New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews
Phase One – Land Forces and
Sealift (November 2000)
Discussion of Land Force Capability Options
Introduction
The previous section has discussed the capability requirements of the land forces, and has described deficiencies that need to be addressed. This section discusses potential options for varying depth or performance of the land forces.
There are four variables:
- size and sustainability of the land force (including the capacity to resource concurrent operations);
- readiness;
- ability to contribute above the tactical self-sufficiency level; and
- logistic support capability.
Size
The previous chapter has identified that the minimum nationally identifiable land forces needs to be a deployable battalion group. To provide some concurrent operation capacity, or to sustain it at strength for one rotation, a minimum of two battalions is required. If longer sustainment is required, three battalions are needed. The two- or three-battalion structure will be organised within a brigade framework for training but a deployable brigade itself is not required. Each battalion should consist of a headquarters, three infantry companies, a reconnaissance company, and combat support elements. With the addition of logistics, medical, engineers and signals capabilities, these form battalion groups. Artillery may form part of a battalion group, for tactical support, but is usually provided at the next level of brigade.
A battalion group composed of all the elements needed to support combat or high activity operations may consist of 1200 personnel. Smaller battalions, however, may be more appropriate for lower intensity operations where smaller numbers or fewer capabilities are required.
The option of deploying company groups into low-level operations exists. It may be appropriate in some circumstances.
In light of the above it may be concluded that the minimum requirement is for two infantry battalions and sufficient support to form battalion groups.
Sustainability
Sustainment of deployed forces for extended periods is a problem for countries with small armed forces. This is particularly so when contributing to PSOs. These invariably take longer than expected, achievable exit strategies are usually not in place, and disengagement is seldom possible within the “reasonable” period for which forces have been structured to deploy. Although an actual crisis may be resolved relatively quickly (i.e. a cease-fire arranged), often there is a considerable period before the situation is stable enough to reduce or withdraw forces. Nevertheless, contributing nations can declare time limits on their contributions, and withdraw forces at the end of their stipulated period.
For New Zealand, such a strategy is problematic for operations close to home. There is an expectation that Australia and New Zealand will play a leading role in PSOs and will remain committed through the critical period. As an example, East Timor may require four rotations of New Zealand's battalion-sized contribution. This is to be generated from a force structured to provide one rotation in accordance with the current output statement. Clearly the output requirement no longer reflects the reality of some PSOs in which New Zealand is expected to have a strong role.
It would seem logical, therefore, to plan and structure the land forces to allow sustainment for a longer period. Given that it is customary to allow a two-year gap between deployments for individuals (to minimise domestic pressures on families), an output requirement of two years (or three rotations) could be considered. Sufficient regular and non-regular personnel would underpin this with each doing one deployment. Extension beyond that could be achievable by reusing people previously deployed, together with some supplementary recruiting to cover attrition. A sustainment period of two years effectively gives indefinite coverage.
A two-battalion structure will not support sustainment of a full-strength battalion group for two years unless individual rotation lengths are extended or New Zealand personnel are augmented with other nations' troops. Otherwise a third battalion must be created.
Sustainment of Full-Strength Battalion Groups
A battalion at full strength is more likely to be used for higher intensity or peace enforcement operations. It is possible that commitment to a high intensity phase of the operation will be limited, and the force can be downsized as operations reduce in tempo as the situation becomes resolved, but this cannot be assured. Increasing force structure to provide for a third full strength battalion would require a very substantial injection of capital and operating funding to equip, house, train and pay the additional personnel. An alternative is to maintain the permanent establishment of the present two-battalion level and accept either that New Zealand will commit for a twelve-month period only or extend personnel tours when withdrawal is absolutely not possible.
Another alternative is to use measures such as short term contract recruiting and enhanced Territorial Force availability strategies to generate the equivalent of three battalion manning for a defined period.
A further strategy to continue commitment to a high intensity operation beyond the period that land forces can be sustained at full strength is to commit another contribution or combination of capabilities of equivalent value. This will only be possible when the intensity or tempo of the operation permits this.
Sustainment of Smaller Units
Deployment of smaller battalions will be typical of regional PSOs conducted at a lower intensity. Inclusion of other nations' military personnel is a useful strategy to reduce the load on New Zealand's small force. This is the case in East Timor, where Fijian, Canadian and Nepalese companies and an Irish platoon have been variously attached to the New Zealand battalion. There is international benefit in providing a vehicle for smaller contributions to become involved in operations. There may not, however, be any volunteer “supplements” to the New Zealand contribution in the more unattractive or drawn-out operations.
Use of smaller battalions of around 600 New Zealand personnel allows more rotations to be constructed, and increases sustainability. Four rotations are, therefore, being planned for East Timor. Sustainment beyond this, however, will require recruiting additional personnel to augment the regular and territorial forces for a period. Temporary augmentation of forces by recruiting personnel for fixed short terms is a feasible strategy.
