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New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews
Phase One – Land Forces and Sealift (November 2000)

Introduction

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Background

In June this year The Government’s Defence Policy Framework (DPF) was released. It outlined the key principles of the Government’s defence policy and has been guided by and builds upon the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. It also took account of the External Assessments Bureau report Strategic Assessment 2000, which identified the key features, and trends of New Zealand’s security environment, as well as those at the global level which are of particular relevance to New Zealand. (see Box 1). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s New Zealand’s Foreign and Security Policy Challenges accompanied the DPF. These four documents provide the top-level strategic policy guidance for the capability review process.

The key elements of the Government’s defence policy are:

The Government has established five key objectives for New Zealand’s defence policy. These are:

The DPF sets out the Government’s broad strategic outcomes, its defence policy objectives and the roles and tasks envisaged for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). To meet these objectives the NZDF must be able to offer an adequate range of capabilities that are sustainable, safe and effective in combat and in peacekeeping and structured for maximum operational and political impact. The core requirement is for well-equipped, combat-trained land forces that are also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air Force.

The Capability Reviews Process

To ensure there is a sensible prioritisation of investments that will give the NZDF the depth it requires, the Government directed that NZDF capabilities be reviewed to provide a basis for a new capability blueprint and a re-prioritised long-term capital equipment plan. This plan will then form the basis of a new programme of capital acquisition. Consistent with the DPF, the aim of the review process is:

To provide advice to the Government on the range of military capabilities required to meet its defence policy objectives that are sustainable, safe and effective in combat and peacekeeping and structured for maximum operational and political impact.

Military capability is the ability to undertake assigned roles and tasks to an acceptable level of competence. It encompasses people, their education and training, the equipment they use, their deployment to the area of operations, and doctrine and organisational structure that underpins their activities. Capability is generally employed in a joint and combined environment, and is dependent on the synergy obtained from co-ordinating and integrating the activities and characteristics of different armed services of a number of nations for its effectiveness.

The report on land force capability has focused almost exclusively on the capabilities it needs to conduct its immediate assigned tasks. Thus it presents a picture of only one part of a combined operation. It does not show the interrelationships that exist firstly, among the three New Zealand services and secondly, among the national participants in the joint and combined environment. These interrelationships consist of dependencies in raising, training, equipping, deploying, protecting, supporting, and recovering the land force.

The analysis 4, in concentrating on what the land force does once it is established in its area of operations, takes a land-centric approach that largely ignores other linked capabilities. For example, deployment of the land force by aircraft and sealift ship is assumed, but analysis of options for contributing to the escort and protection of the ship, aircraft, and soldiers into and within the area of operations are not evaluated.

Box 2 - The Capability Review Process

Strategic and Operational Environment

Image: Downward arrow.

Strategic Environment. This is based on the External Assessments Bureau report Strategic Assessment 2000. The key features and trends of New Zealand’s security environment were identified, both immediate and regional, as well as those at the global level which are of particular relevance to New Zealand from a security and defence perspective. Other assessments have also been prepared to inform the strategic environment analysis.

Operational Environment. The constraints, laws, and assumptions that govern security responses.

Security Outcomes

Image: Downward arrow. 		Security Outcomes are broad statements of the desired states of security that the Government seeks to achieve (see DPF). They provide the start-point for all future and current security and defence force planning, programming, budgeting, service delivery and performance measurement process.

Comprehensive Security Approach

Image: Downward arrow. 		Defence is one aspect of New Zealand's foreign and security policy (see DPF). New Zealand can best contribute to regional security and global peace by promoting a comprehensive security approach which utilises policies and resources based on a “whole of government” approach.

Defence Policy Objectives

Image: Downward arrow. 		The defence policy objectives contribute to achieving the security outcomes and are the basis for the roles and tasks of the NZDF (see DPF).

Security Circumstances

Image: Downward arrow. 		Security Circumstances summarise the current state of New Zealand's security outcomes. These highlight circumstances that presently affect progress towards achieving New Zealand's security outcomes.

Security Events

Image: Downward arrow. 		Security Events are descriptions of representative and illustrative security events, for which there is a high likelihood that a New Zealand Government would expect to make a military response should they occur.

