Defence Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP)
(June 2003 Update)
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Projects Necessary to Avoid Significant Risks to Policy
ANZAC Self-Defence Upgrade
Description
- This project proposes to upgrade the ANZAC frigates’ self-defence systems to protect the Naval Combat Force
against increasingly sophisticated anti-ship systems and to address equipment obsolescence.
Policy Value
- The role of the Naval Combat Force is to meet military tasks, particularly in support of the Government’s
regional and global objectives. The ANZACs are critical to the protection of New Zealand/Australian
territorial sovereignty, for participating in FPDA activities, supporting our relationships with regional
partners, and undertaking peace support operations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. These environments
contain significantly higher threats to surface vessels than exist in New Zealand’s immediate area,
including air and sub-surface threats. To continue operating in these environments, and therefore meet the
Government’s policy requirements, the ANZACs will require an upgrade to their defensive systems to meet the
changing threat levels in these areas.
Capability Gap
- By the end of the decade, the increase in air, surface and sub-surface threats, and the sophistication of
these threats, within the Australia/Asia-Pacific region and beyond will mean that the defensive systems
onboard the ANZACs will become increasingly ineffective. Consequently, the operational capability of the
ANZACs will decline to the point where their ability to operate in these environments would carry serious
risks.
- The design of the majority of self-defence equipment on the ANZACs will be approaching 25 years of age by
2010. Support will become increasingly difficult and operating costs will rise. In some cases, such as the
anti-air missile, existing systems are becoming increasingly difficult to support.
Links to other Capabilities
- This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
- NZDF Torpedo Replacement
- Multi-Role Vessel
- Anti-Ship Missiles
- P-3 Mission Systems Upgrade
Timing
- This project needs to be implemented from around the end of this decade.
Current Status
- Preliminary work is underway to scope the project and determine the best way to implement the package of
required work.
Costs
- This project is expected to cost around $300 million.
Possible Options
- It may be possible to share in economies of scale with the Australian project to upgrade ANZAC self-defence
systems. The self-defence capability comprises a number of components and these may be able to be
implemented in a phased manner.
NZDF Torpedo Replacement
Description
- This project proposes to replace the torpedoes for the ANZAC frigates, P-3 Orions and SH-2G Seasprite
helicopters to maintain the ANZAC’s basic self-defence capability against sub-surface threats and the P-3’s
area anti-submarine capability.
Policy Value
- The role of the Naval Combat Force is to meet military tasks, particularly in support of the Government’s
regional and global objectives. The ANZACs are critical to the protection of New Zealand/Australia
territorial sovereignty, for participating in FPDA activities, supporting our relationships with regional
partners, and undertaking peace support operations in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. These environments
contain significantly higher threats to surface vessels than exist in New Zealand’s immediate environs,
including air and sub-surface threats. Torpedoes provide a basic self-defence capability against
sub-surface threats, and enable the ANZACs to be safely deployed in these environments.
- The P-3s require a torpedo replacement to maintain their current capability to fulfil the above policy
roles.
Capability Gap
- The current torpedoes will reach the end of their life around 2007, limiting the ability of the ANZACs to
be deployed to areas beyond the South Pacific where sub-surface threats may be encountered. This would
impact most significantly on the ability of the ANZACs to provide support for peace enforcement operations,
such as during INTERFET. It would also limit the utility of the ANZACs as a contribution to the protection
of New Zealand/Australia territorial sovereignty.
- The absence of a torpedo capability will mean that the P-3 aircraft will be unable to provide area
protection for New Zealand naval vessels against submarine threats.
Links to other Capabilities
- This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
- ANZAC Self-Defence Upgrade
- Multi-Role Vessel
- Anti-Ship Missiles
- P-3 Mission Systems Upgrade
Timing
- The current Mark 46 Mod 2 torpedo will not be supportable beyond about 2007. A replacement will need to be
in service before the current torpedoes become unsupportable.
Current Status
- Work is underway to consider options to replace the current torpedo.
Costs
- This project is expected to cost around $30 million.
C-130/P-3 Self-protection
Description
- This project proposes to equip the C-130 and P-3 with a self-protection capability against likely threats,
primarily man-portable infrared (IR) missiles.
Policy Value
- The C-130 is a critical enabler for many NZDF operations. It provides essential air transport for a number
of roles and tasks, including: supporting counter-terrorist operations; peace support operations;
evacuations of New Zealanders from trouble spots; disaster relief and humanitarian operations; supporting
the civil power; and supporting New Zealand's Antarctic programme.
- The capability provided by the P-3 is critical to meeting many of the roles and tasks required of the NZDF
across the range of the Government’s five defence policy objectives. The P-3 is critical for the
surveillance of New Zealand’s EEZ and the Southern Ocean. It is also critical to meeting our South Pacific
obligations. The P-3 is one of the primary capabilities that contributes to our defence relationships with
Australia and FPDA partners, and is of high utility for peace support operations.
- C-130s and P-3s are expensive assets and moreover carry a significant number of people. It is important
therefore to protect those assets and minimise the risks to people onboard.
Capability Gaps
- The current C-130 self-protection fit was installed in the early 1990s. Since that time there has been a
significant increase in the sophistication and availability of missiles. The current system is no longer
appropriate for today’s threat environment.
- The P-3 currently has no dedicated self-protection equipment. The aircraft’s sensors inherently provide
protection from long-range and/or obvious threats. Man-portable missiles are easy to conceal, however, and
detection may not be possible before the aircraft has closed within range of the weapon. It is therefore
necessary to be able to detect the missile launch and use countermeasure techniques to defeat it.
