Reports and Publications

• New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews
  • Contents
  • Key Findings
  • Introduction
  • The Operational Environment
  • Assessment of Land Force Capabilities
  • Discussion of Land Force Capabilities
  • Sealift
  • Appendices

Within this section

• Introduction
• Manoeuvre
• Information Management
• Enforcement
• Physical Management
• Logistics Management
• Capability Requirements for Land Forces Conclusions

New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews
Phase One – Land Forces and Sealift (November 2000)

Assessment of Land Force Capabilities

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“The soldier of the future must be able to do his military job but he must also be able to do more. He is a mediator and a diplomat and must be able to develop empathy for the parties in conflict….”

Rudolf Scharping, German Minister of Defence, November 2000

Introduction

The Government’s defence policy calls for the NZDF to make a meaningful contribution to international security with a core requirement for well-equipped, combat-trained land forces that are also able to act as effective peacekeepers. The political impact made by New Zealand depends on the quality of the NZDF effort. Its principal strength is the international recognition given to the consistently high performance of its military personnel in PSOs over a long period. Building on this strength will ensure strong political impact and support the Government’s international engagement goals.

Land forces, along with other capabilities, have high utility in PSOs. The requirement to deploy land forces to UN or multinational PSOs determines the level of capability required and the basic orientation of the force. The political impact made depends on the degree to which the contribution is useful to the UN and on the land force’s competence to achieve peace support goals. That means the land force must be equipped to participate in the expected range of UN peace operations. These will be broadly of three types: Chapter VI peacekeeping and peacemaking, and Chapter VII peace enforcement operations.

As indicated in the previous sections, the demands of PSOs are wide, ranging from low-level tasks carried out within a stable environment up to enforcement tasks requiring combat skills. A wide range of effects is also to be achieved. A range of capabilities and skills are required to meet the total responsibility assigned to the combined force. The question is, which of those must be provided by a New Zealand land force contribution?

In this section, the breadth of capability required for a battalion group to be self-sufficient within its area of operations is developed. This provides an opportunity to highlight areas in which capability gaps currently exist, or where current capabilities need to be enhanced. First however, it is necessary to be clear about what is meant by “self-sufficiency” and “area of operations”.

Self-Sufficiency

Self-sufficiency refers to the ability of the battalion group to be able to undertake effectively its tactical tasks without undue dependence on the multi-national force itself. National forces committed to a combined operation will be expected to be self-sufficient to:

• conduct their primary task;
• meet immediate logistics needs;
• defend themselves from reasonable and anticipated threats within their assigned operational area; and
• operate continuously for extended periods in concert with allied forces.

Box 6 - The Three Dimensions of an Area of Operations

The Physical Dimension The physical dimension of the area is the easiest construct to deal with. Essentially it describes the movement of physical elements within an area of interest. Surface and air operations or capabilities characterise the physical dimensions of an operational environment. The traditional concepts of air, sea and land environments are all interconnected by the electro-magnetic spectrum. Contemporary military operations in the physical dimension are typically non-linear in nature i.e. they are dispersed and opposing forces may be operating freely in the same area. Superiority in the physical area of operations is achieved by: real-time information systems; responsive command and control systems; inherent tactical mobility across all environments as required; responsive logistical support; and ability to rapidly deliver lethal or non-lethal effects. The Intellectual Dimension The intellectual dimension is characterised by the impact of time on the conduct of operations. Elements of time are usually manifested in the speed and clarity of the decision-making process. While time has always been a fundamental element in military operations, the contemporary area of operations requires an ability to manipulate time, to the advantage of friendly forces while simultaneously disadvantaging the opposing forces. The focus is very much on conducting operations at a tempo that renders the adversary’s actions largely irrelevant. Maintenance of superior rates of activity will result in ‘temporal dislocation’ of the adversary and undermine his ability to conduct operations within the physical dimension of the area of operations. Superior tempo in the intellectual dimension is provided by: responsive command and control systems; real-time information systems; and superior situational awareness and analysis systems. The Psychological Dimension The third dimension of the area of operations refers to the psychological dimension or the mental impact on the conduct of operations. Manipulating adversarial perceptions to achieve a psychological edge in warfighting by exacerbating fear, doubt and chaos can attain mental superiority. The achievement of a psychological edge allows exploitation of the physical and intellectual dimensions to achieve greater effects from a small force. The psychological dimension can also be exploited to garner support from the local populace. This has the benefit of building up our situational awareness as well as helping to undermine domestic support to the adversary. Mental superiority can be achieved by: responsive command and control systems; ability to control the adversarial electro-magnetic and cyber spectrums; the use of non-lethal measures to challenge public support for the adversary; and information operations and electronic warfare.