Security Scenarios

Image: Downward arrow. 		Security Scenarios describe the way an event might unfold, so that a set of appropriate responses and capabilities can be developed for evaluation. Both the possible military and non-military responses are shown, in keeping with the Government’s comprehensive approach to security.
Capability Requirements Capability Requirements are statements of the capability specifications and levels required in order to successfully meet the completion or contribution to a mission. Defence capability requirements do not prescribe particular military equipment but rather set the programme standard required for all components of a capability (equipment, personnel, training, logistic support, doctrine, command and control) to be effective.

Similarly, the report does not indicate how other capabilities are used to bring the land force to a preparedness state from which it can be committed to joint and combined operations. Nor does it illustrate the way use of the various capabilities of the NZDF in joint and combined exercises and training instils a joint/combined culture and awareness.

The analysis does not explore how the land force in isolation contributes to other international engagement goals, as the national objectives are largely based on how the NZDF as a whole will contribute. For example, engagement in FPDA activities is primarily an air defence activity involving aircraft and ships. No land force participation is envisaged in the medium-term. These are the tasks of the second phase of the study.

The reviews are being done in phases. The first phase outlined in this report identifies options for conventional land forces 5 and associated sealift. The second phase will provide advice on the complete range of capability options that satisfy the Government’s defence policy objectives. The Phase Two report will incorporate whatever decisions the Government takes as a result of the Phase One report, as well as the outcome of the review of maritime patrol that is being led by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The Process for Assessing the Requirements for Land Forces and Associated Sealift

In reaching conclusions about the Government’s requirements for land forces and associated sealift, a key issue is to determine the type of security events for which these capabilities are likely to be required. These events are derived from the Government’s security outcomes and defence policy objectives outlined in the DPF. They are also based on an assessment of New Zealand's strategic environment and the key trends in the wider international security environment. The process for translating government policy into the capability requirements for the land forces and associated sealift is represented schematically in Box 2.

Assessments of the security circumstances for each of the Government’s five security outcomes are used to identify the plausible security events for which the Government may require an NZDF response (these are outlined in the security requirements described later).

Selected security events have been used to develop security scenarios. These describe how a particular security event may unfold. They are used to identify possible government responses and to assess the capabilities the NZDF would require in order to provide an appropriate response. Both the possible military and non-military response options are shown, in keeping with the Government’s comprehensive approach to security.

Scenarios do not reflect any particular ‘real-world’ events, nor do they predict where, when and how events may develop in the future. They are plausible, however, insofar as they are representative of the dynamics that occur in such situations and are informed by ‘real-world’ experiences and events, especially in terms of the nature and causes of conflict. Similarly, the information contained in the scenarios does not aim to cover the complete picture in detail. Rather, it seeks to provide sufficient information to enable analysis of the tasks, conditions and effects required in conducting a specific military mission.

The scenario based strategic planning methodology outlined in the previous paragraphs is in wide use in other countries for defence planning. It represents best practice to meet the reviews’ objectives. It also offers the advantages of establishing a direct linkage with policy goals, is not based on specific threats, and avoids being captured by the status quo. Instead of answering the question “what use can we make of this capability or military technology?”, it focuses on answering the question “what capabilities and technologies does the government need to meet its defence policy objectives?”

The Use of Scenarios

Some 50 potential security events have been identified which may require a response from Government. It is not necessary to develop a scenario for each event: many are similar in nature, some dissimilar events invite similar responses, and military and non-military tasks are common across many scenarios. Some events are relatively minor and the response can therefore be generated using capabilities identified within more complex scenarios. Other potential tasks, either of a development or humanitarian nature, are less demanding as stand alone tasks and therefore do not drive any additional capability requirement. In many cases, however, these tasks also exist within the scenarios where they will need to be conducted within a military environment. As such, they are adequately catered for within the framework of the reviews.

A limited number of scenarios were developed in two distinct but closely related sets. The first set are those required to drive out the range of capabilities that might be required by a New Zealand contribution to a peace support operation which is dominated by land forces with New Zealand naval and air forces providing support. These are the scenarios required for Phase One of the review. The second set drive out the wider range of NZDF capability requirements and will be considered during Phase Two of the review. In keeping with best practice, sufficient scenarios are developed to ensure that the full range of capability responses is identified.

