that the A-4s met current needs, but are limited by the lack of an airborne laser target designator, a medium range anti-shipping missile, improved navigation and communication equipment and improved self defence systems. The evaluation report states that:

    “The Air Attack Force could have deployed and made a useful, if limited, contribution to collective or regional security operations in a relatively benign operating environment.”⁴

    “In the NZDF’s own assessment the Air Attack Force would have required additional resources in order to generate OLOC (operational level of capability), would have needed to have had restrictions placed on its designated missions or tasks, or would have only been able to sustain operations independently for a reduced time.”⁵

13. The current capability of the A-4s was described in the Quigley Report of the F-16 lease. Quigley highlighted the need for capital expenditure of $35 million on the A-4’s between now and 2005 to maintain reliability and supportability. This covers most of the structural work as well as that on avionics, the fuel system, ejection seats and cockpit displays. Variable maintenance costs were also expected to increase because of the deferral of all work following the expected leasing of F-16’s ⁶.

Suitability of A-4 Skyhawk

14. The A-4 was designed as a lightweight attack and ground support aircraft, the aerodynamic and engine performance being suited to a low altitude environment. However, the increased threat from small arms, anti-aircraft artillery and infrared portable surface-to-air missiles, makes low altitude operation high risk. For high-intensity coalition operations, the A-4 is relatively slow and unmanoeuvreable making it vulnerable to radar guided missile attack. It lacks the aerodynamic and engine performance to carry useful weapons loads, and a navigation/attack system upgrade would be required to enable the aircraft to guide precision weapons. The A-4 has no growth potential to accommodate the sort of electronic self-protection necessary to counter modern threats.
15. In addition to the work to maintain reliability and supportability mentioned in paragraph 4.13, expenditure would be required to acquire targeting pods and Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) Systems in order to deploy into anything other than benign environments. The estimated additional cost is about $70 million.

Contribution to Defence Policy Objectives

16. The Whineray Review in 1998 concluded that the air combat capability had high policy value in protecting and promoting New Zealand’s local, regional and global security interests. It was considered to be fundamental to demonstrate that New Zealand is serious about its own defence, and to send a clear message about our commitment to broader security.
17. The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee did not share this view. The Defence Beyond 2000 Report stated that:

    “ The A-4 Skyhawks which New Zealand has possessed for nearly 30 years have never been used by the RNZAF in a combat role, and almost certainly never will be.”⁷

    “In what circumstances short of war would the New Zealand Government consider sending aircraft to sink ships?”⁸

    “We see air combat forces as being of lesser utility, given competing demands for scarce NZDF resources than the other force elements maintained by the NZDF.”⁹

18. The MOD evaluators also had difficulty identifying the contribution made by air combat.

    “The Defence Assessment 1997, the 1997 White Paper and related documents provided insufficient guidance as to the capabilities required of the Air Attack Force. In addition, guidance on where the Air Attack Force might be deployed and how it might be employed was limited.”

19. The Quigley Review of the F-16 lease agreed in part with the Whineray report, expressing the view that the need to maintain an air combat force seemed to be based on: demonstrating that New Zealand is serious about its own defence; sending a clear message that New Zealand is committed to broader regional and global security; and, importantly, having an operational capability that can be expanded should strategic circumstances deteriorate significantly at some point in the future.
20. The Quigley review reported that it is questionable whether the New Zealand air combat force would be deployed in direct support of New Zealand Navy or Army contingents in an operational situation. In a submission to the review, the Navy expressed the view that RNZN ships would normally be deployed as part of a larger force with access to layers of defence and support. It saw the provision of air support in these circumstances coming from the air combat assets of a coalition rather than a dedicated New Zealand air combat component. The Army had a similar view about their operational circumstances. Notwithstanding this, both the Navy and Army require training support from the air combat force in order to achieve their operational readiness states.
21. The air combat force equipped with the A-4 Skyhawk in its current state would be a marginal asset to any multinational coalition, and its operational utility will continue to decline. Should the Government wish to retain an air combat capability with some useful operational utility, then it would have to make a significant investment in new aircraft, more modern weapons, and improved combat systems.
22. In the absence of a foreseeable military threat, it is unlikely a New Zealand government would use the air combat force to respond to a low level security challenge around New Zealand or the South Pacific.
23. The air combat force plays a useful role in confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region through its involvement in FPDA activities and bilateral exercises. This is part of the architecture that helps maintain stability in the region. These activities also contribute to our foreign policy objectives. A New Zealand government, however, has not used the air combat force in response to a security challenge in the region for over 25 years. The outlook in Strategic Assessment 2000 makes it difficult to visualise a situation where a government might do so in the foreseeable future.

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3. This agreement provides for 1,080 hours of Air Defence Support Flying for the ADF consisting of 800 hours in tasking and 280 hours in transit.
4. Evaluation of NZDF Output 11: Air Attack Force, Opening Letter.
5. Evaluation of NZDF Output 11: Air Attack Force, p.29.
6. The Air Force have advised that, based on more current information, the extent and cost of the work required would be less than what is mentioned in the Quigley report because replacement ejection seats are no longer available. The move to BLOC will also reduce maintenance costs.
7. Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. p.94
8. Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. p.97
9. Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. p.99

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