Reports and Publications

• Air Combat Review
  • Contents
  • Summary
  • Introduction
  • The Setting for the Review
  • The Air Combat Force
  • Description of the Options
  • The Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications
  • Military Operational Implications
  • Financial Implications
  • Conclusions
  • Annex A – Defence Policy Objectives
  • Annex B – Costing Assumptions
  • Glossary

Within this section

• Option 1 – Continuation at Present Levels of Capability
• Option 2 – Reduction in Capability
• Option 3 – Disbandment of the Air Combat Force
• Summary of Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications

Review of the Options for an Air Combat Capability
(February 2001)

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The Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications

Option 1: Continuation at Present Levels of Capability

1. The maintenance of the status quo would allow the Government to retain the option of using air combat forces to respond to local, regional and global security challenges. Although there is no discernible direct military threat to New Zealand’s sovereignty, there is an ongoing threat of low-level incursions by foreign vessels involved in fishing, smuggling, illegal migration and other transnational crime activities. The Defence Beyond 2000 report expressed doubts that a government would use the air combat force in response to these non-military challenges.
2. The maintenance of the air combat force would enable it to be deployed on a sustainable basis to a peace support operation or other multinational operation, regionally or globally, in pursuit of Government objectives. It would also allow New Zealand to continue to provide an air combat element in FPDA exercises.
3. The Australians are aware that New Zealand is reviewing the continuation of its air combat capability, and a decision to continue with this capability would be welcomed and seen as a demonstration of New Zealand's ongoing commitment to Closer Defence Relations (CDR). There would be no foreign policy implications of the continuation option for our relations with the South Pacific.
4. FPDA partners are aware that New Zealand is reviewing the air combat capability, and a decision to retain the capability would be the preferred outcome for our FPDA partners, as well as Thailand.

Option 2: Reduction in Capability

5. New Zealand would retain a limited but effective capability to commit an air combat element to a multinational operation for a short duration. It would also have a base on which to build up an air combat capability should there be a significant deterioration in our strategic circumstances.
6. A reduced air combat capability would allow New Zealand to continue to contribute combat aircraft to FPDA exercises, and to continue, albeit at a lower level, joint exercising with Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. This would contribute to New Zealand demonstrating its commitment to playing a role in the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
7. As with the first option, there are not likely to be any significant foreign policy implications for relations with the South Pacific. A smaller number of combat aircraft would enable New Zealand to continue to cooperate with Australia under CDR through augmentation of the overall Australia/New Zealand air combat capability, though at a lower level than before, and through continuation of the ENA.

Option 3: Disbandment of the Air Combat Force

8. Disbandment of the air combat force would trigger a number of strategic and foreign policy implications. The NZDF would not be able to provide the Government with the choice of committing an air combat force to a multinational operation or in response to a security situation close to New Zealand.
9. The impact of disbanding the air combat force would be most significant in terms of our bilateral defence relationship with Australia. New Zealand defence policy has established Australia as its most important defence ally, with the objective of maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit of common security interests. The NZDF operates with the ADF to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both New Zealand and Australia, and to work together in the pursuit of a secure and peaceful region.
10. The new Australian White Paper states that they would regret any decision by New Zealand not to maintain at least some capable air and naval combat capabilities.
11. In the absence of an air combat capability, New Zealand would still be able to contribute to regional security and to the defence of both New Zealand and Australia, albeit with fewer options. These would include elements which the Australians greatly appreciate, such as naval and land combat forces and maritime surveillance. The Australian reaction to disbanding the air combat force would, however, depend on what decisions are taken across the whole range of defence capabilities.
12. In the end, what Australia wants to see is New Zealand maintaining a range of capabilities necessary to continue to play an effective role in the region and to be able to work jointly with Australia.
13. If it were decided to disband the air combat force, the timing of a decision would be important for Australia. The Australians have an expectation that our A-4s would be available until June 2002.
14. A decision to disband the air combat force is likely to be unwelcome news in Washington, as the new Administration is strong on defence and wants to devolve responsibility for regional stability to countries in the region.
15. In the DPF, the Government has committed to playing a role consistent with New Zealand's interests and capabilities in long-term efforts to build security and stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Although the Asia-Pacific region is relatively stable, it does face some security challenges. Given the level of our interests in the region, New Zealand would be expected to contribute to crisis management, peacekeeping or multilateral operations in the region. In general, such deployments would be in the nature of peacekeeping and peace enforcement rather than conventional war operations. While we can never rule out the possibility of having to again face a decision to commit forces to combat in the Asia-Pacific, Strategic Assessment 2000 considers this to be most unlikely. A New Zealand government has not utilised the air combat force in response to a security challenge in the region for over 25 years. The outlook in Strategic Assessment 2000 makes it difficult to visualise circumstances where they would do so in the foreseeable future.
16. The FPDA is also an important consideration. The Arrangements are based on maritime and air defence, although a land force dimension has been added to improve joint and combined operational procedures and understanding.
17. Our air combat force is considered by our FPDA partners to be of high value because its multi-role capability is flexible. If we did not contribute air combat assets, another country would have to increase its effort and pay a higher cost for its participation. The effect of disbanding our air combat force would be dampened as long as some sort of maritime contribution was maintained. To our FPDA partners, meaningful participation is the key.
18. Our close defence partners in the Asia-Pacific, Singapore and Malaysia, will look closely at New Zealand's continuing overall contribution to the stability and security of the region and to the FPDA exercises. In particular, they will be interested in what New Zealand does with its naval combat and maritime surveillance capabilities.
19. Participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations is an expression of New Zealand's intention to uphold fundamental commitments under the United Nations (UN) Charter. The NZDF needs to be structured, equipped and trained for combat, in both UN and other collective security activities. The New Zealand air combat force, however, has not played a direct role in any peace support operation. The reality is that New Zealand’s strike aircraft are unlikely to be called upon by a New Zealand Government to play a role in peace support operations. While it has played a role in collective security in the past, the chances of New Zealand’s air combat force being needed or used in this way by a New Zealand government in the future is not considered likely.

Summary of Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications

Option 1 – Retain the Current Level of Capability

• The air combat force would continue to be available as a response on a sustainable basis to local, regional and global security challenges.
• There would be no foreign policy implications.
• The air combat force could continue to participate in FPDA activities and bilateral exercises with regional partners. Both Australia and our FPDA partners would welcome the retention of this capability as a demonstration of New Zealand’s commitment to regional security.

Option 2 – Reduced Capability

• There are not expected to be any major foreign policy implications.
• A limited but effective capability would be retained providing a base from which an air combat force could be developed should there be a significant deterioration in our strategic environment.
• A reduced capability would still allow New Zealand to contribute to FPDA activities and bilateral exercises, albeit at a lower level.

Option 3A – Disband the Air Combat Force Immediately

• A New Zealand government would not have the choice of committing an air combat force in response to a future security challenge.
• Any negative perceptions of this decision would be mitigated by ensuring that any financial savings are redirected into rebuilding the remaining force elements of the NZDF that are valued by our defence partners.
• Disbanding the air combat force is likely to be negatively perceived by the United States, which is expecting regional countries to play a greater role in regional stability.
• The Australian concern would be heightened if our training support under the ENA was terminated before they were able to replace our A-4s with their new Hawk trainer.
• Concerns on the part of our defence partners in the Asia-Pacific, especially Singapore and Malaysia, could be dampened by continued participation in FPDA activities by other New Zealand force elements, particularly naval combat and maritime surveillance.

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