New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews
Phase One – Land Forces and Sealift (November 2000)
Key Findings
Summary
Land Forces
- To meet the full spectrum of potential requirements consistent with the Government’s Defence Policy Framework the NZDF should have the ability to deploy and sustain a self-sufficient battalion group (up to 600). At present the NZDF cannot sustain a commitment of this size beyond 12 months without adverse consequences (see Chart on Page 11).
- Filling out the existing Army structure with 1,000 additional personnel would allow the NZDF to sustain a battalion group (900) deployment to a Chapter VI peace support operation indefinitely or provide a battalion group (1200) to a Chapter VII/mid-level combat operation for up to 12 months. It would not permit the Army to undertake concurrently another company size task.
- To undertake concurrently another company size task and to sustain a battalion group deployment to a Chapter VII/mid-level combat operation requires a three-battalion group capacity indefinitely. This could be provided by raising a third battalion group permanently or providing a third battalion group temporarily when required through a combination of increasing personnel levels on a short term basis, cross-employment of existing regular force personnel and enhancing the ability of Territorial Force personnel to serve on operational commitments. The three-battalion group allows for a Chapter VII battalion group deployed indefinitely, or a battalion group for up to 12 months and conduct a company task concurrently.
- Participation of Territorial Force personnel in long-term operations can be built up to around 10% of the force. This level of contribution could be improved by increasing the size of the Territorial Force, providing job protection for Territorial Force personnel, and providing more latitude for calling out Territorial Force personnel.
- The major and most urgent capital investments for land forces will be completed with the light armoured vehicles, tactical communications and light operational vehicles projects. There is only a marginal difference between the additional near term acquisition needs for peacekeeping and combat situations - $70 million for peacekeeping and $90 million for combat. The more significant cost impact derives from possible increases in personnel strength.
Sealift
- There are four options for providing sealift: 1) reliance on commercial chartering arrangements; 2) acquisition of a used military sealift ship; 3) purchase of a new purpose built ship like RSS ENDURANCE; and 4) modification of HMNZS CHARLES UPHAM. Acquiring a used military ship is costly and risky and is unlikely to offer any significant advantage.
- The modified CHARLES UPHAM has some shortfalls in off-loading cargo where ports are not available and limitations for other tasks. A ship like RSS ENDURANCE has a better over the beach capability and is more versatile, but it has only half the strategic lift capacity of CHARLES UPHAM. It costs significantly more – in the region of $440 million as opposed to $35-$40 million to modify CHARLES UPHAM. It may, however, be a viable replacement for both CHARLES UPHAM and CANTERBURY. The cheapest option is to sell CHARLES UPHAM and rely on chartering. A modified CHARLES UPHAM is the most cost effective option for meeting the core requirement for assured strategic sealift.
Introduction
In June of this year the Government released The Government’s Defence Policy Framework (DPF). It outlined an approach that has been guided by and builds on the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. The DPF sets out the Government’s broad strategic outcomes, its defence policy objectives and the roles and tasks envisaged for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). To meet these objectives the NZDF must be able to offer an adequate range of capabilities which are sustainable, safe and effective in combat and in peacekeeping, and structured for maximum operational and political impact. The core requirement is for well-equipped, combat-trained land forces which are also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air Force.
To ensure there is a sensible prioritisation of investments that will give the NZDF the depth it requires, the Government directed that the capabilities of the NZDF be reviewed to provide a basis for a new capability blueprint and a re-prioritised long-term capital equipment plan. The aim of these reviews is:
This review has been undertaken by linking policy objectives set out in the DPF with capabilities using a scenario based strategic planning methodology. This method identified security events that could affect desired security outcomes and defence policy objectives. These events were then examined to identify what actions a New Zealand Government could potentially take and the capabilities required to successfully undertake such action. Some 50 different security events were identified.
The first phase of the reviews, which has now been completed, identifies the options for a land force structure and sealift capable of meeting New Zealand’s most immediate needs. The review did not consider land force capabilities required for special operations. This is the subject of a separate study.
The interdependencies between land, naval and air forces will be analysed in Phase 2 in order to expose the implications, costs and effects of force structure changes.
