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Hunn Review: 30 September 2002

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Chapter 5

Government expectations of defence

  1. Government expectations of the defence organizations are set out in three main documents. These are the Government's Defence Policy Framework (June 2000); New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, June 2000); and the 8 May 2001 Government Defence Statement A Modem Sustainable Defence Force. In producing these three documents the Government drew extensively on the August 1999 Parliamentary Select Committee Report Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000: this report continues to inform the Government's broad approach to Defence issues.
  2. The Defence Policy Framework describes New Zealand's strategic setting, defines New Zealand's security interests, and sets out key elements of the Government's approach to defence. The Framework also defines the Government's defence policy objectives, the roles and tasks of the NZDF and the Government's broad priorities for force structure and capability matters. The core requirement is described as being well- equipped, combat trained land forces that are also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air Force.
  3. In the Defence Policy Framework the following elements are stressed as being important to shaping and rebuilding the NZDF:
    • to meet the Government's defence policy objectives the NZDF must be able to offer an adequate range of capabilities that are realistically attainable;
    • priority will be given to investing in force elements that are trained, equipped and maintained at appropriate levels of combat viability and readiness;
    • available resources will be concentrated in areas where they are most needed. This will mean a shift towards a range of military capabilities which are sustainable, safe and effective in combat and in peacekeeping, and structured for maximum operational and political impact;
    • the three armed Services work most effectively when they work together and;
    • the NZDF must be appropriately equipped and trained for both combat and peacekeeping.
  4. The Government believes that with very few exceptions, the NZDF will be involved in joint operations (operations involving more than one Service in land air, and sea operating environments). While the single Services are the basic building blocks of military capability, they must be structured to operate in a joint environment. This places a premium on the ability of the three Services to work closely and cooperatively together. The Government also believes in the need to be able to work collaboratively with like-minded partners, in particular Australia. This requires the NZDF to be able to work safely and effectively with the Australian Defence Force.
  5. In its 1999 Report, the Parliamentary Select Committee described its first priority, in force development terms, as the identification of a useful range of combat and combat support options to allow New Zealand to contribute well equipped, highly trained, sustainable force elements at short notice to credible crisis-management and peace-building tasks. The basis of the Select Committee's approach was the recognition that 'a greater degree of combat-readiness is required for New Zealand to maximize its value to Defence partners as a contributor to international peace and security'. The Select Committee defined the desired Defence Force as having the ability to achieve a self-sufficient, quickly deployable, hard-hitting force, small, but fully equipped and highly trained: this meant a joint force with its combat capability enhanced by combining mutually supporting elements that were frequently training and exercising together.
  6. The stress is on jointness within the NZDF's constitutent parts, and effective interoperability with the forces of our strategic partners. These two objectives reinforce the importance of achieving an outcome from the present review, in organisational terms, that helps the MoD/NZDF and the single Services to work effectively and efficiently together across the full range of defence policy, resource planning and operational tasks.
  7. The broader links between defence, foreign and security policy are spelt out in the MFAT document New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges. Defence capability is described as 'only one element in a broader approach to international security'. A comprehensive approach is called for in promoting New Zealand's external interests. The South Pacific and Australia receive particular attention. South Pacific capabilities are seen as a core requirement for the NZDF, with the ability to perform core military tasks acting as a 'primary point of reference for future NZDF capability development'. Defence links with Australia are seen as important if New Zealand 'wants to maximize the effectiveness of the New Zealand defence effort on a limited resource base'. Particularly in the South Pacific, but further afield as well, interoperability and close operational links with the Australian Defence Force, along with complementary capabilities, 'will remain essential'.
  8. As outlined above, these documents spell out the Government's broad expectations of Defence at a strategic level. In addition, its requirements are operationalised and updated annually in purchase agreements signed between the Minister of Defence, the CDF and the Secretary. These agreements, which set out the immediate priorities for the year, are supplemented from time to time by public statements issued by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. The Minister's statement announcing the present review and associated inquiries (Annex A); and the Terms of Reference for the review itself (Annex B), offer guidance on the Government's expectations in the field of defence. The immediate points are summarized below.
  9. In the Minister of Defence's statement of 10 September 2001, the Government confirmed that it was 'intent on building a highly professional, well equipped modem defence force;... to put the most appropriate structures in place; and, to ensure that any past problems are identified and eliminated'. To this end, it directed that the review 'consider issues such as the effectiveness of the 1990 decision that created the NZDF and MoD; the balance of responsibilities and accountabilities between the Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force, and between CDF and the single Service Chiefs; options for better coordination of policy advice and implementation; the issues raised in the Controller and Auditor General's Report; and, options for greater transparency in capital planning and acquisition processes'.
  10. In the Terms of Reference for this review, the Minister of Defence noted the key outcomes desired by Government:
    • defence policy and operational advice that meets New Zealand's national security requirements, interests and obligations;
