Reports and Publications

• Hunn Review
  • Contents
  • Executive Summary
  • Chapter 1
  • Chapter 2
  • Chapter 3
  • Chapter 4
  • Chapter 5
  • Chapter 6
  • Chapter 7
  • Chapter 8

Within this section

• Introduction
• Overview
• Roles and Responsibilities of the Minister of Defence

Hunn Review: 30 September 2002

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Chapter 6

Review findings

Introduction

1. It will be apparent from the foregoing chapters that in the course of this review a very wide range of views have been canvassed on a complex set of issues. There is broad agreement on some of these issues and disagreement on others. The findings reached here represent my best effort to build on the areas of agreement that have emerged, while working to accommodate those areas where views differ. Because of the complexity of some of the issues discussed, this review cannot pretend to be the last word. But I believe that the reforms pointed to in this chapter, and discussed in greater detail in following chapters and in the Annexes, have the potential to improve significantly the performance of the New Zealand defence organisation.
2. This section of the report is confined to principal findings. Those responsible for implementing Cabinet decisions flowing from this review will also need to examine the information provided in the submissions and the accompanying papers for more detailed change suggestions for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the defence organisation.

Overview

3. Twelve years after the implementation of the reforms set out in the 1990 Defence Act there is a broad consensus that some parts of the organisational model on which it is based, have worked (such as achieving key benefits in efficient and informed resource management within the Defence Force). At the same time, the benefits that were expected to flow from drawing a clear separation between policy formulation by civilians and the management of operational delivery by the military have not materialised.
4. A number of reasons account for this failure. Low-trust expectations were embedded into structural arrangements that set one organisation to check on the other. Distinctive organisational cultures grew up around, and reinforced, these structural boundaries. Roles and responsibilities were split in inappropriate ways that hamstrung both organisations. Little attention was paid to the difficulties of recruiting and sustaining the strategic capacity of a civilian defence policy organisation in a small country which did not (and arguably still does not) have available a professional, specialist and experienced cadre of civilian defence policy advisers or effective educational schemes for generating them.
5. Structures and role separation were designed to minimise co-operative tendencies, when the reality was (and still is) that both needed to work together for each to achieve effective results. Structures which set out to deepen the differences between civilian and military cultures by placing them in permanent opposition to each other are bound to result in dysfunctionality and, ultimately, poor quality advice.
6. Earlier in this review (qv. Constitutional and Legal Setting Chapter 2), I have made the point that in respect of the relationship between the Government and senior officials, whether military or civilian, there is (and should be) no distinction in terms of the conventions and standards which apply to them. That is not to say that there are not significant differences in traditions, cultures and values that must be recognised as being deep-seated and to a large extent, justifiable, from the standpoint of the professional strengths each must bring to the common task.
7. An essential difference arises from the obvious fact that it is the role of Armed Forces personnel to serve their country in the expectation that at some point in their career they may face death or serious injury. The public servant is similarly dedicated to a concept of service to the public but apart from a few exceptions is not confronted with the constant possibility of personal risk. Like the Police and Fire Service, the uniforms and badges of rank, strict discipline, hierarchical command environment, and the value placed on personal bravery, the emphasis on team work and highly developed skills (and, it must be said in the case of the military, the ultimate acceptance of the need to injure or kill one's enemy) are essential for both the effectiveness and the safety of the group in dangerous situations.
8. It is understandable that the close attachment to one's group is a vital element in successful operations. The problem is that as admirable and necessary as these qualities are on operations, they are not equally effective in the bureaucratic, management and process-driven world of Government and high policy and politics. It is important for the health and good order of our defence system as a whole that military officials should not only be able to adjust to the exigencies of working in Wellington, but also to see it as having an essential purpose and place in their careers.
9. I am told that at present many officers regard a Wellington posting as a sentence rather than an opportunity. Admittedly, not all officers are suited to the Headquarters environment -perhaps they should not be expected to serve there. Those who are, however, (and that should include all of those aspiring to the highest appointments), must be given the chance to learn the skills and processes of performing effectively within the Governmental and broader multi-agency and international political systems. The ability to operate effectively in Wellington should not be regarded as having "sold out", but as essential to making a valuable and critical contribution to the strategic capacity and efficiency of the defence system.
10. At the same time, cultural divides always have two sides. It is clear that a culture has developed among some Defence public servants that sees military experience as irrelevant to high policy work, which applies its own forms of information control and seeks to exclude other contributors from work seen as the preserve of the Ministry. This exclusivity culture was fostered by the objective of creating a separate, hard-nosed civilian organisation. Despite individual attempts at co-operation and consultation, the underlying environment in many areas remains one of suspicion and contention. Inclusive collaboration must be worked at, rather than being assumed to be a natural aspect of work behaviour.
11. These attitudes and values, which have been central to the dysfunctionality noted by the Auditor General, need to be replaced by new cultural values within an integrated defence system. These values emphasise:
    • Respect for Value-Adding. Each professional community -whether from the Public Service or the Defence Force -contributes complementary skills, experience and knowledge that temper the other with the qualities most needed to make each fully effective.
    • Commitment to Individual and Team Learning. New and updated knowledge is a critical resource of the Defence Organisation, and there needs to be value placed on husbanding, disseminating and expanding knowledge;
    • Information Sharing. A negative, information- denial culture needs to be replaced with a positive, energetic knowledge culture that sees information sharing as a normal way of doing business; and
    • Mutual Support. A culture where personnel, because they all share common goals, naturally seek to assist others in their work by sharing relevant ideas, information, and experience; in turn, this encourages those assisted to see what they can do to return the favour.
12. It has also been recognised that over the last 15 years, there have been significant advances in the ways in which strategic direction of military operations is best achieved and in the ways in which military forces work effectively together. To a considerable degree, these advances have not been incorporated in the NZDF. In contrast to the direction taken by relevant overseas military forces, particularly at the strategic and top-level management levels, (where most benefit can be gained) the NZDF's internally fragmented structures have been reinforced rather than made more permeable. Where effective results have been achieved, it has often been in spite of, rather than because of, the multiple structures, duplicated and dissimilar work processes and behaviours.
13. The history of warfare is characterised by rivalry between the different components of Armed Forces, as each new Service or branch has fought to be recognised as an instrument of battle, campaign or even war success -for example, the emergence of air forces, from their naval and ground force parent organisations or within one Service, as between armoured, infantry and special forces. On one level, some rivalry is a catalyst for new ideas, news ways of achieving battlefield success. But on another level, inter-Service rivalry is debilitating and wasteful of people and resources.
14. It is evident that over the last years, the NZDF has experienced an unhealthy episode of intense inter-service rivalry. Through a period of constrained and contracting budgets, high operational demands, and escalating costs of maintaining aging equipments, and acquiring capability upgrades, it would seem that some personnel believed that gains for one Service could only be achieved if another Service lost out.
15. It must be noted here that in other defence establishments studied by this review, the exclusiveness and single-minded focus on Service professionalism that feeds inter-Service rivalry has, to varying degrees, been counter-acted by initiatives supporting jointness. These include efforts to embed joint cultures, structures and careers; institute joint concepts for defence organisations and capabilities; and set up joint education and training schemes to develop shared experiences and knowledge. A significant start on addressing the NZDF's delayed development of joint structures, which will in part also address some of these inter-Service deficiencies, has been made through setting up the Joint Forces Headquarters. However, much still needs to be done, particularly at the strategic level of the Defence Organisation.
16. To address these issues and those of the structural arrangements between the MoD and NZDF, it is the finding of this review that there is a clear need for wide ranging reform designed to facilitate, rather than frustrate, the ability of civilians and military professionals to work with one another in delivering the Government's defence outcomes.
17. The main findings of the review are summarised below against the review's Terms of Reference.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Minister of Defence