The Operational Environment
The analysis of the security events that could potentially face a New Zealand Government reaffirms previous observations about the changing nature of military operations in the post-Cold War era. For many countries war-fighting doctrine has shifted from set-piece battles between power blocs to crisis response by national forces or flexible multinational groupings put together to deal with a crisis.
At the same time peacekeeping has changed from monitoring ceasefires in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN charter to encompass a wide spectrum of tasks, including the use of military force in combat under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For countries like New Zealand, the distinction between combat and peace enforcement has narrowed to the point where it has limited utility in determining the capabilities required by land forces.
The analysis of the security events demonstrated that no situation could be visualised in the foreseeable future which threatened New Zealand’s survival. Except for some low level and limited situations, our involvement in dealing with security situations is a matter of choice rather than necessity. This means New Zealand governments have some discretion in deciding whether to get involved militarily and, if so, the type and size of the force they will provide.
This new operational environment confirms some basic principles applicable to land forces and sealift capabilities.
- To be effective as peacekeepers, land forces must be trained and equipped for warfighting. Land forces committed to peacekeeping operations must be able to defend themselves, protect others and have the means to enforce the mandate under which they are operating.
- To play a useful role in an operation, a New Zealand land force must be self sufficient at the tactical level, interoperable with others and able to operate as part of a joint and combined force.
- A rapid response to a crisis is crucial. New Zealand’s contributions will be highly valued if it has land forces at a high state of readiness that can be deployed quickly with readily available airlift and sealift.
- Land forces must be trained and practised in working with the types of air and naval capabilities with which they will be expected to interact within a combined force. This means that they must participate in a regime of joint and combined training and exercises, using other NZDF capabilities as well as those of other countries. Such training cannot be arranged on an ad hoc basis prior to each operation, and it would be unsafe to commit forces to combined operations without adequate joint preparation.
The Lance Force Requirement
To meet the full spectrum of potential requirements consistent with the criteria set out in the DPF, the NZDF should have the ability to provide a deployable battalion group 1 that is self sufficient at the tactical level. This requirement can be met by a motorised, light infantry battalion group of up to 1,200 personnel consisting of the following elements:
- three rifle companies of 125 personnel each;
- a reconnaissance company of 100 personnel;
- a support company of up to 160 personnel to provide close direct and indirect fire support, including anti-armour protection, as well as communications;
- task-tailored support units to provide longer range indirect fire support within the battalion group’s area of operation and engineer elements to deploy, manoeuvre and sustain the force, when such support is not available from another nation as part of a multinational force; and
- command, control and administrative elements (medical, supply, etc).
For a Chapter VI peace support operation, with a lower requirement for fire support, the size of the battalion group could be in the range of 600-900 personnel.
Many Chapter VI peace support operations have the potential to escalate to a Chapter VII/mid-level combat situation. The Army should therefore be trained and equipped to safely transition from one to the other.
The length of time the NZDF might be expected to sustain operational commitments cannot be forecasted with any certainty. Furthermore it is not always possible to ensure a pre-planned exit strategy. At present the Army cannot sustain a battalion size commitment beyond a period of 12 months without adverse consequences. To sustain a battalion group commitment beyond 12 months the Army requires a three-battalion group structure. This is based on assumptions that operational tours in theatre should not exceed six months and individual soldiers should have at least 12 months between operational tours.
It is likely that from time to time New Zealand will have to deal with more than one security situation simultaneously. The Army should therefore have sufficient depth to handle concurrent tasking. The analysis showed that a reasonable planning assumption is the ability to undertake a company size task concurrently with the deployment of a battalion group size force. This assumption caters for the requirement to continue with a multitude of smaller tasks (Bougainville, Solomon Islands, MFO, etc) and to have a stand-by force in New Zealand concurrently with a battalion size commitment. This element can combine with the other services to deal with security contingencies, civil emergencies and large scale search and rescue tasks in New Zealand.
