Maritime Forces Review
Gap Analysis
Table 4: Extent to which the policy requirements are currently met by the RNZN
| Inshore | Offshore | Southern Ocean |
South Pacific | Regional / Global |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fisheries Protection | Not met | Not met | Limited | Not met | Not required |
| Border Protection | Not met | Not met | Not required | Not met | Not required |
| Conservation Support | Not met | Met | Not required | Not required | Not required |
| Offshore SAR | Limited | Limited | Limited | Not met | Not required |
| Presence | Not met | Not met | Limited | Met | Met |
| Inshore SAR, towage, salvage | Limited | Not required | Not required | Not required | Not required |
| Pollution Control | Limited | Limited | Limited | Limited | Limited |
| Support to the Police | Met | Met | Not required | Not met | Not required |
| MCM and Clearance Diving | Met | Not required | Not required | Not required | Not required |
| NCS | Met | Met | Not required | Met | Met |
| Maritime Counter Terrorism | Not met | Not met | Not required | Not met | Not required |
| Tactical Sealift | Not required | Not required | Not met | Not met | Not met |
| Logistic Support for Land Forces | Not required | Not required | Not required | Limited | Limited |
| Disaster Relief | Met | Met | Not required | Limited | Not required |
| Military Roles | Not required | Not required | Not required | Met | Met |
- Gap analysis has identified where the current fleet does not have the capacity or capability to meet the military and civilian requirements (See Table 4). With the exceptions of sealift and towage, the Navy has the capability to meet all of these requirements, but not the necessary capacity. The Navy can meet some response patrol requirements if a vessel is available, for example, Manawanui's recent arrest of a fishing vessel in Cook Strait. The Navy does not, however, have the capacity to meet programmed requirements, which are the majority of requirements. It should be noted that there is some capacity in other agencies to meet inshore requirements to a limited extent.
- It is clear from Table 4 that there are some requirements that the RNZN has limited or no ability to meet. These gaps can be identified on a geographic basis.
Global/Regional
- In 2005 Canterbury will be decommissioned leaving two surface combatants to fulfil the required combat related roles. With two frigates the RNZN will be unable to sustain a continuous commitment of one ship to operations in the Asia Pacific or globally. A sustained commitment requires the ship on station to be replaced by another with a crew that is fully trained. The routine maintenance requirements and limited training capacity of the ANZAC frigates do not allow sufficient people to be trained so that a deployment can be sustained beyond six months. Other vessels, such as a MRV or an OPV, would be capable of conducting generic operator/maintainer training. Combat training, however, can only be done in combat capable ships. Because of the need for on-going training to sustain the capability, with a naval combat force of only two frigates, one ship will be available for only six months in every twelve month period.
- One of New Zealand's most visible contributions to regional security is participation in FPDA exercises. With the disbanding of the Air Combat Force, New Zealand's participation in FPDA exercises will be reliant on the naval combat force, Endeavour and maritime patrol aircraft. These assets will need to maintain their level of interoperability and current levels of capability to remain relevant. With only two frigates there will be an increased risk that priority tasking will preclude naval combat force participation in these exercises.
South Pacific
- The absence of a tactical sealift capability and limited port facilities in the South Pacific limit the extent to which New Zealand can presently assist with operations such as disaster relief, evacuations of New Zealanders and peacekeeping initiatives. The outlook in Melanesia suggests that over the next thirty years there will be further calls on maritime forces in support of peacekeeping, and that they will need to provide: helicopter support; an across the beach capability; command, control, communications and intelligence gathering functions; storage and resupply facilities; a medical facility; and logistic support for New Zealand troops. The sealift requirement that is not being met also includes the transport of oil spill response equipment to the South Pacific. This could be done by C-130 if an airfield is nearby; however considering the remoteness of such locations, and the need for delivery to the actual location, air response windows are considered to be limited.
- At present, surveillance of Pacific Island countries' EEZs is carried out occasionally when New Zealand ships are visiting or transiting the region, but ships do not currently assist on a regular basis. There is a need for an enhanced presence, which would add to our existing support for Pacific Island countries through Overseas Development Assistance. New Zealand is a member of the Forum Fisheries Agency and has constitutional obligations for the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, which rely on New Zealand support for maritime surveillance and fisheries protection. New Zealand also has responsibilities as a signatory to the Convention on Highly Migratory Species in the Central and Western Pacific.
Southern Ocean
- The Navy does not have the capability to conduct surface patrols in the Southern Ocean below about 65 degrees south. There is a requirement for patrolling in the deep Southern Ocean (below 65 degrees) and in the Ross Sea, to provide both a New Zealand presence and to meet our obligations under the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). An ice-strengthened ship is needed to meet this requirement.
New Zealand EEZ – Inshore and offshore
- The gaps in the New Zealand inshore and offshore zones are in terms of capacity to meet the fisheries, border protection and conservation support roles. The Navy provides some support for these activities at present, such as offshore search and rescue, fisheries response patrols and carriage of people and supplies to offshore DoC bases. These activities are, however, limited by the availability of vessels in the EEZ.
- There is a requirement for a vessel to be available for maritime counter terrorism tasking. The naval combat force is capable of meeting this requirement, however, it will not always be in a position to respond due to other commitments. Additional helicopter-capable vessels operating in the EEZ would mitigate this shortfall.
- Another requirement that is not met is towage of large vessels. Inherent in the design of naval vessels is the ability to tow other vessels. There are, however, size limitations. Specialist vessels, such as tugs or supply vessels capable of operating in the coastal environment are required to provide assistance in emergency situations. They are not being replaced, however, leaving a future national capacity gap and risk of environmental damage from an oil spill in the event of a vessel becoming disabled and not having assistance available.
- Close inshore SAR (0-3 nm) is not covered by the proposed fleet configuration. This service is currently provided by volunteer organisations, however there is concern for the future viability of Coastguard and the need for a national service provider with dedicated funding.