    • defence policy advice that is well-informed, meets state sector standards and combines the expertise of military personnel with that of civilian advisers to serve the collective interest of Government;
    • effective and efficient performance direction, planning and management of Defence assets, resources, outputs and outcomes;
    • transparent and robust defence planning and capital acquisition processes, including the setting of capital acquisition priorities, tendering and decision-making and advice to Ministers; and
    • a New Zealand Defence Force and Ministry of Defence that is committed to jointness at inter-agency and a11levels of the Defence Organisation.
  11. Taking these references together, what the Government expects of Defence can be summed up very simply. The Government wants a Defence Force that is well-equipped, well-trained and well-motivated; capable of undertaking a basic range of tasks independently or in combination with others; and, capable of contributing to the attainment of New Zealand's larger foreign policy and security objectives. The Government also wants a defence policy, planning, programming and management structure in Defence that supports New Zealand's security requirements, and provides effective and efficient direction and management of Defence assets, resources, outputs and outcomes.
  12. In more detail, these expectations include the ability to:
    • generate on demand mission-capable, prepared military forces to carry out specified military and national support missions that contribute to New Zealand's national security objectives;
    • provide clear and timely strategic direction on, and launch, sustain and complete military missions with minimum risk;
    • bring together fully capable maritime, air and land force components into coherent, interoperable, joint or combined forces under unified command;
    • provide high quality professional advice to government;
    • provide effective and efficient performance direction, planning, management and accounting for Defence's resources, through transparent and robust planning and management processes;
    • be a good employer of New Zealanders with high standards of personnel management and fairness; and
    • sustain high standards of integrity, prudence, professional capability, and communication.
  13. The defence organisation must not only meet the Government's performance expectations in today's operating environment, but also in that of the future. I have had prepared a note (see Annex E) highlighting some of the key challenges and features that are likely to characterise New Zealand's medium-term defence and security environment and the implications that such an environment has for future defence structures and management future. The main features are:
    • an increasingly complex international security situation typified by complex security emergencies as states undergo crises or transnational groups use violence and. illegal activities to create instability;
    • threats of international conflict including conflicts over resource and environmental issues, the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and the evolution of cyberspace threats;
    • the growing influence of non-state actors, both as protagonists, and as contributors in responding to security crises;
    • the continued trend towards intra-state conflicts, raising issues over the rights of peoples versus the rights of states, the legalities and legitimacy of intervention and the degree to which the international community can organise ad hoc coalitions to respond rapidly and effectively within current international security frameworks;
    • the uneven distribution of economic, information and technology effects of globalisation across the world's regions and the challenges posed to cultural and ethnic diversity;
    • growing risk of potential security threats and breakdowns spreading well beyond the area generating them due to expanding interdependencies between states and regions;
    • a consistent trend amongst comparator defence organisations (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States) towards greater jointness within military structures;
    • extending jointness from the military environment into the broader security and inter-agency environment at the national and international levels, where the principles of improved co-ordination, communication, and interoperability offer the same potential synergies in responding to increasingly complex security emergencies;
    • accelerating technological development, and innovation that is producing shortening cycles of technology advances and reduced life of equipments before they are made redundant or obsolete;
    • research and development cost growth and a change in focus away from manufacturing specialist military equipment to more commercially-oriented products (off-road vehicles rather than tanks) that increases or sustains the high costs of the former;
    • new or substantially reconfigured weapons and military equipment, that will change the risks for personnel and the capabilities needed by future defence forces; and
    • greater risk of commercial technologies being harnessed by illegal transnational groups, including terrorists and terror organisations.
  14. In the current security environment in which our Defence Forces are required to work, the premium is on the ability to respond quickly and effectively. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York, New Zealand forces at work in Afghanistan, East Timor and other sensitive areas around the world are a constant reminder that the only place where defence capability ultimately counts is doing the difficult, dangerous, uncomfortable work of military operations.
  15. Carrying out such operations is, of course, the end result of a great deal of preparation of our armed forces. Equipping them, training them, deploying them into areas of operation, supporting and sustaining them there and getting them home is only the most visible part of a long policy and operational process, and of the structures that support those
    processes.
  16. This review springs from the Government 's concern over accountabilities and responsibilities within Defence. These are first and foremost organizational matters but they can and do impact on both policy and operations. In the findings that follow, and in the discussion and analysis that translates the broad findings into proposals for change, I have been conscious that the Government 's ultimate concern goes well beyond issues of organizational effectiveness and efficiency. It is concerned to ensure the ability of New Zealand's military personnel to get the job done safely, to the success or failure of which a well functioning defence organisation can and does make a critical difference.

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