Capabilities of the Current Land Force
The current structure of the Army is based on two light infantry battalions within a brigade framework, comprising about 4,400 regular force personnel. The Army has the ability to deploy and sustain a battalion group of 600-900 personnel for up to one year. It can provide a larger force (900-1,200 personnel) for a Chapter VII operation for six months. Either type of deployment can be extended if: other nations are able and willing to provide some of the force elements; the length of operational tours is extended beyond the planned six month period; the time between deployments for individuals is shortened from the current planning period of 12 months; use can be made of the Territorial Force to augment the regular force; and specialist personnel are cross-trained and employed in secondary roles.
Even when it is equipped with the LAV III and new tactical communications equipment, the Army will still have some equipment deficiencies that limit the roles it is able to undertake:
- The current fleet of Landrovers is at the end of its useful life. Approval in principle for replacement light operational vehicles (LOV) is being sought from the Government. The estimated cost is $60-$110 million.
- Close-in fire support, including for protection against armoured vehicles, is inadequate.
- Suitable vehicles and sensors to equip the reconnaissance companies are required.
- There are deficiencies in command and control, and in combat service support.
With these shortcomings the Army on its own can undertake limited peace enforcement roles. It cannot sustain a battalion level commitment beyond one year without adverse consequences and it does not have the capacity to undertake a concurrent task of any magnitude while deployed on a major commitment like East Timor.
Over the medium term, other capability issues in the areas of engineer support, long-range indirect fire support, air defence, electronic warfare and combat service support will need to be addressed. There is also a need to examine the implications of new technology in areas such as command and control, non-lethal weapons and battlefield surveillance and target acquisition.
Land Force Options
The review examined the land force structure required for three progressively higher levels of capability than the Army presently has, considering personnel strength, equipment needs, sustainability and the capability to undertake a second concurrent activity.
- The first level is the additional structure required to undertake and sustain over a period of more than 12 months a battalion group size commitment to a peace support operation, but without the capacity to undertake another concurrent commitment of company size or above.
- The second level is the structure required to undertake and sustain over a long term a battalion group size commitment to a peace support operation and to undertake concurrently another commitment up to company size.
- The third level is the structure required to undertake a battalion size commitment to a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation or mid-level combat. The key element of this option is the marginal increase in equipment required for combat as opposed to a Chapter VI peace support operation. Within this level there are two sub-options: the structure required for only a single battalion group commitment; and the second with the additional depth required to provide the capability while undertaking concurrently a commitment up to company size.
Chapter VI Peace Support Land Force – Single Commitment
For the ability to deploy and sustain continuously a commitment of a battalion group (600-900) to a Chapter VI operation similar to the current East Timor commitment, largely on our own (but not to provide concurrently another commitment of a formed body of troops), the following investments would be required (in addition to the acquisition of LAV III, tactical communications and replacement light operational vehicles):
- An increase in the regular force strength of the Army from the current level of 4,400 personnel to 5,400 personnel. This filling out of existing units would increase the operating cost of land force outputs by approximately $50 million annually. There would also be some incremental equipment and accommodation costs.
- Acquiring reconnaissance vehicles and sensors ($50 million).
- Acquiring area close support weapons and all weather sights ($20 million).
- In the medium term, additional investments would be required in engineer equipment for mobility and protection, combat service support, non-lethal weapons and electronic warfare.
Chapter VI Peace Support Land Force – Concurrent Commitments
Providing the Army with the capacity to undertake a company size task at the same time as being able to commit a sustainable battalion group requires the Army to move to a three battalion structure. Providing the Army with a three battalion capacity could be done in one of three ways or a combination of all three:
- Raise a third battalion permanently. This would increase the size of the Army from 4,400 to about 7,000, increasing the cost of Army outputs by about 40%. (The current operating costs of the Army are about $400 million, Outputs 7,8&9). There would be additional start-up costs associated with equipping, basing and overheads in the region of several hundred millions dollars.
- Raise a third battalion temporarily when required, by increasing personnel levels on a short term basis through recruiting and employing personnel for fixed three-year terms. The throughput of trained personnel, who could be offered trades training following deployment as an incentive, would also contribute to government’s social and economic priorities. The feasibility and identification of the costs of this option requires further detailed study, but it would appear to be an attractive, cost effective way of increasing the depth of the Army on an as required basis.