This is referred to as self-sufficiency for the tactical task. Beyond this, other capabilities of a high value low usage nature or that provide heavier and more concentrated support to deal with unanticipated or unusual tasks and threats, will be pooled for use in support of a number of tactical units. These capabilities will be referred to as operational level capabilities.

Area of Operations

The area of operations refers to the area of immediate responsibility for the battalion group. The physical, intellectual and psychological dimensions can describe this area across the traditional environments of land, sea and air, together with the contemporary elements of space, the communications spectrum and information technology domain (see Box 6). Figure 2 illustrates these dimensions.

Figure 2 - Area of Operations Dimensions

View text equivalent of above image.

The multi-dimensional area of operations is an important concept in illustrating the changing nature of conflict. This operational area goes beyond the traditional aspects of the physical environment by encapsulating the notion of both the intellectual and mental dimensions. In both the latter dimensions, the ability to defeat an adversary through superior information and decision-making ability, whilst also denying the adversary information, is an important element in resolving any hostility. Similarly, the ability to undermine the moral and psychological aspects that may underpin the adversary’s efforts can play an important role in resolving tensions in both the pre-conflict and conflict stages.

The idea that a land force is responsible for a linear zone of interest is thus no longer relevant in the type of modern-day conflicts that prevail. Furthermore, the nature of contemporary PSOs requires the ability to ‘tap into’ and shape the information available to all players within the area of operations. In doing so, one can try to avoid hostility or, if in a hostile situation, quickly resolve the situation either through force or by influence.

In brief, today’s modern area of operations is essentially characterised by the following:

• Information is gained primarily by dedicated systems and technology rather than by ad-hoc intelligence reported from the field.
• Managing security within areas is now more about what is happening within particular times and particular places rather than the blanket occupation and holding of ground.
• There are military tasks in all phases of an operation extending beyond the period of hostility. Mediation and diplomacy are as important as warfighting.
• The ‘enemy’ is likely to be dispersed within the area of operations rather than be an identifiable opposing force.
• Smaller, organisationally flexible forces able to provide targeted effects are best at applying combat power.
• Non-lethal means of persuasion are just as important in the ability to effect operational outcomes as lethal means.

General Characteristics of the NZDF Land Force

Using the scenarios to illustrate how NZDF land forces will be employed within a multi-national force, it is possible to identify some general characteristics of the land forces that would meet government policy requirements. These characteristics include type of contribution, orientation of the force and size of the force.

How Much is Enough?

For New Zealand to make an impact within a multinational force, and to obtain some influence within the PSO, it must commit a force large enough to stand alone as a recognisable national contribution. It should also be able to be given responsibility for an area of operations and set of tasks in its own right. A battalion is the smallest, internationally recognised, independently tasked unit. Anything smaller would be placed under the command of another nation’s battalion. National visibility and influence would, therefore, be lost.

Impact does not, however, depend solely on the size of contribution. For many years New Zealand has contributed small numbers of observers and specialists such as de-mining personnel to a wide range of UN missions. Both New Zealand’s willingness to be involved to the extent it has been, and the professional capability of the personnel involved, have made a considerable impact on the UN. It has enhanced New Zealand’s standing as a reliable and effective contributor.

Chapter VII PSOs require combat capabilities to deal with challenges to UN-imposed conditions for restoration of peace. The UN requires forces employed on Chapter VII operations to have the capability to defend themselves, and any other element for which they might be responsible, and be credible in their resolve to enforce UN requirements.

The military skills developed for combat operations encompass all those needed to carry out similar military tasks in a non-combat environment. Awareness and skills training in political issues and civil/military interaction within the peace support environment supplement these.

PSOs will almost inevitably see New Zealand forces committed to a multinational force. Such operations usually require rapid intervention of forces to stabilise the peace environment. The most useful forces are those that can arrive early and be immediately effective.