- In the last 15 years, 90 percent of all aircraft lost in combat have been attributed to infrared (IR)
guided missiles. Specifically, these aircraft have fallen to man-portable missile systems. These
shoulder-launched systems are widespread globally. Lack of a self-protection capability could limit the
use of our C-130s or P-3s in humanitarian or peace support operations globally.
Links to Other Capabilities
- This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
- C-130 Life Extension
- P-3 Mission Systems Upgrade
Timing
- This project should be considered to allow this project to be completed during the upgrade projects for the
C-130 and P-3. This project will, however, be tendered separately. Ideally, a self-protection capability
would be available as the upgraded aircraft return to service.
Current Status
- Work is underway to determine the appropriate self-protection requirement and the Government will be able
to consider options by mid-2004.
Costs
- This project is expected to cost around $30 million.
Anti-ship Missiles
Description
- This project proposes to equip the P-3 aircraft with an anti-ship missile capability.
Policy Value
- Equipping the P-3 aircraft with an anti-ship missile capability would significantly enhance the value of
these aircraft in fulfilling policy roles relating to the territorial sovereignty of New Zealand and
Australia, playing an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, and
participating in the FPDA.
Capability Gap
- Disbanding the Air Combat Force has resulted in the loss of the maritime strike capability. The P-3s
provide targeting information but do not have an anti-ship capability. The inability to take immediate
action against surface threats limits the P-3’s ability to provide force protection for New Zealand naval
vessels, particularly the frigates and, in future, the MRV.
Links to Other Capabilities
- This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
- P-3 Mission Systems Upgrade
- Multi-Role Vessel
- ANZAC frigates
Timing
- The timing of this project is dependent on the completion of the P-3 mission systems upgrade. The
modification required to enable the P-3 to launch anti-ship missiles is relatively straightforward and
could be done during routine maintenance. A minimum number of missiles would need to be purchased, with
the rest obtainable through an access arrangement. Before a missile capability is added, the mission
systems upgrade would be necessary to provide sensors capable of locating and properly identifying targets.
Current Status
- A study will be conducted in due course to determine the appropriate weapons for the P-3.
Costs
- This project is expected to cost $10 million to equip the P-3 with the capability to launch anti-ship
missiles and a further $10 million - $15 million for the missiles.
Joint Communications Modernisation
Description
- This project proposes to modernise the NZDF’s long-range and medium-range communications capability to
ensure that the NZDF maintains a reliable, integrated, world-wide communications infrastructure. This
communications infrastructure will support NZDF deployed forces, ships and aircraft operating outside
short-range radio coverage and enable communications between force elements deployed to different parts
of a theatre of operations.
- The modernisation will support higher data transfer rates and modern communication protocols, with a mix of
military and commercial communications services.
Policy Value
- As communications are critical in almost all roles, the modernisation of the communications infrastructure
is important in the achievement of defence policy objectives in New Zealand’s environs, the South Pacific,
the Asia-Pacific region and, potentially, in contributions to global security and peacekeeping.
Capability Gap
- Current communications systems are single Service oriented, technologically dated, and comprise ad hoc and
short-term systems. Communications between the Joint Force Headquarters and units deployed or operating
beyond short-range radio coverage will not meet requirements, resulting in an inability to exchange
information between NZDF units and allies. Deferral of this project will limit the type and timeliness of
information that can be exchanged and thus will limit the ability of the NZDF to develop a modern,
integrated command control communications and intelligence capability.
Links to other Capabilities
- Long-range and medium-range communication systems form an essential part of the NZDF communications
infrastructure and contribute to all NZDF outputs. This project is dependent on the completion of the JCCS
project definition study and is linked to the Army Tactical Communications System.
Timing
- Modernisation of this capability needs to be started around 2005 to fully realise the benefits of the JCCS
and the enhanced communications systems being introduced with other projects such as the P-3 mission
systems upgrade and the MRV. To provide a fully effective command, control, communications and intelligence
capability, the communications infrastructure must match the capability of the JCCS.
Current Status
- A study is underway to determine the programme of work required to achieve an integrated communications
infrastructure. This study, along with input from the JCCS project definition study, will assist in
developing a strategy to implement this project.
Costs
- This project is expected to cost $20 million - $40 million.
Ohakea Hardstanding Reconstruction
Description
- This project proposes to reconstruct the Ohakea hardstanding and taxiways to keep the airfield fully
operational for military and commercial use.
Policy Value
- The Government has agreed in principle to vacate Whenuapai and consolidate RNZAF operational capability at
Ohakea. Ohakea will be the sole operational airfield for the Air Force supporting the operations of the
maritime surveillance aircraft, air transport aircraft, and helicopters.
Capability Gap
- The hexagonal block construction of the hardstanding area and taxiways is failing due to irregular aircraft
usage far above the original design limits. Eventually, the hardstanding and taxiways will become unusable
and restrict aircraft operation. An upgrade of these areas is essential for Ohakea to continue as an
operational base and to support an increase in air traffic. Restrictions on aircraft operations at Ohakea
impact on the ability of the Air Force to operate.
Links to other Capabilities
- This project has links to the following projects and capabilities:
- Ohakea Runway Reconstruction (now completed)
- Air Force consolidation at Ohakea
- Air transport
- Maritime surveillance
Timing
- Reconstruction work needs to be undertaken around 2010.
Current Status
- Ongoing monitoring of hardstanding and taxiway condition.
Costs
- This project is expected to cost $8 million.
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