18. The Minister of Defence has two broad sets of roles and responsibilities -one of contributing to political direction in respect of national security, and one of political decision-making on defence matters, securing resources to meet defence requirements and of providing political direction to the defence organisations.

Contributions to Political Direction for National Security

19. As outlined in Annex E on the future security environment, New Zealand must protect its interests, as an open, trading-dependent democracy and an international citizen, in an environment that is changing unpredictably. While the globalisation of security has been a gradual process, following the end of the Cold War, the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC were a watershed. Governments and their citizens everywhere have realised the need for co-ordinated multi- national action to address common threats to their security. It is now more readily accepted that technological developments, and globalised knowledge and people movement, could lead to such other transnational challenges as the collapse of computer systems, the use of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and stateless rogues, major failures of environmental management and so on.
20. At the same time, states will continue to maintain their independence in formulating security policies and strategies that they see to be in their national interest. In this context, it is increasingly accepted that many agencies of government contribute to our national security -Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, border controls with the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine Services, New Zealand Police, Civil Defence, Emergency Services, for example. The Government recognised this changing circumstance in its June 2000 Defence Policy Framework statement, when it reflected that the defence function needed to be part of a much more comprehensive approach to New Zealand's security (as did the Select Committee report which preceded it).
21. The defence function is being drawn more regularly into a wider range of responses to different security challenges -for example, more recently the use of Defence's maritime surveillance to detect people smugglers and if required, intercept them at sea; or dealing with improvised chemical and explosive devices. It is also recognised that defence units and personnel can be used pro actively to shape positively New Zealand's broader security environment -for example in helping to improve the professionalism of regional defence forces, peacekeeping or assist in governmental infrastructure projects in the South Pacific.
22. As national security becomes more multi-faceted, it has been recognised that effective responses to security emergencies depend upon co-ordinated strategies for action by a wide range of governmental agencies and departments. As noted by the Select Committee, defence forces can be used in concert with other arms of Government for many other security tasks than protecting New Zealand from remote threats of military invasion.
23. At present, some functions of national security management structure exist in an External Relations and Defence sub-committee of Cabinet and an Officials Defence and External Security Committee (ODESC) in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. These arrangements have been focused on responding to security crises as they occur. They do not provide a forum for setting overall long-term policy and strategy for New Zealand's national security.
24. Other countries examined by the review, (see Annex D) have evolved standing political and bureaucratic structures for directing the co- ordination of departments and agencies that contribute to national security. In these countries, Ministers of Defence, (or their equivalents) have permanent roles to play in contributing to the co-ordination of political direction for national security priorities and long-term response strategies. These responsibilities are usually carried out within a standing political decision-making body supported by groups of professional advisers.