Each scenario is a series of incidents, which can be grouped into defined phases during the evolution of a security event. In describing the way each event might unfold, each scenario has been developed to show six distinct phases in the life cycle of the event to which it refers. Phases differ between scenarios to reflect the different way that individual events unfold. Each of these phases is then considered through a succession of ‘lenses’ as part of a strategic assessment to determine the Government’s options and the risks involved. Analysis of military factors to determine potential NZDF missions, the strategic options to fulfil these and the ensuing tasks and risks follows.

New Zealand’s Security Interests

In considering New Zealand’s security interests the DPF considers the world in five spheres of interest, moving from the immediate to the more distant in geographic terms. Each of these areas is now considered in turn. For each, the security outcomes from the DPF are identified along with the defence policy objectives. The security circumstances applicable to the particular sphere are detailed followed by the range of security events considered by the review. Following each summary, the particular scenarios used in the review for detailed analysis are identified and briefly discussed. The following tabulated sections summarise the first seven steps in Box 2.

New Zealand and its Environs

Security outcomes

A secure New Zealand, including its people, land territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), natural resources and critical infrastructure:
  • a New Zealand free from significant interference by external forces in its EEZ, territorial waters, the Antarctica and the Southern Oceans;
  • a New Zealand free from threats to its territory, natural resources and critical infrastructure;
  • New Zealanders free to go about their lawful business without interference or threat to their physical safety;
  • a highly skilled and educated national labour force able to sustain and build an inclusive, innovative and prosperous economy.

Defence Policy Objectives

To defend New Zealand and to protect its people, land, territorial waters, EEZ, natural resources and critical infrastructure:

Within New Zealand and its neighbourhood, the NZDF will be used to:

  • ensure the sovereignty of our EEZ and territorial waters;
  • protect our interests in the Southern Ocean and Ross Dependency;
  • counter any threat posed by terrorism or acts of sabotage;
  • provide support in civil defence and other emergencies;
  • contribute to the Government's social and economic priorities by providing opportunities for training and rewarding careers.

Security Circumstances

The following are the key features affecting the security of New Zealand and its surrounding area:

  • New Zealand (and Niue, the Cook Islands, and Tokelaus for which New Zealand has a defence responsibility) does not face any direct military threat now or in the foreseeable future but it does face a number of lower-level security challenges and issues of concern.
  • New Zealand sovereignty over one of the largest maritime environments in the world and territorial interest in the Antarctic will come under increasing pressure. Fish resources (in New Zealand’s EEZ, the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters), are likely to be increasingly targeted by the world’s fishing fleets as a result of growing international demand for high quality fish, the decimation of Northern Hemisphere fisheries and a shortfall in global fisheries catch. Evasion methods are likely to become more deliberate and refined as pressures grow. Current and proposed international agreements on fishing and resource exploitation in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters will place demands upon New Zealand’s monitoring and enforcement resource.
  • Trans-national crime is a risk to New Zealand's security. There is an apparent trend towards targeting New Zealand and the small island states associated with it. Crimes such as drug-trafficking, money laundering and fraudulent business dealings based on flags of convenience are becoming increasing problems. Illegal immigration is also a problem and unlikely to abate. It may well take the form of boat landings, as in Australia. Australian experience demonstrates that effective maritime surveillance, including co-operating with neighbouring jurisdictions, is important in containing this risk.
  • Expanding sea and air access is increasing the risk of bio-security hazards and pressures on border control.
  • New Zealand’s critical information infrastructure is vulnerable to information attacks. These attacks may not be specifically directed at New Zealand but global interconnectivity will increase the risk of New Zealand’s systems being affected by attacks on others.
  • New Zealand is not immune from terrorism. While New Zealand remains physically distant from many areas where terrorism occurs, it can be a target in certain circumstances: when New Zealand is hosting significant events, or New Zealand is seen to take a stand at odds with some state or group. Targets can include multinational businesses and the property and personnel of foreign nationals in New Zealand. The risk is growing that terrorists are gaining access to inexpensive and easily constructed terror weapons, including chemical and biological agents as well as improvised land and maritime explosives.