A range of measures from using other national contributions to ad hoc cross-training of non-infantry personnel have been used, but the limit has now been reached where further sustainment will require temporary force augmentation.
Personnel
There is one critical issue underlying sustainment of the force. Personnel numbers have been held below establishment in all three services for budgetary purposes. While this has not unduly affected routine training and force preparation, or initial deployments, it directly affects sustainment. Sustainment is dependent on the required depth of personnel being available. If the NZDF is to maintain the capability to commit and sustain its forces for the longer periods now expected, personnel budgets must be funded to the required levels.
Availability of non-regular force personnel for long-term operations will be problematic. While the East Timor deployment has been well supported by the Territorial Force, many have been unable to retain their civilian jobs. Job protection measures may be necessary to protect the interests of both employer and the Territorial Force employee.
Determining the strength at which the land forces should be held is an issue. Based on its own assessment, the NZDF will require another 1000 troops to be able to sustain a full strength battalion group at its maximum expected rate of effort, and establish the reconnaissance companies required in the battalions. In setting this figure, the NZDF does not advocate the raising of a third battalion with its attendant heavy overheads. An increase of half of this number was agreed following the last Defence Assessment (although for a different reason) while the other half represents the level of personnel shortfall common across the NZDF where strength has been deliberately held down as a fiscal management strategy.
While the current force structure can produce only one rotation of a full strength battalion group, it can provide smaller battalions where appropriate. This flexibility permits sustainment for longer periods.
An increase of 1000 Regular Force positions carries with it a significant increase in operating costs over the present level. Deployments to date have not required a battalion to be sustained at its highest strength. This study has not been able to measure the effect of lower manning on sustainability. It should be noted, however, that holding any NZDF unit at lower strength would not necessarily affect initial deployability. It will affect sustainment if high levels of effort are required. The output requirement should be reviewed to either set delivery or sustainment to alternate levels obtained from the two-battalion structure (augmented as needed) or to clearly articulate the need to sustain the maximum rate of effort.
Concurrency
Potential demand for peace support contributions in the region is high. New Zealand is unlikely to be able to avoid concurrent operations (for example New Zealand may be called upon to respond to a natural disaster while being heavily committed to a peace support operation). The commitment of a battalion to East Timor is significant and long running. With a battalion deployed, there is limited capacity to handle concurrent operations. A concurrent company level deployment would be possible within the limitations of the logistics and support resources ability to manage multiple consumers.
In general, a two-battalion structure does not support concurrent deployment of two battalions or one battalion and one company at a high rate of effort with any significant sustainment capability for low-level military commitment. In an emergency, however, New Zealand could put out two smaller battalions at once. Nevertheless, only one could be sustained for a single rotation, but there would be some very serious quality limitations.
At a company level of commitment, and with up to two companies deployed, there is long term sustainability. With three separate companies deployed, sustainability for three rotations can be managed depending on the ability to manage manpower in critical experience and skill levels. Beyond that, the need to repeat rotations for a significant number of personnel creates problems of access to sufficient Territorial Force and retention of skilled Regular Force personnel.
Government has a choice about committing to concurrent operations, to use other non-combat land force contributions, or to use other NZDF force elements as alternative contributions. Permanent structuring for a larger combat land force to cover a larger number of concurrent operations will significantly drive up costs as indicated earlier in the discussion on sustainment.
Peace Support Operations in the Pacific region and globally can be expected to continue at the present level or grow. Situations will take longer to resolve, and commitments are likely to be for extended periods. There will be demand for concurrent deployments from time to time. Government can manage the level of effort required by careful selection of the contingencies to which it commits, and, to a lesser extent, the duration of its commitment.
Some flexibility exists in the current two-battalion land force structure to generate and sustain a credible effort. Better performance would be possible if the present force was at full strength. Augmentation along the lines discussed in the earlier sustainment section will provide further capability. However, a permanent increase to a third permanent battalion would appear to have high costs which would exceed the benefit to be gained.
Readiness and Deployability
New Zealand holds its land forces at a graduated level of readiness: it can generate a battalion group by providing an initial company group rapidly, with the balance of the battalion group following later subject to achieving the required training levels and the speed of transportation into the area of operations.
In general, however, the New Zealand battalion is at longer readiness than some rapid reaction forces raised by larger countries. This is not a major issue given that it has to be integrated into a brigade provided by another nation or nations, and it will usually be expected to arrive slightly after the lead units of that brigade.
Early response by contributing countries to peace support contingencies is highly valued. Humanitarian crises must be resolved quickly. The UN has indicated that it places high priority in securing forces that can be committed rapidly to contain situations. It has stated that forces are often needed on the ground within 30 days to provide effective stabilisation. Although New Zealand's response capability lies outside this timeframe, it is known that it is nevertheless of significant value to the UN.
Readiness is essentially a cost issue. Shortening military response time requires maintenance of a higher trained state, continuous pre-deployment training, and possibly quarantining and pre-positioning of equipment (which is then unavailable for training activities). New Zealand could choose to place the deployable battalion at higher readiness, but this would incur additional equipment costs, and higher operating costs to meet the increased training and preparation overheads.