Ministerial Roles and Responsibilities in respect of the Defence Organisation

25. Political responsibility for defence matters lies with the Cabinet as a collective, and the Minister of Defence individually. The Minister of Defence has ministerial responsibility to Cabinet and the Parliament for defence matters, including:
    • formulation and implementation of defence policy, including presenting major defence proposals - such as changes in defence policy and strategy, new operational commitments or major capital investments - to the Cabinet for consideration and decision.
    • representing to Cabinet colleagues the financial requirements of the MoD and the NZDF, to maintain the strategic capacities and military capabilities needed to deliver defence results in both short and long terms.
    • being the Government's principal advocate for defence matters, both within the Cabinet and obtaining support for Cabinet-agreed defence priorities, positions and policies.
    • exercising the power of control over the NZDF, through the Chief of the Defence Force. ¹
    • determining whether the Armed Forces shall be used in industrial disputes or to assist the police in an emergency,
    • setting the maximum number of military personnel in the Armed Forces; and
    • providing political direction to the Secretary and the CDF in respect of results required from their respective agencies, or on any other matter.²
26. These responsibilities make defence a demanding and complex portfolio. They involve significant ownership issues of capital investment decisions, and purchasing issues involving a significant diversity of outputs and results. They require an appreciation of the risks and limitations on military action, and knowledge of the impacts of the broader international security environment on defence and national security policy and strategy choices.
27. In the countries studied, Ministerial decision-making, control and over-sight, is usually carried out by Ministers of Defence who do not hold other portfolios. These Ministers are also often supported by subordinate Ministers with specialised responsibilities for defence equipment acquisition, or defence personnel for example. They are also supported directly by small staffs of experienced and qualified policy and operational advisers.
28. By comparison, the New Zealand arrangements do not support Ministers of Defence to the degree desirable. New Zealand Defence Ministers are usually assigned multiple portfolios, some of which can be as demanding upon their time as Defence. To carry out these roles and responsibilities effectively, the Minister must be supported by high quality advice requiring relationships of high trust with his or her professional advisers. Such trust can only evolve from regular communication and interaction over time: when the defence responsibility is competing with other portfolios, the level of exchange needed may not be possible. Regular professional exchange can give the Minister greater assurance that departmental advisers are committed to carrying out the Government's policies to the best of their ability. In rum, departmental advisers receive assurance that the Minister will respect and encourage advice that covers all the available options, including those that may challenge established preferences.
29. It is not only the nature but also the span of the defence responsibility that requires the Minister's time. In other instances Ministers with multiple portfolios may limit their formal relationships to the single Heads of each of their departments. In the case of defence, however, they have formal relationships with five senior officials and informal contacts with many others, together with a range of ceremonial obligations. The nature of the principal actors is a not inconsiderable factor. Senior military officers are the product of a command system that places emphasis both on disciplined hierarchical structures and on the personal mana of the commander. Strong personalities, who are accustomed to command, themselves need strong, consistent leadership.
30. The Minister's practical exercise of his responsibilities is also affected by the fact that the current defence legislation and the structures which it established, are designed to provide contesting advice from the Secretary and the CDF. Lacking specialist advisory support, the Minister must in effect adjudicate between the two sources of advice -to take the advice of one over the other, or to seek a middle path, rejecting part of the advice of both.
31. The Minister's exercise of his responsibilities depends upon knowledge of the issues, and the key aspects of critical decisions especially for defence policy ownership and purchasing issues. Good advice is critical. However, on the evidence gathered by this review, it would not appear that the Minister has always received comprehensive, high quality advice. As indicated previously, this has been due, in part, to limitations on the Secretary and the Ministry of Defence on the one hand, and the CDF and the NZDF on the other, to access from each other, information required to prepare advice that meets this standard.
32. That said, weaknesses in policy advice to the Minister stem from more than information access problems. These include: poor quality of the information itself; lack of analytical rigor; defence structures which are designed to set civilian and military advisers against each other, and military against military; and, incentive structures which reward single Service rather than joint loyalties. These factors, if not corrected, will continue to impact significantly on the official advice the Minister receives to support his efforts to represent defence proposals effectively and make decisions based on good information and analysis.

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1. For further detail, see Annex F: Legal Analysis of New Zealand's Defence Legislation.
2. Under the Defence Act, the Minister issues CDF with "Terms of Reference". As a CE of a Public Service department, the Secretary negotiates a Performance Agreement with the Minister of Defence.

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