Security events

(where a military response might be sought)

  • Persons lost and in distress needing assistance in New Zealand
  • Natural events which threaten lives and property
  • Man-made hazard or disaster in New Zealand or its environs that threaten lives and property
  • Mining of New Zealand ports and approaches
  • Attempted entry by groups of illegal migrants into New Zealand
  • Illegal activities in New Zealand’s EEZ including exploitation of New Zealand’s marine resources
  • Trans-national crime across New Zealand’s borders
  • Civil disturbances affecting delivery and maintenance of critical services
  • Bio-security incidents
  • Terrorist act(s) in New Zealand
  • Accident/incident involving transport of nuclear waste in areas adjacent to New Zealand’s EEZ
  • Asymmetric attacks on New Zealand (e.g. information attacks on critical infrastructure)

Scenario Selected

The scenario chosen is terrorist acts in New Zealand. Much of the capability to address such incidents lies within Special Forces and this scenario is, therefore, addressed in Phase II of the reviews.

New Zealand and Australia

Security Outcomes

A strong strategic relationship with Australia in support of common interests for a secure and peaceful region:
  • both nations work in continuous partnership to secure and promote the security interests they share;
  • the territorial sovereignty of both Australia and New Zealand remain secure;
  • Australia understands and appreciates New Zealand’s commitment to common interests and is sensitive to New Zealand’s particular national interests;
  • an NZDF that operates effectively with the Australian Defence Force.

Defence Policy Objectives

Meet New Zealand’s alliance commitments to Australia by maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit of common security interests:
  • The NZDF will operate with the Australian Defence Force to protect territorial sovereignty and in support of a secure and peaceful region.

Security Circumstances

The key features of the security situation affecting New Zealand and Australia are that:

  • Both Australian and New Zealand territorial sovereignty is currently secure. There is both an understanding and an expectation that in the face of serious threats to security, each country would come to the defence of the other.
  • Mutual security is enhanced by the high degree of co-operation and co-ordination that exists between the governments and defence forces of both countries. Australia sees defence links with New Zealand as central to the strength of the Australia-New Zealand relationship. NZDF effectiveness is enhanced by both countries working closely with each other in training and exercising, operations, procurement and capability development.
  • New Zealand’s proximity to Australia and similarity of social, cultural and economic outlook means that often the strategic and security interests of both countries coincide. Nevertheless, the potential exists for differences of policy and approach to particular security issues as Australia and New Zealand make their own independent assessments of regional security events. Australia places a high priority on its US security relationship, seeing it as crucial for preferential access to leading-edge technology and equipment, strategic intelligence and logistic support, as well as the deterrent effect of the link with a global power.
  • The region to the north of Australia has experienced a number of destabilising crises and unanticipated events which has created a security environment that is seen, particularly by Australia, as less stable and predictable than previously. Australia sees its primary security challenges as a weak and unstable Indonesia, growing internal unrest and instability in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, the rebuilding of East Timor, incursions into its maritime approaches to the north, and illegal migration. Accordingly, Australia’s security strategy focuses on pro-active contributions to regional security, and preparations to deal with potential threats by achieving strategic dominance over its maritime approaches.
  • Australia’s size and “middle power” outlook can mean that on occasions it overlooks the interests of smaller neighbours. On security issues there has been a tendency in some quarters to under-rate New Zealand’s interest and role. This has been partially offset at present by New Zealand’s level of commitment to East Timor operations. Security will, however, remain an area where management of the relationship will continue to be tested.

Security events

  • Significant natural events which threaten life or property in Australia and its environs
  • Emergency resulting from human hazard or disaster in Australia or its environs
  • Exploitation of at-risk marine resources that affect both Australia and New Zealand
  • Australia and New Zealand co-hosting an international event that may encourage terrorist acts
  • External threats to either Australian and New Zealand sovereignty

Scenario Selected

The scenario selected is an external threat to either Australian and New Zealand sovereignty. This is considered in Phase Two of the review as such a situation is likely to require a New Zealand commitment of maritime and air capabilities.

New Zealand and the South Pacific

Security Outcomes

A secure and stable South Pacific composed of nations that provide effective democratic governance to their peoples, build self-sustaining economies to meet the needs of their peoples and contribute materially to the security of their territories and resources:
  • the territorial integrity of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau is maintained;
  • the safety and human rights of New Zealand citizens and other nationals are protected in the event of civil emergencies in the South Pacific;
  • New Zealand’s international obligations for search and rescue in the South Pacific are met;
  • a South Pacific where the sovereignty of member states’ EEZs is respected and observed;
  • a South Pacific which is free from internal strife and civil war, and violent conflict between neighbours;
  • a South Pacific of nations which have the economic and human capacity to contribute materially to their own security needs;
  • a South Pacific of nations whose natural environment and resources are managed sustainably in ways that support economic viability;
  • a South Pacific of nations that are able to minimise the social and economic impacts of natural and other disasters and recover rapidly from them.

