Hunn Review: Annexes (30 September 2002)
Annex C
Summary Extracts from the Ansell/White Review1
Para 101 pg 39
"The view of the Chief of Defence Force that it was appropriate to rely on the authority of the single Service Chiefs to investigate leaks in their own services reflects the constraints which affect the authority of the Chief of Defence Force in respect of the single Service Chiefs. The constraints arise under the Defence Force structure created by the Defence Act 1990 which, in an operational command sense, makes the Chief of the Defence Force paramount, but in a managerial sense makes him only first amongst equals because all are appointed by the Governor-General and the CDF has no authority to remove or suspend a single Service Chief CDF does not have the authority of a Chief Executive in respect of the single Service Chiefs. They are commanders in their own right in respect of their Service. The review being conducted by Mr Hunn provides a timely opportunity to consider how what seems to us to be structural ambiguities should be resolved."
Para 133 pg 48
"It seems to us that in the context of the subject matter of our review there is a need for clear and decisive leadership at the top of the Defence Force and the army to identify and remove or neutralize those individuals responsible for the breach of Defence Force standards and the unauthorized disclosure of official information. .."
Para 134 pg 49
"The terms of reference to be given by the Minister to the CDF... should state clearly and prominently that one of his principal responsibilities will be to take decisive steps to end this sorry saga. They must include a vigorous attempt to identify and remove or neutralize that small minority of officers who have participated in it; the expeditious reiteration to all personnel of their responsibilities in this area, and all practical means that can be taken to enhance and preserve respect for the accepted standards of behaviour..."
Para 135 pg 49
"In para 101 we referred to constraints on the powers of the CDF (who) can only carry out his management role through the Service Chiefs; yet since he does not appoint those Chiefs he has very limited disciplinary power over them and therefore less authority to ensure that his wishes are carried out... "
Para 136 pg 49
"One possible approach might be a change in the way the Service Chiefs are appointed... consideration might be given to aligning appointment processes governing Service Chiefs a stage further with those governing Departmental Chief Executives... while the Governor-General continues to approve the appointment of Single Service Chiefs, the Defence Act could be changed to provide for the appointment to be formally made by the CDF, bringing the Service Chiefs into the same kind of contractual relationship with CDF as State Sector Chief Executives have now with the State Services Commissioner."
Para 137 and 138 pg 50:
"Consideration could usefully be given to other amendments of the Act including:
- The nature and extent of the powers of the CDF to command all aspects of the Defence Force (current ambiguities should be removed)
- The role and functions of the three Service Chiefs now that the Joint Forces Headquarters has been established
- The effectiveness of the command structure outside operational and related areas
- A requirement that by the end of a transitional period all appointments to senior positions should have Joint Forces experience.
- Clarification of the role of the Governor-General
- Inclusion of a specific provision requiring political neutrality of the Defence Force and briefing of the Leader of the Opposition to encourage a bipartisan approach to defence issues. There is a precedent for such a provision in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969: see s 4AA."
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Full Title: Review Of The Performance Of The Defence Force In Relation To Expected Standards Of Behaviour, And In Particular The Leaking And Inappropriate Use Of Information By Defence Force Personnel.
