Reports and Publications

• Air Combat Review
  • Contents
  • Summary
  • Introduction
  • The Setting for the Review
  • The Air Combat Force
  • Description of the Options
  • The Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications
  • Military Operational Implications
  • Financial Implications
  • Conclusions
  • Annex A – Defence Policy Objectives
  • Annex B – Costing Assumptions
  • Glossary

Within this section

• Summary of Military Operational Implications

Review of the Options for an Air Combat Capability
(February 2001)

Contents | Previous | Next

Military Operational Implications

1. Because of its size and limited military capability, the NZDF must exercise and train with the military forces of other countries, especially Australia, to reach a level of capability from which it can be safely committed to operations. One of the underlying issues is therefore the extent to which the NZDF depends on other forces and how it manages expectations with respect to what it puts in to and takes out of the relationship. New Zealand has a long history of participating in air combat operations and exercises as an equal partner. Eliminating a capability that is considered in military circles as basic for a modern multi-tasked military would alter perceptions among our military colleagues of the value of New Zealand as a defence partner.
2. Australia's training is centred on interoperability with the US and thus its exercise programme is heavily focused on US participation. Because there are limitations on the NZDF exercising with US forces, Australia schedules a separate series of bilateral exercises with New Zealand. This imposes a burden for Australia, but they also benefit as it enhances our ability to work together on operations, such as Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor.
3. The new Australian Defence White Paper reinforces a focus on maritime and air operations in the air/sea gap to the north of Australia. It states that air combat is the most important single capability for the defence of Australia, because control of the air over Australian territory and maritime approaches is critical to all other types of operations in the defence of Australia. They have set a capability goal of having an air combat capability at a level at least comparable qualitatively to any in the region, and with a sufficient margin of superiority to provide an acceptable likelihood of success in combat. They are planning on spending $(AUD) 5.6 billion over the next 10 years enhancing air combat. It is most unlikely New Zealand could afford the kind of investment that would be required to maintain an air combat capability of a comparable quality. New Zealand could, however, provide an air combat force that would be considered by the Australians to be a useful adjunct.
4. The RNZAF's ability to provide joint training for the RNZN and New Zealand Army for operations in an air-threatened environment is an important ingredient of operational readiness. This is demonstrated by the importance the Australians have placed on the continuation of our A-4s providing support for the RAN until they are able to do this training themselves with the introduction of the Hawk. If the air combat force were eliminated, New Zealand would need to rely on others to provide this type of training and we would have to bear the cost.
5. The existence of the air combat force within the NZDF provides air combat expertise that is important from a joint perspective. Navy and Army military planners need to understand the role of combat air power and its control, management and linkages with surface forces. The lack of expertise in this area will limit the effectiveness of operational and strategic level military planning for New Zealand's participation in multinational joint operations. That is not to say that the continued existence of an air combat force is a necessary condition to have this expertise available. Other countries could agree to provide suitably qualified personnel on attachment to the NZDF for this purpose. Another possibility is having some New Zealanders train and work with others to keep the skills and knowledge alive in the NZDF.
6. It is generally accepted that no security situation is predictable. Defence is a long-term business and it takes time to acquire a new capability and prepare it to a level at which it can be safely deployed. This can be as long as fifteen years for a significant capability such as an air combat force. It is conceivable that New Zealand may face a security situation beyond our horizon for making informed predictions that will have to be dealt with using the capabilities immediately at hand. A decision to eliminate the air combat force would need to take into account the risks of an uncertain future security environment.
7. Intangible factors will need to be considered. It is possible that downsizing or eliminating the air combat force could impact on RNZAF recruiting and retention. There could also be impact on the other Services. In isolation from other announcements, such a decision could be perceived as a diminution of New Zealand's defence effort and a lessening of the stature of the NZDF. It can be expected that the first to act on such a perception would be aircrew and technicians who have skills that are readily marketable. They are also the individuals that the NZDF has invested the most in and those that will be the most expensive to replace.
8. Eliminating the air combat force would free up considerable resources that could be applied to address deficiencies in other capability areas within the NZDF. It may also be possible to reduce support costs over the long-term by consolidating the RNZAF in the North Island to one base.

Summary of Military Operational Implications

Option 1 - Retain Current Level of Capability

• The retention of an air combat capability would be viewed favourably by our key partners and thus help secure their cooperation in training and exercising with the NZDF.
• The air combat force could provide essential training for the RNZN and New Zealand Army and provide the necessary air combat power expertise for joint planning and operations.

Option 2 – Reduced Capability

• The NZDF would retain air combat expertise and have a base to build on in the future.
• The air combat force could still provide essential training for the Navy and Army and provide the necessary air combat power expertise for joint planning and operations.
• Savings would be made that could be used to overcome operational deficiencies in other capability areas.

Option 3A – Disband the Air Combat Force Immediately

• The NZDF would have to secure air combat training support for the Navy and Army.
• We would lose an indigenous air combat expertise for joint planning and joint operations.
• There could be a negative impact on recruitment and retention of skilled service personnel.
• Considerable resources would be freed up to address operational deficiencies in other capability areas and the smaller force structure of the NZDF would be more likely to be fiscally sustainable over the long term.
• It may be possible to reduce support costs by consolidating the RNZAF to one base on the North Island.

Option 3B – Disband the Air Combat Force When ENA is Terminated

• The difference with this option is that the Government could decide to continue providing training support to the Australians until their Hawk fleet was able to take over this task. Any cost reductions resulting from the elimination of the air combat force would be delayed.

Top | Previous | Next