Defence Policy Objectives

To assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to New Zealand’s Pacific neighbours:

In the South Pacific, the NZDF will be used to:

  • meet New Zealand’s constitutional responsibilities for the defence of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau;
  • contribute to maintenance of peace and stability in the South Pacific;
  • meet New Zealand’s international obligations for search and rescue and for emergency medical evacuation;
  • strengthen New Zealand’s relationships in the Pacific through our Mutual Assistance Programme, including providing defence assistance and Official Development Assistance delivery;
  • assist with surveillance of Pacific Islands countries' EEZs;
  • provide protection for, and if necessary assist in the evacuation of, New Zealand nationals in civil emergencies;provide assistance after natural and humanitarian disasters.

Security Circumstances

The key features affecting New Zealand’s relationships in the South Pacific are that:

  • South Pacific island states are confronting many challenges to their security and viability, including failing governance and infrastructure, marginal economic viability, ethnic and demographic stress, secessionist tendencies, disputes over ethnicity and resource distribution, small arms and traditional weapons proliferation, urbanised unemployment, increasing crime, exploitation of the natural resources of South Pacific countries in potentially unsustainable ways, and trans-national crime including trafficking in drugs, people, and other illegal goods.
  • Given current indicators there is a strong prospect of further emergencies on the pattern of the 1980s and 1990s.
  • New Zealand has strong cultural, constitutional, political and economic links with South Pacific island countries. There is, therefore, an expectation in the region and further afield that New Zealand, along with Australia, either independently or in co-operation with each other, will carry the main burden of response and requests for assistance to these crises. Evacuation of New Zealanders and other expatriates has been an issue on several occasions.
  • Other states, particularly Australia, and regional co-operative institutions are active players in the South Pacific. While differences of perspective may exist on some issues, more usually a co-operative approach is the norm to providing support to South Pacific island states.
  • A range of initiatives will also be needed to avert further security crises, including supporting economic development, playing an active role in South Pacific institutions, applying diplomatic resources, using military aspects to support peace processes, and military and police assistance programmes to help build security capabilities appropriate for regional needs.

Security events

(where the impact is beyond the ability of Pacific Island states to provide effective responses)

  • Persons lost or in distress needing assistance or rescue in the South Pacific
  • Natural events in the South Pacific that threaten life or property
  • Human hazard or disaster in a South Pacific island country
  • Illegal exploitation of marine resources in the EEZs of South Pacific island countries
  • Attempted entry into a South Pacific island country by groups of illegal migrants
  • Trans-national crime threats to South Pacific island countries
  • Exploitation of marine resources in international waters that affect the economic viability of South Pacific island countries
  • Development failures in a South Pacific island country threatening life, economic viability and national stability
  • Acts of terrorism in a South Pacific island country
  • Use of violence by secessionist/separatist movements in a South Pacific island country
  • Civil disorder and violence associated with political unrest
  • New Zealand nationals needing evacuation in civil emergencies

Scenario Selected

Of the range of security events that might occur in the Pacific, a likely event for land forces is a situation that leads to the loss of good government through the use of violence by secessionist/separatist movements in a South Pacific Island country. This scenario includes a need for a national evacuation of nationals. The scenario focus is a subsequent peace support operation to prepare the ground for rebuilding of the public sector, law and order and good governance. This enables exploration of the utility and need for particular capabilities in a low threat Pacific peace support setting. The scenario is generic but informed by the kind of developments recently observed in events spanning a number of Pacific Islands.

Other opportunities for employment of land forces in the Pacific are assessed as requiring levels of capability that are within the force determinants of this Pacific scenario.