- Provide the capacity for a temporary third battalion deployment through cross employment of existing regular force personnel and enhancing the ability of Territorial Force personnel to serve on operational commitments. The cross training of specialists is considered to be a minimum cost expedient that has many drawbacks. It should be done only on a voluntary basis and personnel should not be expected to be cross-employed more than once in a five year period. The morale of cross-employed personnel becomes a factor and the option assumes that personnel can be spared from their primary duties for both the cross training and cross employment.
Personnel of the Territorial Force make a significant contribution to the Army’s ability to sustain operational commitments. Under current circumstances very few Territorial Force personnel can be available for an initial deployment but their participation in long-term operations can be built up to around 10% of the force. This level of contribution could be improved through: increasing the size of the Territorial Force to provide a larger base to draw from; providing job protection for Territorial Force personnel; and by providing more latitude for calling out the Territorial Force.
Land Forces – Chapter VII Peace Enforcement and Mid-Intensity Combat
Undertaking Chapter VII peace enforcement missions or mid-level combat would require the commitment of a larger size battalion group (900-1,200 as opposed to 600-900 for Chapter VI operations). Because specialist personnel are needed for their primary function in combat, it would not be possible to increase the ability of the NZDF to sustain a commitment by cross-employment of personnel. It would also be necessary to acquire a medium range anti-armour weapon ($20 million). Additional capability issues that arise in the medium term are in the areas of engineer support, long-range indirect fire support, air defence and electronic warfare.
With this additional equipment, and a personnel increase of 1,000, the NZDF (5,400) would be able to deploy a battalion group of up to 1,200 personnel and sustain it for 12 months. With three battalions the NZDF (7,000) could sustain a commitment of this size continuously and undertake concurrently, for a limited time, a company size task.
Conclusions
The Phase I analysis showed that to meet the full spectrum of potential requirements consistent with the Government’s Defence Policy Framework, the NZDF should have the ability to deploy and sustain a self-sufficient battalion group. At present the NZDF cannot sustain a commitment of this size beyond a period of 12 months without adverse consequences. To be able to sustain a full battalion group commitment, the NZDF requires additional personnel.
The major and most urgent capital investments required in the Army will be completed with the light armoured vehicle, tactical communications and light operational vehicle projects. For other capital investment, there is only a marginal difference between the near term acquisition needs for peacekeeping operations and combat situations - $70 million for peacekeeping and $90 million for combat. The more significant cost impact derives from possible increases in personnel strength.
The analysis has shown that government has a spectrum of options for retention and development of land force capabilities. These options are summarised on the next page. Depending on the option chosen, the suggested priorities for providing land force capabilities required to meet core requirements are as follows:
Capital Acquisition Priorities
- Acquiring new light operational vehicles.
- Acquiring an area close-in fire support weapon system.
- Acquiring reconnaissance vehicles and sensors.
- Acquiring medium range anti-armour weapons.
- Undertaking definition studies to address the medium term capability issues so that other investment proposals can be developed as part of a new long-term capital acquisition plan.
Personnel Strength Priorities
- Developing a programme to maximise the use of Territorial Force personnel to sustain operational commitments, including the drafting of legislation to provide job protection and provide greater latitude for call out Territorial Force personnel.
- Investigating the feasibility of raising personnel levels on a temporary, short term basis through recruiting and employing personnel for fixed three year terms.
- Increasing the strength of the Army from 4,400 to 5,400 personnel.
- If other options for providing a three-battalion capacity are inadequate, raising a permanent third battalion.
The affordability of these options will need to be considered in the context of the overall capability blueprint that will be developed following completion of Phase 2 of the capability reviews.