Readiness can also be increased progressively if sufficient warning time prior to commitment to deploy is given. This requires an intelligence system that monitors and detects changes in strategic circumstance, and allows Government to give early warning of a potential decision to commit forces.
New Zealand is regarded as a responsive, reliable and consistent contributor to UN operations. It has demonstrated that it can quickly make political decisions in response to the demands of UN operations, which enhances its readiness. While there may be some political benefit in holding forces at a higher level of readiness, there are other investment priorities in modernisation and development of capability, or sustainment of forces, that would have a more direct benefit on the effectiveness of the force.
Self-Sufficiency
New Zealand could choose to structure its land forces to provide tactical self-sufficiency, or place more responsibility on the UN or other combined force commander to allocate support to meet any shortfall in capability. However, the latter option has implications for the operational and political impact of a New Zealand contribution. It is the ability of a New Zealand force to be ready for action soon after arriving in a crisis area that makes it effective. Reducing the tactical self-sufficiency of a New Zealand land force contribution would thus reduce its operational and, as a result, its political effectiveness. Alternatively, New Zealand could choose to commit only to those operations where the operational demand matches reduced capabilities held. Such measures will, however, reduce the value of New Zealand's contribution, and add to any multinational group's burden. Such a move would also set capability at a lower level of performance and utility than at present and directly impact on effectiveness to the multinational force.
New Zealand could also choose to contribute a share of combat and support capability at the operational level. Such a contribution could be a land force capability or it could be comprised of other NZDF assets. The marginal value in contributing another land force capability may be lower in a contingency involving a number of larger countries as it is likely that good theatre level support will be available. For a contingency in which Australia and New Zealand are the main contributors of combat capability, however, there is likely to be both a greater expectation of burden sharing, and a high political gain in doing so.
This operational level capability pool must be furnished by contributions from the multinational force members. Where major countries are involved, such as the US or NATO members, it may be expected that they will furnish a significant majority of those capabilities. For lower level regional operations, however, where Australia and New Zealand are the principal providers of the force, it is unlikely that Australia will be able and willing to furnish all operational level assets. Neither is it likely to be willing to take sole responsibility for protection and support of the combined force.
Therefore, a New Zealand contribution must be self-sufficient for its tactical tasks. This is expected of all tactical units employed under the doctrinal principles shared with New Zealand's partners. Dependency on others would create non-standard demands on them that they will not usually be equipped to provide, and would create some “drag” on other coalition members.
New Zealand could contribute to the operational pool of supporting capabilities. The demands on New Zealand to contribute to this level of capability will be higher where New Zealand has a major role in the combined operation, particularly if this is in the immediate region and it is partnered with Australia.
Logistic Support Capabilities
Several support capabilities, such as medics, engineers, and logistics are sized to support the military task and force structure at its maximum rate of effort. At lower levels of military effort, spare capacity may be used for civil tasks that are characteristic of such operations. Alternatively, these capabilities may be committed to humanitarian and PSOs in their own right where it has been decided combat forces are not required, or the Government does not wish to participate with a combat option. Thus Government has some capacity inherent in the present force structure to provide support to communities.
Notwithstanding that, Government could increase the size of these capabilities to provide a greater capacity for civil tasks in conjunction with, or separate from, military operations.
While military forces can be used on these tasks, there are many international NGOs and other government agencies that are specifically set up to contribute to reconstruction, and some of those have the capability to operate under rudimentary conditions. This suggests that military capability is best used in circumstances where the supporting infrastructure is too disrupted to support civil agencies, or civil support is not available (such as in the stages of peace restoration where the threat level is still high).
Therefore, a decision to hold additional military capability with its higher overheads, specifically for this purpose, should take into account whether it is simply competing with traditional civil sources of support, or filling a gap in supply against demand. The utility of military forces in this field lies in its inherent flexibility and self-reliance. This suggests that it should only be used where other agencies cannot contribute, or political advantage can be obtained.
In principle, however, the overhead of holding military capability solely for civil tasks is high: commercial enterprises and NGOs are far more efficient in the provision of this capability.
Conclusions of Land Force Capability Options
The most significant issue relating to options is the size of the land forces. Options exist to increase strength to provide adequate sustainment together with capacity for concurrent operations. Permanent increase to provide a third battalion would be expensive and is not favoured. Improved sustainment and concurrency capability can be obtained through measures such as improved Territorial Force availability, short term recruiting and use of other national forces where applicable. Sustainment and concurrency will be below the level required if the land forces remain at their present strength.
Readiness could be increased, but this is a lower priority. The cost of doing so would have to be assessed against the marginal benefit.
Non-combat capabilities could be enlarged, but there is no clear requirement for investing further in these capabilities, nor can the marginal benefit be easily assessed. The priorities are to rectify capability deficiencies to meet the standards required to commit the land forces safely to operations, and to provide sufficient personnel to sustain the force.
