Hunn Review: Annexes (30 September 2002)
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Annex L
Culled Structural Options
- A wide range of structural options for defence organisations can be considered. For each option, there are many variations where one or more features can be varied from the option's central defining feature or features. Every option will have its own utility and advantages and
disadvantages.
- It has been beyond the practical scope of this review to examine all conceivable options. The following note is included in the Annexes to this report merely as an indication that possibilities other than the one incorporated in the text have been looked at.
Option 1: A National Security Organisation, headed by a Minister for National Security
- I have noted the changes in national and international security over the last decade, including the watershed event of the Sept 11 attacks in terms of transnational threats. I have commented on the need for a much more comprehensive approach to national security. I have taken account of the Parliamentary Select Committee's 1999 Defence Beyond 2000 report's observations in respect of the broader utility of military forces for the spectrum of operations other than war. I have also noted the need for greater co-ordination and communication between a number of departments and agencies with a national security interest in the course of carrying out this review.
- One approach to addressing these needs might be an integrated "super-department" that would draw together the Ministry of Defence, the New Zealand Defence Force, and the national security components of other departments, for example, the Fisheries resource protection and enforcement, the arms control and international security division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Customs and Quarantine Services, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Security Bureau. A Minister for National Security, possibly supported by subordinate Ministers, could head such a "super-department".
- There are a number of difficulties with such a concept. They include:
- determining which current government departments and agencies should be included in a super-department on a permanent basis;
- potentially damaging effects on the strategic capacity of retained departments and agencies by drawing off parts into a super-department (skilled personnel, overhead support requirements, etc);
- creating a very wide span of control for a Minister of National Security, with multiple complex sub-areas requiring high levels of knowledge;
- highly dissimilar organisational cultures would be drawn into the super- department creating potential for debilitating conflict and competition;
and
- significant expense in separating off components from current departments and agencies, and creating a "super-department".
- The purpose of such a "super-department" and Minister would be to ensure that proper co-ordination and management of resources for all aspects of national security. This goal can be achieved, without the necessity of formally "re-grouping" such a wide variety of departments, through increasing the emphasis on a whole of government approach to security vulnerabilities, through high level inter-agency co-ordination, with a National Security Committee and officials committee providing the necessary proactive policy/strategy direction. Interoperability between relevant departments can be forged through consensus and common understanding, without diluting primary responsibilities.
Option 2: A Single Unified Defence Force
- Question marks are routinely raised over the requirement to retain separate military services based on land, maritime, and aerospace operating environments. It is often argued that there would be significant savings, particularly in duplicated overhead and support areas if the Royal New Zealand Navy, the New Zealand Army, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force were merged into one unified military service. Other advantages are put forward, including greater flexibility in using military personnel, fewer senior appointments, removal of vertical hierarchies and cultures.
- The Canadian Forces embarked on this total integration option -unification- in the early 1970s. After three decades, the concept was re-evaluated, and the Canadian Forces returned to maintaining three military services, within a broader joint strategic and operational-level framework.
- The Canadians found that their experiment had demonstrated there had been an insufficient understanding of the crucial dynamics of conducting military operations and managing the defence function. The expected benefits and synergies were not evenly spread across all levels of military operations and defence management activities, (strategic national, strategic military, operational and tactical) and across all types of military activity (combat, combat support and combat service support elements.
- At the tactical level of combat and combat support activities of military operations, performance is fundamentally environmental-specific. Even though such forces are working within a broader joint environment, and receive support from that broader environment, for the soldier, sailor, or aircrew member, the immediate operating environment defines their work, and the dangers and risks they must face. The ethos and culture needed to support self-sacrificing performance in high-risk situations is centred upon the professional skills and knowledge particular to that immediate operating environment.
- Unification at the tactical level of military forces are likely to lead to significant compromises in professional skills and knowledge and performance standards. Over time, the compromises at the tactical level will inevitably have a knock-on effect at the operational and strategic levels, as members progress to those levels with less experience and knowledge in their tactical-level operating environments to contribute at these higher levels of leadership and management.
- The benefits and synergies of jointness are most effectively achieved at the operational and strategic national and strategic military levels. The Canadian experiment, their follow-on re-organisation, and the evolutionary track taken by other relevant international peers shows that these benefits can be gained without amalgamating military services. This evolutionary track involves introducing and embedding joint structures and organisational concepts into strategic and operational levels of a defence organisation. At these levels, significant gains in efficiency, reduced duplication, synergy and interoperability are achievable.
- The NZDF has already started, albeit later than the defence organisations of other strategic partners, to follow this path with the establishment of the Joint Forces Headquarters, and the position of the Joint Forces Commander, New Zealand. In 2002, the NZDF is exploring the feasibility of moving to a Joint Logistics Organisation, and both of these concepts, along with other joint structure concepts that have been built into the review's model outlined at Annex J. These initiatives, together with others suggested in this review, are more likely to achieve the Government's objectives than attempting to unify the three Services.