New Zealand and the Asia Pacific

Security Outcomes

An expanding role in the regional dialogue of South East and North East Asia and, where appropriate, a role in regional security consistent with New Zealand's interests and capabilities:
  • New Zealand has a significant and respected presence and impact in key Asia-Pacific multilateral arrangements;
  • an Asia-Pacific region where all nations abide by their UN Charter obligations and international law and the human rights of all peoples are respected;
  • an Asia-Pacific where current disputes have been resolved or are being contained and resolved;
  • an Asia-Pacific where aggression against regional members is not tolerated and, if it occurs, is reversed by UN or regional organisation responses;
  • an Asia-Pacific where the US remains responsibly and positively engaged;
  • an Asia-Pacific free from aggressive domination by any country with interests which may be inimical to New Zealand;
  • an Asia-Pacific which continues to build upon existing regional and multilateral institutions;
  • an Asia-Pacific with a prosperous, growing regional economy based on open trading practices;
  • an Asia-Pacific supportive of initiatives to manage sustainably the global ecological environment;
  • an Asia-Pacific where rights of freedom of passage are respected and maintained;
  • an Asia-Pacific where nations have eschewed procuring weapons of mass destruction and other destabilising weapons.

Defence Policy Objectives

To play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting our obligations as a member of the FPDA.

In the Asia-Pacific region the NZDF will:

  • continue to participate in FPDA activities;
  • build upon existing co-operative bilateral defence relations with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines;
  • develop a broader-based defence dialogue with other nations in East Asia.

In East Asia, New Zealand's security policy will include active participation in important regional fora such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum; a constructive approach to regional human rights initiatives; and, where necessary and feasible, mediation and PSOs.

Security Circumstances

The key features affecting New Zealand’s interests in the Asia-Pacific region are that:

  • While recovering from the Asian financial crisis, the Asia-Pacific region is basically stable. However, a number of trouble spots in the region (the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan/China, the South China Sea and South Asia), could flare up and destabilise the regional and in some cases the global security situation.
  • New Zealand has significant economic and trade relationships and interests with the countries of the Asia-Pacific which would be affected by conflict in any of the trouble spots, particularly if it closed the region’s shipping lanes and air routes. Trade could be disrupted, and demand depressed in some of New Zealand’s key markets. Conflict could also create refugee flows destabilising neighbouring states.
  • Regional security frameworks and institutions are still in their formative stage and are not well developed to work effectively to resolve conflicts with the potential existing for the formation of pan-Asian groupings that exclude Australia and New Zealand participation in responses to regional issues.
  • New Zealand diplomatic and military capabilities and activities (in regional crisis management, participation in peacekeeping or other multilateral operations, through the FDPA and in bilateral defence relations with key countries) are practical ways of demonstrating New Zealand’s commitment to collective efforts to maintain peace and security and protect our interests.

Security events

  • Natural events which threaten life or property in the Asia-Pacific
  • Breakdown of law and order leading to threats to New Zealand nationals
  • Human hazard or disaster in the Asia-Pacific
  • Serious disruption to sea lanes of communication in South East Asia
  • Threats to or loss of access to airspace in South East Asia
  • Trans-national crime in South East Asia that requires an international response
  • Splintering of a state in South East Asia
  • Disputes over resources that require international response
  • Wars of democratisation (Destabilisation of a South East Asian country moving to democracy)
  • Religious/ethnic war in South East Asia
  • Territorial conflict in South East Asia
  • Weapons of mass destruction in Asia
  • Conflict in North Asia
  • Piracy

Scenario Selected

The scenario selected is the splintering of a state in South East Asia. A range of potential events could occur. For this review a secessionist struggle has been used. This scenario is illustrative of the kind of conflict that might lead to New Zealand involvement in a peace support operation within Asia-Pacific. More importantly, it explores the evolution of operations in such a setting and the kinds of tasks and capabilities that might be required for effective involvement. Its focus is an international peace operation led by Australia, with a contribution of a New Zealand battalion group land force.

This scenario differs from the Pacific scenario in that it is set in a higher threat environment where the mission requirements are more demanding than those likely to be encountered in the Pacific.

