Reports and Publications

• Defence Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP)
  May 2002
  • Introduction
  • The Long-Term Development Plan and Defence Policy
  • Funding
  • Managing the LTDP
  • Projects Approved in Principle by Government
  • Projects Necessary to Avoid the Failure of Policy
  • Projects Necessary to Provide a Well-Equipped Land Force
  • Projects Necessary to Avoid Significant Risks to Policy
  • Projects that have Benefit but are Less Critical to Achieving Policy Objectives

Within this section

• Direct Fire Support Weapon – Area
• Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon
• Land Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)
• Army Tactical Trunk Communications
• Combat Service Support Vehicles
• Army Engineering Equipment
• Army In-Service Weapon Replacement
• Very Low Level Air Defence

Defence Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP)
(11 June 2002)

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Projects Necessary to Provide a Well-Equipped Land Force

Direct Fire Support Weapon – Area

Description

1. The area direct fire support weapon (DFSW-A) project will provide land forces with the ability to engage groups of enemy at a range of up to two kilometres.

Policy Value

2. DFSW-A forms an element of any significant land force contribution to peace enforcement operations in the Asia-Pacific and globally where land forces may face a threat on the ground. The DFSW-A is also important in peacekeeping operations for self-protection and as a deterrent to escalation. The weapon may have some utility in higher-threat situations in the South Pacific.

Capability Gap

3. The New Zealand Army presently lacks this capability. This limits the effectiveness and self-protection capability of land forces, particularly during peace enforcement operations in the Asia-Pacific and globally.

Links to other Capabilities

4. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
   • Light Armoured Vehicle
   • Light Operational Vehicle
   • Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon
   • Land Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance

Timing

5. The optimum entry into service for DFSW-A would be over 2003-04 to coincide with introduction of LAVs into service.

Current Status

6. Government approval to proceed with this project will be sought following finalisation of the requirement.

Costs

7. This project is expected to cost $22 million.

Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon

Description

8. This project proposes to provide protection for our land forces from armoured threats.

Policy Value

9. The Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon (MRAAW) provides land forces with a medium range capability against armoured vehicles and other targets. It is a critical part of any contribution to peace enforcement operations where land forces may face an armoured vehicle threat. The MRAAW also has some utility in peacekeeping operations in the Asia-Pacific and globally for self-protection in the event of an escalation in the threat to ground forces.

Capability Gap

10. New Zealand land forces are currently very vulnerable to threats from tanks, armoured vehicles or other anti-armour weapons. There is a need for a capability to engage these threats at the greatest distance practicable.
11. The Army currently has a short-range anti-armour weapon, however, it is limited in range and lethality. A medium range anti-armour weapon is required to defeat threats at a greater range (2,300 metres) than the current weapon.

Links to other Capabilities

12. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
    • Light Armoured Vehicle
    • Light Operational Vehicle
    • Direct Fire Support Weapon
    • Land Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance

Timing

13. The optimum entry into service for MRAAW would be over 2003-04 to coincide with introduction of LAVs into service.

Current Status

14. Government approval to proceed with this project will be sought following finalisation of the requirement.

Costs

15. This project is expected to cost $10 million - $22 million.

Possible Options

16. The missiles are the major cost driver for this capability. One option would be to phase purchase of the missiles. Another option would be to enter into an agreement with the manufacturer guaranteeing access to missile stocks for operations and training. These options will be explained fully, with costings, when the project is brought forward for Government approval.

Land Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)

Description

17. This project proposes to equip the Army with an improved land intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability.

Policy Value

18. An improved land ISR capability provides land forces with the ability to detect threats at greater distances and with greater certainty. An improved land ISR capability is an important element in operations where land forces face a demanding threat environment and need to know what is happening around them.

Capability Gap

19. Land forces require integral capabilities to identify personnel and vehicles, both static and moving. Current ISR capabilities are limited to foot, vehicle and motorcycle patrols and include night vision and some ground sensors. A significantly larger area, up to 100 by 60 square kilometres, will need to be observed when the LAV is introduced into service.

Links to Other Capabilities

20. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
    • Special Operations capability
    • Light Operational Vehicle
    • Light Armoured Vehicle
    • P-3 mission systems upgrade

Timing

21. The optimal time for entry into service for a land ISR capability would be over 2003-04 to coincide with introduction of LAVs into service.

Current Status

22. Further studies are required to assess joint contributions to land ISR needs, assess the best mix and numbers of sensors and review personnel issues.

Costs

23. This project is expected to cost $25 million - $52 million.

Possible Options

24. Options for providing land ISR capabilities will be identified as part of the further studies required on this capability.

Army Tactical Trunk Communications

Description

25. This project proposes to replace and/or upgrade existing Army short-range communications systems to provide a high bandwidth (high capacity) digital theatre communication system to support command and control requirements of the NZDF Battalion Group operations.

Policy Value

26. The Army Tactical Trunk Communications system will provide an enhanced capability to exercise command and control over an NZDF battalion group, as well as communicate with allied forces. It forms an important component of any battalion group deployment, particularly in peace enforcement operations where good command, control and communications enhance the safety and effectiveness of land forces.