Therefore, to fulfil key policy requirements of achieving maximum political impact and being combat capable within peace enforcement operations, the land forces must be of a type, size, capability, and level of competence to be highly valued. They must be readily deployable and quickly effective, and be available with few restrictions on employment. They must be sustainable for the period for which they are required, able to protect themselves, and they should be self-sufficient to carry out their assigned tasks. This is to avoid placing unnecessary demands for support on other nations already providing operational level supporting capabilities to tactical units such as a New Zealand battalion.

Orientation or Type of Force

Heavy and mechanised forces are inappropriate for New Zealand. They are expensive to acquire and maintain, difficult to deploy, and oriented towards high intensity combat. The operations envisaged under the Defence Policy Framework suggest light infantry forces, together with immediate support capabilities, are appropriate. Such a force orientation will match the political and combat demands of peace support, is flexible in terms of the physical environments in which they can be used, is less expensive to develop and maintain than a mechanised force and is easily deployed using other NZDF assets.

Size

As indicated above, the land forces structure should be based on committing and sustaining a battalion group. This requires, as a minimum, a two-battalion structure organised within a brigade framework for training, but a deployable brigade itself is not required. The battalions should consist of:

• Headquarters;
• three infantry companies;
• a reconnaissance company; and
• combat support elements.

Box 7 - Definitions of a Selection of Military Capabilities

Command and control (C2) - The ability of the commander to know, control and co-ordinate what is happening, to plan and decide what to do and to communicate orders to subordinates and receive orders from superiors. It allows the commander to manage resources efficiently. Another commonly used phrase is C4I: command, control, communications, computers and intelligence. These encompass the tools and systems which allow command and control to be exercised. Manoeuvre - Employment of forces through physical movement in combination with fire or fire potential as well as superior decision making to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (ADF) Tactically it is very similar to mobility, but more generally it is an approach to the use of armed forces that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering its morale and physical cohesion – its ability to fight as an effective, co-ordinated whole, rather than by destroying him physically by incremental attrition. (UK) Mobility - A quality of capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission. (ADF) Reconnaissance - A mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (ADF) Logistics - The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. (ADF) Surveillance - The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. (ADF) Intelligence - The product resulting from the collection and processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. (ADF) Combat service support (CSS) - The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. (ADF) Fire support - The delivery of direct or indirect fires in support of friendly activity. Close fire support - The delivery of direct or indirect fire, in close proximity to, and integrated with the fire and movement of, friendly forces. Situational awareness - A clear picture of a given situation, which is the product of successfully executed reconnaissance, intelligence and surveillance combined with an understanding of the local environment and culture, the local and international political dynamics related to an operation, and the state and disposition of friendly forces. Other similar terms are situational understanding and common operating picture. Force protection - Process that aims to conserve the fighting potential of the deployed force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from an adversary, natural and human hazards and fratricide. This is achieved through a combination of a defensive posture, protective armour, troop training, and sufficient firepower to present a credible deterrent. (UK) Information operations (IO) –Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. (DOD) Electronic warfare (EW) - The military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (ADF)

With the addition of logistics, medical, engineers and signals capabilities, these form the battalion group. Artillery may form part of a battalion group for tactical support, but is usually provided at the next level of brigade.

A battalion group composed of all the elements needed to support combat or high activity operations may consist of 1200 personnel. Smaller battalions may, however, be more appropriate for lower intensity operations where smaller numbers or fewer capabilities are required.

The option of deploying company groups into low-level operations exists and may be appropriate in some circumstances.

Level of Interoperability

Any New Zealand land forces contribution must be interoperable with those forces with which it is likely to combine. New Zealand military doctrine must be based on that of the major partners with which it can expect to work. The standards to which it carries out its assigned tasks must meet internationally accepted levels. This does not mean that New Zealand must possess identical equipment, nor that its equipment should have same performance as that of our partners. The effects, however, of employing New Zealand’s capability must achieve the objective set, to the standards of accuracy or completeness needed. New Zealand’s focus for interoperability is Australia, whose doctrine is based on that used by Canada, Great Britain, and the US.

Capability Requirements: What would be expected of the NZDF Land Force?