New Zealand and the rest of the world

Security Outcomes

A global approach which supports New Zealand’s place in an international community committed to the maintenance of human rights and the collective security responsibilities enshrined in the UN Charter, and which strengthens New Zealand’s economic linkages:
  • a global community where all nations abide by their UN Charter obligations and international law and the human rights of all peoples are respected;
  • a global community containing multilateral institutions that ensure that small states have an effective voice and vote;
  • a strong and effective UN where states can resolve their disputes without recourse to conflict;
  • a UN with access to a professional military capability, manned, equipped and trained and available for rapid and effective response in crisis situations;
  • PSOs carried out under UN mandate are effective and achieve their objectives;
  • an expanding global economy that is underwritten by adherence to an international open trading regime;
  • effective international health and environmental institutions that control the spread of dangerous diseases and mitigate environmental change;
  • a network of international/multilateral/bilateral economic linkages that supports New Zealand’s economic growth and prosperity.

Defence Policy Objectives

To contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations:
  • New Zealand will meet its UN Charter commitments to the maintenance of international peace and security. The NZDF will contribute to UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations. Due regard will be given to the increasing complexity and danger of these operations. The Government supports development of a permanent UN military capacity;
  • Internationally, New Zealand has a long standing interest to being recognised as a good international citizen, committed to collective security, including PSOs, humanitarian relief operations, and international efforts to support economic development, good governance, human rights and democracy. Contributions to such efforts raise New Zealand’s profile and ensure that we are playing our part as a responsible member of the international community to the benefit of New Zealand and as an example to others.

Security Circumstances

The key features affecting New Zealand’s role globally are that:

  • The global security architecture remains fluid with the United States remaining the world’s sole superpower and a much more diverse number of lesser global players. Nevertheless, as Europe expands and reunites, it is increasingly a power of economic and diplomatic weight comparable to that of the US. It is a major player in world affairs in many areas that are of direct interest to New Zealand.
  • Globalisation is occurring at a fast pace, creating opportunities for co-operation on a global scale. But uneven global economic development is increasingly the focal point for widespread protests about regional inequities, unresponsive international institutions, and protectionist policy advocates.
  • Modern conflicts are typically within rather than between states. These conflicts are fuelled by ethnic, communal and religious tensions. They are compounded by structural inequities, high debt levels, rapid population growth, weak governments, environmental over-use and damage, rising crime, uncontrolled refugee migration, and arms proliferation. These conflicts continue to give rise to both cross-border terrorism and terrorism in targets-of-opportunity countries.
  • Intra-state disputes create a tension between the principles of universal human rights and of respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of sovereign states. The UN and the international community are increasingly drawn into intra-state conflicts that pose a wider threat to international peace and security and human rights. Intervention in such disputes can have implications, however, for wider regional and international relations.
  • Efforts to bring about the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction have been only partially successful. Progress has been challenged by the South Asian nuclear tests, Israel’s ambiguous nuclear programme, the continuing threat of “rogue” states and organisations acquiring nuclear weapons, and the spread of nuclear technology.
  • Greater international engagement and participation in multilateral institutions faces contrary pressures from tensions, great power aspirations, conflict and insecurity in the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, East Asia and South Asia. PSOs in these areas are possible.
  • Trans-national crime is increasingly global in its activities in illegal trades of drugs, people and money.

Security events

  • Massive natural events leading to humanitarian disaster outside the Asia-Pacific region
  • Cessation of conflict/changes to political environment leading to opportunity for international rebuilding of a state, where involvement is in New Zealand’s interests
  • Establishment of peace in long running conflicts leading to requests for international cease-fire/border assistance
  • Ethnic and/or religious conflicts outside the Asia-Pacific region
  • Development of weapons of mass destruction by a rogue state outside the Asia Pacific region
  • Breakdown of sea lanes of communication outside the Asia-Pacific region
  • Threats to or loss of access to critical resources outside the Asia-Pacific region
  • Inter-state conflict outside the Asia-Pacific region where the UN calls on the international community to mount a peace-enforcement operation 6
  • Secessionist/separatist conflict outside the Asia-Pacific region where the UN calls on the international community to respond
  • Global conflict
  • Humanitarian disasters within a failed state where the UN calls on the international community to respond

Global Peace Enforcement: Combat Operations

The Government has stated its requirement for forces to be trained for combat operations. It also requires forces to be capable of operating in Chapter VII peace enforcement operations that could involve combat.