Capability Gap

27. Current Army tactical trunk communications systems are voice oriented, technologically old and are comprised of ad hoc and short-term systems. This limits the Army’s ability to exchange information between deployed Army sub-units. An upgraded system would provide short-range communications that interface between medium/long range communications and the tactical units. This system needs to be military specification equipment.

Links to Other Capabilities

28. The Army tactical trunk communications system will need to be interoperable with other NZDF communications systems, particularly the Joint Command and Control System and the Joint Modernisation Communications.

Timing and Current Status

29. This capability needs to be implemented following the outcome of the JCCS project definition study and on completion of a separate study to determine the work required to achieve an integrated communications infrastructure.

Costs

30. This project is expected to cost up to $10 million.

Combat Service Support Vehicles

Description

31. This project has two parts:
    • Additional combat service support trucks, to provide support to the LAV. LAV support vehicles include fuel, water and bulk-handling equipment (moving containers/pallets over rough terrain).
    • Later in the decade, a replacement for the Unimog general service trucks that provide service, maintenance and sustainability to the motorised battalions, specifically LAV and LOV logistic support.

Policy Value

32. Combat service support vehicles are a critical enabler for LAV motorised operations. They sustain and resupply the LAVs with fuel, personnel and spares and provide maintenance support. Their utility in meeting policy objectives is in peace support operations in the Asia-Pacific and globally.

Capability Gap

33. The introduction of the LAV will create an additional requirement for combat service support trucks beyond the Army’s current capabilities.
34. In addition, the current fleet of Unimog general service trucks (2.5 and 4 tonne) will be 25 years old in 2008. At this age they will be approaching the end of their economic life and will require replacement.

Links to Other Capabilities

35. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
    • Light Armoured Vehicle
    • Light Operational Vehicle
    • Multi-role vessel

Timing

36. The optimum entry into service for the additional combat service support capabilities would be over 2003-04 to coincide with introduction of LAVs into service.
37. The Unimogs will need to be replaced from around 2008/9. Timing will depend on the levels of serviceability of the Unimogs.

Current Status

38. Work is underway to define requirements.

Costs

39. This project is expected to cost $10 million for immediate needs and $84 million from 2008/9 to replace the Unimogs.

Army Engineering Equipment

Description

40. This project proposes to enhance Army engineering equipment to support mobility of the motorised land force. Equipment includes:
    • Fast engineer tractors
    • 20 metre light bridging equipment
    • Lane way track laying equipment (metal carpet rolled in front of a truck)
    • Water purification/storage

Policy Value

41. Additional engineering equipment will enable LAVs and LOVs to cross obstacles that may be encountered. Some engineering equipment may also be necessary to enable landing operations from the multi-role vessel.
42. The policy utility of this equipment will be in supporting the LAVs when deployed on peace support operations in the Asia-Pacific region and globally.

Capability Gap

43. Current engineering capabilities are very limited and not oriented towards motorisation. Additional capabilities are necessary to provide for the increase in the scale of mobility requirements associated with the increased number of vehicles in the motorised battalion. This also includes providing for the crossing of gaps and broken or soft ground, potentially including beach crossing from the MRV.
44. The Army lacks water purification and storage capacity.

Links to Other Capabilities

45. This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
    • Light Armoured Vehicle
    • Light Operational Vehicle
    • Multi-role vessel

Timing

46. The engineering equipment is required in 2003-04 to coincide with introduction of LAVs into service. This equipment could be acquired in tranches to spread the cost over several years.

Current Status

47. Work is underway to define requirements.

Costs

48. This project is expected to cost around $15 million for near term needs.

Army In-Service Weapon Replacement

Description

49. This project proposes to replace the following in-service weapons when they become due for replacement around 2007-2009:
    • 1000 C9 light machine guns
    • Special Forces miscellaneous weapons
    • Carl Gustav light anti-armour weapons

Policy Value

50. The above small arms are integral to the full range of land force operations and have applications in a host of policy roles.

Capability Gap

51. Current weapons are serviceable but will require replacement around 2007 – 2009.

Timing

52. The weapons do not require replacement until 2007-2009.

Current Status

53. No action required at this stage.

Costs

54. This project is expected to cost $8 million.

Very Low Level Air Defence

Description

55. This project proposes to purchase additional equipment to bring the Mistral Air Defence System up to operational standard.

Policy Value

56. An air defence capability is necessary to protect critical land force elements from air threats such as low flying aircraft and armed helicopters.

Capability Gap

57. The current system is not fully operational. The system acquired comprises 23 missiles, 12 firing points, two practice acquisition systems, one firing simulator, test equipment and seven thermal night sights. The equipment required is the auto cueing system.

Timing

58. This project should proceed as soon as possible.

Current Status

59. Work is underway to identify the best option to bring the system up to a fully operational standard.

Costs

60. This project is estimated to cost $8 million.

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