Option 3: A Single Integrated Civil-Military Defence Organisation with a single Departmental Head
- This structural option would be based upon a military force supported by a civil-military strategic-level organisation, with a single Departmental head, who would carry both command responsibility for the military force and could be accountable also for defence policy and strategy, the long-term strategic capacity of the military force and all aspects of departmental management and operations. Two possibilities exist for a single Departmental head -either a military officer or a civilian public servant. Examples of this arrangement suggest that military officers typically head such Defence organisations -for example, France, Italy, Germany, Singapore.
- This option has two components -a single integrated civil- military defence organisation, and such an organisation being headed by a senior military officer or civilian official. I see many advantages in moVing to an integrated civil-military defence organisation, particularly at the strategic level, and such strategic-level structures are incorporated into the review. In the context of this note, the issue of particular concern is the concept of a single Departmental head.
- Concentrating responsibility and accountability for the overall defence organisation and national military force in a single military officer is not a concept that sits easily with New Zealand's political traditions, or national values or culture. By the same token a civilian lacking personal professional knowledge in evaluating military operational risks, as the sole head of the defence command structure would be unacceptable to military professionals. New Zealand has followed the Anglo-American tradition of seeking pluralism of views in national security decision-making, with the practice of professional advice being provided in a balanced way by both a senior civilian public servant and the most senior military officer. This arrangement recognises that there are risks of incomplete advice being tendered to Government with a sole principal adviser, be that person a military officer or a civilian public servant. The concept of two senior advisers and leader / managers recognises the particular professional skill sets, knowledge and experience that a military officer brings to strategic command, management and advice roles. Equally, it recognises the skill sets, knowledge and experience that a senior public servant qualified in national security affairs, brings to departmental leadership, management and advice roles. Given that some form of duality is best suited to our circumstances, and has been accepted for more than 40 years, there would have to be major advantages to warrant a move to a defence organisation with a single head. Such advantages are not apparent at this time.
Other Precedents
- Other structural options have been considered, and summary points are highlighted below.
New Zealand Fire Service
- The structural arrangements and accountabilities of the New Zealand Fire Service include a civilian Fire Service Commission chaired by a major public figure, other external civilians and the professional Chief Fire Officer. A mixed civilian / professional fire service officer Secretariat supports the Commission. The Chairman of the Commission is responsible for negotiating budgetary matters and for resource management. The Department of Internal Affairs provides a policy linkage between the Government, the Commission and the Fire Service. This approach if applied to the Defence Organisation, would place the operational force at some distance from the Government and it is almost certain both Ministers and Parliament would be uncomfortable with such a weakening of political control.
New Zealand Police
- The structural arrangements and accountabilities of the New Zealand Police are based around a single organisation, single professional officer CE (the Police Commissioner) reporting direct to a Minister, without a civilian department, or CEO There is no legal requirement that the Commissioner has to be a sworn police officer, but there has been only one exception in the last 50 years (even though Governments have considered the possibility more than once in the past decade). If this model were applied to the Defence Organisation, the head would be a military professional. While there would be nothing to stop a military officer as a single head from employing civilians in relevant positions in the defence organisation, there would be a risk that over time, such civilian input and presence could be marginalised. It is also to be questioned whether Ministers or Parliament would be happy with the possible emergence of a doctrine of "military operational independence" to match the Police Commissioner's "constabulary independence".
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- The structural arrangements and accountabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflect the fact that the Ministry operates under two Acts -one for domestic purposes (State Sector Act), and one for overseas (Foreign Service Act). In the Defence situation, this would enable the domestic-based Ministry to be headed by a civilian public servant, and the NZDF, when deployed overseas, to be commanded by the CDF through the Joint Forces Commander NZ. All military staffs would have to be seconded to the Ministry with responsibilities to the Ministry CE and to their military Services. There would be a grey area as to the status of the bulk of the NZDF while it was based in New Zealand and to the relationship between the CDF as its commander and the Ministry CE. This approach contains the same problems outlined in Option 3 above. Furthermore, there is a risk for the Joint Command, and the remainder of the NZDF to be distanced from the domestic Ministry, causing the same problems of separating policy and operations alluded to earlier in the review.
- Such an approach probably works successfully in MFAT because essentially only one profession and one culture is involved. Because of this single entity situation, there is no argument as to who the CE should be, and it makes little difference organisationally whether Foreign Affairs staffs are at home or abroad. The case would be very different in Defence.
Ministry of Health and District Health Boards
- The structural arrangements and accountabilities for the Health function include a Ministry of Health with a single civilian head, responsible for health policy advice, output definition, funding allocation, standards setting and evaluation. The District Health Boards are responsible for applying the resources provided and managing the professional staff to produce health services.
- In Defence terms, this approach would be likely to perpetuate the problems identified by the submissions to this review. It would also involve the risks associated with Option 3, entrench the distance between policy and operations, and sever the alignment between resource management responsibility and accountability. It is not a starter.
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