Review of the Options for an Air Combat Capability
(February 2001)
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Conclusions
- The air combat force equipped with the A-4 Skyhawk in its current state would be a marginal asset to any
multinational coalition, and its operational utility will continue to decline. Should the Government wish
to retain an air combat capability with some useful operational utility, then it would have to make a
significant investment in new aircraft, more modern weapons, and improved combat systems.
- In the absence of a foreseeable military threat, it is unlikely a New Zealand government would use the air
combat force to respond to a low level security challenge around New Zealand or the South Pacific.
- The air combat force plays a useful role in confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region through its
involvement in FPDA activities and bilateral exercises. This is part of the architecture that helps
maintain stability in the region. These activities also contribute to our foreign policy objectives.
A New Zealand government, however, has not used the air combat force in response to a security challenge
in the region for over 25 years. The outlook in Strategic Assessment 2000 makes it difficult to visualise
a situation where a government might do so in the foreseeable future.
- The foreign policy impact of disbanding the air combat force needs to be cast in the wider context of the
other decisions the Government will be making on our defence effort. The Australians will want to see New
Zealand maintain a range of capabilities needed to continue to play a role in the region and to be able to
work jointly with Australia. In the absence of air combat, these would include naval and land combat forces
and maritime surveillance.
- For Singapore and Malaysia, as well as other South-East Asian partners, the key will be maintaining
capabilities that can effectively contribute to FPDA activities and bilateral exercises. Our major
contributions are the air combat force, the P-3 Orions and our frigates. The effect of eliminating the air
combat force could be dampened by assurances that the other force elements will continue to participate.
- The air combat force supports the RNZN and New Zealand Army in maintaining their operational standards, as
well as contributing important expertise to the joint force environment. There are other options for meeting
these requirements satisfactorily if an air combat force was not part of the NZDF force structure. These
would require the cooperation of our defence partners and there would be costs involved.
- Because of the uncertainty of the security environment in the medium to longer term a decision to eliminate
the air combat force carries with it the risk that New Zealand may not have a force structure that is able
to cope with future challenges. But it is hard to visualise any circumstance where New Zealand would face a
future serious threat on its own; we would do so as part of a multinational grouping. In these circumstances,
each country would contribute what it could and smaller countries like New Zealand would not be expected to
have available a full spectrum of capabilities. What would be expected was that our contributions would be
relevant, well trained and well equipped and thus able to play a useful part. It would not be in anybody's
interest for us to maintain a breadth of capabilities that could not be properly developed and sustained.
- If recruitment and retention problems were to arise in the RNZAF as a result of a decision to disband the
air combat force, the impact could be reduced if the decision were seen in the wider context of using scarce
resources wisely in those areas of the RNZAF where there is a demonstrable need. These areas would include
utility helicopters and strategic airlift. This would require an assessment that those capabilities we
choose to retain in the force structure would be properly resourced to maintain professional standards and
operational readiness.
- The cost of the Air Combat Force Output is about $150 million annually, excluding capital charge. This is
about 13.5% of the cost of NZDF Outputs (excluding capital charge). The $870 million reduction in operating
expenses over the next ten years that would be realised if the air combat force was disbanded, and the
avoidance of between $680 million and $1 billion in capital investment over the same period, could be used
to address the needs of the rest of the force structure within the level of resources that are likely to be
available for defence in the current financial setting.
- Retaining the air combat force at its current level of capability would not carry any strategic, foreign
policy or military operational risks. It would be available to respond to security challenges and
participate in FPDA activities and bilateral exercises. Training support could be provided to the
Australians as long as it was needed. It would require, however, baseline increases over the next 10 years
totalling in the region of $300 million. Capital investment in the region of $840-1,100 million would also
be required.
- Retaining a reduced air combat capability would balance the strategic and foreign policy risks of eliminating
the capability with the financial risks of maintaining air combat as part of the NZDF structure.
- Elimination of the air combat force entirely carries strategic, foreign policy and military operational risks.
Disbanding the air combat force would free up considerable resources and avoid the need for significant
capital investment. These cost reductions would go a long way to achieving a fiscally sustainable defence
effort within the Government's financial setting.
- If it were decided to eliminate the air combat force, there is a choice as to timing. The choices would
involve; on one hand, how soon cost reductions are achieved; and on the other, accommodating the Australian
wish to retain our training support.
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