Given the multi-dimensional area of operations that land forces will need to work in, it is possible to identify five broad operational effects that must be achieved:

• manoeuvre;
• information management;
• enforcement;
• physical management; and
• logistics.

In total these effects describe the capability dimensions of a self-sufficient land-force tactical unit. The levels of capability to achieve the particular effects however, are dependent upon the nature of the physical environment, the type of threat and the multi-national arrangements.

Box 8 - The Concept of Manoeuvre

The concept of manoeuvre requires the battalion group to operate within three concentric circles; these being the information envelope, the protective envelope and the ground occupied by the manoeuvre group (see Figure Three). The information envelope provides the time and space required for the decision cycle to run its course and then allow the manoeuvre group to react. It can vary in size as the length of the decision cycle or the enemy speed of movement vary. The protective envelope represents the direct fire capability of the land force within which enemy targets can be engaged and destroyed. The protective envelope is approximately 2500 metres for the New Zealand battalion group as this represents the range of the direct fire weapons appropriate to the conflict spectrum within which the New Zealand battalion group is likely to operate within. These envelopes move as the centre of mass of the unit (the manoeuvre group) upon which they are centre moves.

Figure Three

View text equivalent of above image.

Capability Requirements to Achieve the Effects

To achieve the effects outlined above, there are a variety of tasks that need to be carried out that shape the capability requirement required of land forces ²⁶. These tasks fall into a standard group and are usually carried out regardless of whether it is a combat or non-combat environment.

Manoeuvre

Manoeuvre refers to the ability to move within and control the three dimensions of the area of operations to gain advantage. This could be conducted within a relatively small but complex ground or more open ground which could be urban areas. In geographic terms this could encompass an area of more than 40kms radius. Road mobility through a variety of terrains and protection from small arms fire and blast from mines are minimum requirements.

Specific manoeuvre tasks that are relevant to the land forces include:

• positioning/repositioning forces;
• conducting movement/deployment;
• providing mobility;
• providing counter-mobility;
• conducting countermine operations; and
• gaining/maintaining control of land areas.

The achievement of manoeuvre effects covers three dimensions – Physical, Intellectual and Psychological.

Physical manoeuvre is conducted principally in support of tasks such as raids, ambushes, patrols, checkpoints, convoy security and humanitarian assistance (such as the protection of some NGOs).

Physical manoeuvre based on land is required throughout different terrain types, such as open, urban, jungle and swampy ground. Given the types of threat and physical environments developed under the scenarios, protected, agile land mobility is required. The proposed acquisition of the Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV) will provide the appropriate level of mobility and protection given the physical, threat and operational environments. Land mobility can also be achieved through the use of Light Operational Vehicles (LOV). The current LOV fleet is well beyond its effective life and needs replacement.

The review has concluded that:

• the purchase of the LAVs will provide mobility and firepower to protect and support the land forces;
• the present LOV ²⁷ is no longer supportable and its immediate replacement is critical to future operations; and
• other combat support vehicles are still operational, and replacement can occur as they reach the end of their economic lives.

Physical manoeuvre by airlift is required to conduct operations by day and night, under a wide range of meterological conditions and with a sufficient payload. Capability requirements developed under each of the three scenarios suggest the critical need to use helicopters to rapidly move a 6-person fully-equipped patrol. Ideally this should be achieved in a single lift by one medium-lift helicopter. Currently, this capability requirement can be met with the use of two utility Iroquois helicopters. Helicopters also need to have limited protection against small-arms fire and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. Offensive capabilities are not required given that New Zealand is not required to conduct air-borne assaults. Rather the focus is to support tactical delivery of equipment to the land forces. There is also a capability requirement for medium-lift of stores and equipment by rotary wing to support deployment.

Currently no medium-lift rotary-wing capability exists within the NZDF

This review has concluded that:

• the present helicopter has limited troop lift and cargo capacity and this is a limitation for some operations. There is no medium-lift capability held within the NZDF. Limitations exist on the ability to lift land force equipment across the shore by helicopter. The Phase II review will determine options.