The final scenario explores the capabilities required for commitment of New Zealand land forces as part of a large force in a peace enforcement operation. It looks at a New Zealand battalion operating within a Canadian led brigade, which takes a supporting role in the overall event. The New Zealand battalion operates alongside Canadian and Australian battalions in this scenario. Phase I does not explore the other contributions that NZDF might usefully make in such a scenario. These will be covered in Phase II, when the requirements for Naval and Air capabilities will be examined.

This scenario focuses on combat operations as part of a combined operation to enforce UN resolutions. This scenario is more demanding in terms of the nature and capability of land forces involved than the other two peace support scenarios and completes the requirements for land forces in PSOs.

Summary

Phase I uses these three scenarios and best practice in scenario strategic planning methodology to explore the capabilities required to meet the Government’s needs in accordance with the DPF.

Figure One illustrates the spectrum of military operations. The three scenarios selected for capability development for the NZDF cover the broad range of operations as articulated in the DPF. These three scenarios are:

Figure One

Image: The Spectrum of Military Operations.

View text equivalent of above image.

Figure One also illustrates the range of land force capability requirements for the NZDF. This range covers low-intensity conflict/humanitarian missions through to mid-intensity peace enforcement operations. Some NZDF land force capabilities can also ‘stretch up’ into high-intensity environments, but for limited tasking with combat force or support specialisation (i.e. medics, engineers, Special Forces). The ‘barred’ area contained in Figure One represents this stretch capability.

In determining the capabilities required, it is first necessary to explore the ramifications of the changes to the environment within which military forces operate. In doing so it is necessary to consider both the environment today and the likely environment forces will encounter in the near to medium term.

Although the scenarios used for Phase One are based on various intensities of PSOs, and are sufficient to define the combat capabilities required of land forces, they do not indicate the inter-relationship between land and other combat capabilities. Other scenarios being developed to support Phase Two will cover operations outside peace support, and show how land, sea and air forces are used.

Box 3 - Levels of Warfare and Capability

Strategic - The strategic level is concerned with the art and science of employing national power for national policy objectives.

Operational - The operational level is concerned with the direction of military resources to achieve strategic objectives. It is the level at which campaigns and major operations are directed, planned and sequenced. The operational level commander, typically the joint force or joint task force commander, is responsible for the overall campaign plan and offers the crucial link between the setting of military objectives and the employment of military forces at the tactical level.

Tactical - The tactical level involves the direction of military resources to achieve operational objectives. The tactical level is the level at which engagements are planned, forces are deployed and battles are fought. The tactical level is primarily the concern of component commanders.

Operational level capabilities - Those force elements or functions that are not inherent to a self-sufficient tactical unit, but that are held at the operational level. These are frequently high value, low usage items that are pooled for use by the force on a “bid as you need” basis. At what level capabilities are held will depend on the peculiarities of any operation but those most often held at the operational level would include air defence, long range artillery, air combat force, tactical air and sea lift.

Tactical level capabilities - Those force elements or functions that are necessary for a tactical unit to meet its immediate tactical level responsibilities and which they will be expected to possess when they enter a combined operation.

The concept of intensity - Intensity describes the frequency and the degree of violence encountered in conflict, and is a measure of the rate of consumption of resources. Intensity can be high when violence occurs often or when the encounters are particularly violent. It is likely to vary during a particular conflict; for example, a conflict that is low in intensity at its outset can become high when the frequency and violence of the encounters increase. During a long conflict there may be protracted periods of relatively low intensity operations interspersed with large, high intensity engagements. Therefore, it is unhelpful to attempt to classify conflict in terms of intensity alone, and it is a concept which has more relevance at the strategic level that at the operational or tactical levels. Although high intensity conflict is likely to demand the greatest range of capability, there is no simple correlation between the intensity of conflict and the nature or scale of forces required. For example, in lower intensity operations, where vital national interests are not at stake, governments will almost certainly put a greater emphasis on minimising civilian casualties and collateral damage than they would during a war of national survival; this would have a bearing on the types of weapons systems needed.
  1. The FPDA comprises New Zealand, United Kingdom, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia.
  2. Although this Land Review is land-centric, joint operations and the roles and relationships with the other services will be examined in more detail in Phase II.
  3. Phase I of the reviews will not consider those aspects of land forces structured for non-conventional operations, that is, the Special Air Services. A separate review is examining these capabilities and the results will be included in the Phase II report.
  4. A definition of peace enforcement can be found in Box 4.

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