Intellectual manoeuvre

Intellectual manoeuvre refers to the capacity to have command and control capabilities, such that tempo and decision-making are maintained at a superior rate than the adversary. The ability to command, control and communicate is critical to the effective conduct of the operation. Command and control also extends integration from the tactical unit through to the operational unit and national headquarters. Specific tasks include:

• acquiring and communicating operational level information and maintenance of operational status;
• directing and leading subordinate forces;
• determining actions;
• assessing operational situation;
• commanding subordinate tactical forces;
• co-ordinating information operations within the area of operations;
• co-ordinating and integrating military and NGO effort.

The present command and control system at strategic and tactical levels is quite rudimentary and still heavily paper-based. Interface with the command and control systems of partner nations is becoming more difficult to achieve. Two levels of system are required:

• a Joint Command and Control System ²⁸ that meets the needs of the national headquarters and the Joint Force Headquarters ²⁹; and
• tactical communications systems to support operations in the field.

There are also current capability deficiencies in the local area network and strategic link components of the Command and Control system.

The review has concluded that:

• a definition study should be carried out that defines the requirement for command and control systems to ensure that:
  • a phased approach is taken that allows the progressive adoption of new systems and technology in a prioritised manner, again to reduce risk; and
  • national command requirements, interface with lead nations, and interoperability are managed cost-effectively.

Psychological Manoeuvre

In terms of psychological manoeuvre, there are currently limited capabilities held by the NZDF. Any such skills are limited to rudimentary applications of Civil-Military Affairs and cultural training prior to deployment. There is also very limited language training. Environmental shaping capabilities conducted through information operations and electronic warfare (passive and active) are likely to become increasingly important in the conduct of PSOs as developed in the scenarios. Specific tasks include:

• employing electronic-warfare in the area of operations;
• employing information operations in the area of operations; and
• conduct joint civil-military operations.

The review has concluded that:

• A definition study needs to be conducted to identify the appropriate mix of Information Operations electronic-warfare and civil-military affairs capabilities to be held by the NZDF consistent with operational requirements.

Information Management

Information management in this context refers to the ability to direct, collect, process, distribute and evaluate information for operational advantage. Information management covers two areas:

• close i.e. that area immediately within the protective envelope; and
• shaping i.e. information outside the protective envelope that is likely to influence tactical and operational tasks.

Intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance are inputs into the situational awareness picture that underpin the conduct of manoeuvre. In particular, information is required for force protection, guidance of own force movement, and in support of tactical decision making.

Specific tasks include:

• developing intelligence requirements;
• obtaining and accessing intelligence information;
• collecting and sharing information;
• processing and exploiting collected information;
• producing operational intelligence and preparing intelligence products;
• disseminating and integrating intelligence;
• evaluating intelligence activities in the area of operations; and
• conducting joint combat assessments.

Land forces committed to PSOs are assigned responsibility for larger areas than previously. Situational awareness is, therefore, required over an extensive area. The capability must be available day and night and in poor weather. The present capability is poorly supported by technology. Reconnaissance and surveillance are carried out by troops with night vision equipment. The size of the area and demands of difficult topography mean that technology must be employed to compensate for manpower, to enhance results in poor weather. The increased speed and mobility of the infantry afforded by better vehicles, such as the LAVs, will exacerbate this deficiency.

Sensor technology is a rapidly developing area and there is a wide range of options at different costs. There is potential synergy between the requirements for land operations and capabilities related to other NZDF force elements and indeed, with those required by other government departments.

This review has concluded that:

• a definition study should be carried out to define the requirements and determine how capabilities can best be developed to provide surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, to ensure that:
• synergies elsewhere in the NZDF are identified;
• national, operational, and tactical needs are fully understood so that critical elements are provided; and
• acquisition of appropriate sensors and technology is prioritised and phased to reduce risk and manage investment levels.

Notwithstanding the need for the scoping study to consider operational level and national capability:

• there is a priority requirement to provide a land-based mobile reconnaissance capability in direct tactical support of infantry manoeuvre that introduces some technology to support the manual effort, and ensure its self-sufficiency.

Enforcement

Enforcement refers to the ability to apply military force as required to shape or deal with threats within the area of operations. Enforcement occurs at three levels:

• direct;
• indirect; and
• shaping (may have effects outside the area of operations).

The provision of firepower includes not only the lethal targeting and firing but also the use of non-lethal means. Specific tasks include:

• processing targets; and
• attacking targets within the area of operations through:
  • providing close air support integration;
  • conducting attack on targets using non-lethal means;
  • providing firepower in support of operational manoeuvre; and
  • synchronising operational firepower.

Fire Support

For this capability there are two requirements. The first is for close support weapons that provide self-protection for infantry and supporting forces. The second is for longer range indirect fire weapons that can provide screening, deter approach or deal with an approaching threat.

The three quality dimensions to this capability are:

Accuracy - If weapons are to be employed in a PSO, the rules of engagement stress the importance of accuracy, to reduce the risk of collateral damage.

Range - Self-evidently, the range of own weapons must at least equal that of expected opponents. The range of quite unsophisticated weapons in use in the region is increasing, in particular as it is not fettered by a need for accuracy.

Effect - The weapon employed must create the right effect to ensure success against a range of targets under different conditions and minimise collateral damage. One significant effect is that they should deter others from engaging New Zealand forces: this is the best form of protection. The target may range from opposition light weapons to an armoured vehicle.

The present close support capability has insufficient range to match weapons likely to be used by even unsophisticated renegades or militia. Procurement of replacement weapons had begun, but the following projects are on hold pending completion of this review:

• sights for the 12.7mm Machine Gun direct fire support weapon recently purchased:
• the automatic grenade launcher which requires the same sights for the 12.7mm Machine Gun - thus the two projects are linked; and
• the medium range anti-armour weapon.

This review has concluded that:

• all three weapons are consistent with the direct fire support requirements in the scenarios developed;
• priority should be given to acquiring the automatic grenade launcher and the sights for both weapons to provide the range and all-weather capability required. Until the sights are purchased the machine gun will have limited utility;
• the requirement for the anti armour weapon should be prioritised within the wider land force requirement to be detailed in the NZDF capability blueprint noting that absence of a longer range weapon may limit deployment to areas with no armoured threat;
• the current longer-range indirect fire support weapons have some limitations in accuracy and range but are still presently suitable for use. Long-range fire support is customarily an operational level function and a range of options may be available within the multinational force; and
• a definition study should be carried out to determine the fire support requirement to ensure that:
  • an appropriate balance is struck between capability required to meet essential tactical self-sufficiency requirements and capability which has utility for tasks that may be the responsibility of operational level forces (noting that New Zealand itself is a member of the theatre combined force and may be asked to contribute); and
  • an appropriate mix of weapon types is selected that provides a cost-effective level of capability noting that long range fire support may also be provided by NZDF air and naval assets.

Physical Management

Physical management refers to the ability to control the physical environment for offensive and defensive purposes. Specifically this includes the ability to plan manoeuvre routes, deal with obstacles, and construct defensive works. There are two major groups of tasks in this capability effect – mobility support and force protection.

Mobility Support

The first set of tasks cover a range of engineer capabilities such as the ability to plan and construct safe routes for manoeuvre forces, deal with obstacles, and construct defensive works. Present engineering capabilities are quite basic and an upgrade of some is required. Specific tasks include:

• offensive management/counter-mobility;
• defensive management;
• reconstruction/infrastructure;
• line of communication maintenance; and
• chemical and biological damage control and protection.

The review has concluded that:

• The most urgent upgrade is some engineer equipment to support mobility of the LAV but force development action is required to determine the most appropriate equipment. This need can be dealt with in the prioritisation exercise in Phase Two.

Force Protection

The second set of tasks required is associated with the protection of the force. Specific tasks within this group include:

• providing protection for operational forces, means and non-combatants:
  • preparing operationally significant defences;
  • removing operationally significant hazards;
  • protecting use of electro-magnetic spectrum in the area of operations;
  • protecting use of acoustic spectrum in the area of operations;
  • conducting evacuation of non-combatants from the area of operations;
  • providing for combat identification;
  • establishing NBC protection in the area of operations;
  • conducting joint search and rescue operations;
  • co-ordinating and conducting personnel recovery;
  • developing and executing actions to control pollution and other hazards in the area of operations;
  • co-ordinating/providing counterdeception operations;
  • conducting countermine activities;
  • employing operational security in the area of operations;
• protecting systems and capabilities in the area of operations;
• providing security and means and forces:
  • providing counter reconnaissance in the area of operations;
  • protecting and securing flanks, rear areas and communication zone in the area of operations;
  • protecting operational critical installations, facilities and systems; and
  • protecting sea, air and land lines of communication in the area of operations.

The review has concluded that:

• Routine replacement of equipment with some supplementation to meet the increased support demand of motorised infantry will be required. Such projects are generally low cost and will be managed within the minor and major elements of the reprioritised capital plan.

Logistics Management

Logistics management refers to the ability to manage the human and equipment support elements in pursuit of operational objectives. It also encompasses logistics support to distribute supplies and maintain the force, including medical support. Tasks include:

• distributing supplies and providing transport services;
• co-ordinating supply of arms, munitions and equipment in the area of operations;
• synchronising supply of fuel in the area of operations;
• providing for maintenance of equipment in the area of operations;
• coordinating support of forces in the area of operations;
• managing logistical support in the area of operations;
• building and maintaining sustainment bases in the area of operations; and
• performing civil military engineering support.

The review has concluded that:

• the logistics requirements need to be analysed to:
  • assess operational requirements following the introduction of the LAVs/LOVs; and
  • ensure compatibility with strategic lift requirements.

A Benchmark Capability Structure

From the above, a set of benchmark capability requirements can be established for the land forces. These are the need to have:

• a deployable land forces unit based on a light infantry battalion group;
• sufficient reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence to support tactical operations within the area of operations;
• sufficient fire support capability to support tactical operations within the area of operations;
• logistics and engineer support to deploy, manoeuvre and sustain the land force tactical unit;
• equipment, and training to ensure capability to carry out tactical combat operations within the area of operations; and
• a sufficient command, control, communications, computing and intelligence system to integrate the tactical and operational elements.

Principles that need to be considered in establishing these capability requirements, for the land forces include the need to have:

• sufficiently equipped and trained for combat as well as peacekeeping;
• self-sufficiency for assigned tactical tasks and responsibilities;
• sustainability for extended periods, based on a rotation battalion and Regular Forces (RF) and Territorial Forces (TF) numbers and structure that supports expansion;
• deployability;
• interoperability with key defence partners, particularly Australia;
• force readiness at a level that supports rapid deployment;
• up to date technology in order to reach operational effectiveness; and
• fiscal sustainability.

Capability Requirements For Land Forces Conclusions

The review has considered a range of security events to which the Government could be required to commit land forces. Three peace support scenarios ranging from low Chapter VI level peacemaking to Chapter VII combat operations have been selected. The military tasks within each scenario were assessed to determine the minimum level of capability to reach the standards and effects required.

In general, the analysis confirms that the structure and orientation of the land forces as light infantry with protected mobility is appropriate to the role New Zealand can be expected to play. It is thus consistent with the DPF. A battalion-sized contribution based on the benchmark specifications will meet both the demands of tasks likely to be assigned to New Zealand and the need to demonstrate a distinct national presence.

The type of capabilities held broadly match those expected to be inherent to a light infantry battalion assigned responsibility for an area of operations. The quality of some capabilities currently held, however, is below the standards required to assure self-protection in all circumstances, to be efficient in combat or enforcement tasks, and to meet increasing standards of accuracy demanded by restrictive rules of engagement. Other capabilities have fallen below the technology standards required to support command and control and to provide adequate situational awareness over the greater area canvassed by the infantry and their vehicles.

A small number of projects associated with the capability requirements are urgent and can be progressed quickly. Others will require better definition of the equipment and technology options and expected cost before they can be prioritised into the capability blueprint.

Beyond this minimum standard, there are options to vary the quality and utility of the land forces. These will be discussed in the next section.

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26. For definitions of a selection of military capabilities see Box 7.
27. Note: A LOV-type vehicle is required for special operations. Although this requirement relates to the separate Special Forces Review, it is likely that procurement will be linked to the LOV purchase.
28. A Joint Command and Control System is an information system which enables commanders at the strategic operational and tactical levels to conduct effective exchange of information within a component, joint, combined or coalition force in order to command and control operations. The system typically includes databases, overviews of the operational picture, collaborative planning tools and may include simulation software.
29. A Joint Force Headquarters for the NZDF is to be established on 1st July 2001 and will be responsible for all operations.

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