Land Force Capability Options
| Operation Capability | Chapter 6 Battalion Commitment (600-900) | Chapter 6 Battalion Commitment Plus Company Task | Chapter 7 Battalion Commitment (900-1,200) | Chapter 7 Commitment Plus Company Tasks | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sustainment Capability | 12 months | Continuous | 12 months | Continuous | 12 months | Continuous | 12 months | Continuous |
| Current Land Force Structure (4,400 personnel) | Yes | No | No | No | 6 months only | No | No | No |
| Increase Personnel by 1,000 to 5,400 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No |
| Increase Personnel to give a third battalion capacity (7,000 personnel) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Additional Capital Investment Near Term | LOV ($60-$110 million) Reconnaissance vehicles/sensors ($50 million) Close support weapons ($20 million) |
LOV ($60-$110 million) Reconnaissance vehicles/sensors ($50 million) Close support weapons ($20 million) Medium range anti-armour weapon ($20 million) |
||||||
| Medium Term Capability Issues | command and control; engineering equipment; non-lethal weapons; combat service support; electronic warfare; battlefield surveillance and target acquisition |
command and control; engineering equipment; non-lethal weapons; combat service support; long range indirect fire support; air defence; electronic warfare; battlefield surveillance and target acquisition |
||||||
| Operation Capability | Incremental Cost | Satisfaction of Security Outcomes and Defence Policy Objectives | Operational Risk | Financial Implications |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sustainment Capability | Nil | Low | High | Low |
| Current Land Force Structure (4,400 personnel) | $50 million+ | Good | Medium | Moderate |
| Increase Personnel by 1,000 to 5,400 | Army Output costs could increase by about 40% plus substantial start-up costs | High | Low | High |
| Increase Personnel to give a third battalion capacity (7,000 personnel) | Chapter 6: $130 - $180m Chapter 7: $150 - $200m |
|||
| Additional Capital Investment Near Term | To be determined |
Sealift
Deployment of land forces could require both strategic and tactical sealift. Strategic sealift involves movement of heavy and large equipment and stores from New Zealand to an assembly area, normally a fixed port, where the equipment is married up with personnel deployed by air. In some circumstances delivery may be directly into the operational area, either to an available port facility or, if a wharf is not available, to a location where unloading can be accomplished “over the beach”.
Tactical sealift requires a capability to deliver both personnel and equipment directly into the operational area so that the forces are able to undertake operational missions as soon as they are safely ashore. Tactical sealift ships are specially designed to land both personnel and equipment without requiring access to a port facility.
Both requirements were demonstrated in the deployment of the New Zealand contingent to East Timor. Strategic sealift was provided by a chartered commercial roll on-roll-off (RO-RO) ship, from New Zealand to the assembly area at Darwin. From Darwin, the equipment was deployed into the Suai operational area by a French military tactical sealift ship which had the ability to off-load the M113 carriers and heavy trucks over the beach.
A limited over the beach capability can be built into a modified RO-RO ship through a combination of cranes on the deck, cargo-landing vessels carried on the ship (LCVPs) and using helicopters. These facilities are suitable for containers and light vehicles but not for heavy loads such as the LAV IIIs, heavy trucks and engineering equipment.
Given the relatively small number of available port facilities in the South Pacific and parts of South-East Asia, an ability to off-load cargo independently over the beach would be a useful military and civil asset. However, the requirement to independently off-load heavy military cargoes, such as LAV IIIs, in this manner is likely to be very infrequent. In most circumstances the limited over the beach capability that can be built into a RO-RO vessel will meet New Zealand’s military requirements. On those occasions when heavier loads need to be off-loaded where port facilities are not available, it is likely to be under circumstances where New Zealand would be operating as part of a multinational force. Tactical sealift ships of other nations would be available to provide this capability.
For some disaster relief operations in the South Pacific it could be expected that port facilities do not exist or have been damaged. However, the supplies required for disaster relief can generally be unloaded from a ship by LCVPs or by helicopter. They can also be air-dropped or air landed by C130 Hercules and other aircraft. It is only when heavy engineer plant and vehicles are needed that a full over the beach capability would be required. This requirement has not arisen in disaster relief operations to date.
The NZDF requirement for military sealift is sporadic. Any ship that is owned and operated by the NZDF primarily for strategic or tactical sealift therefore would be available for other tasks, including disaster relief in a civil emergency in the South Pacific, low-level surveillance and presence, and logistic support to deployed forces. In general, the speed, manoeuvrability and lack of combat systems limit the utility of a sealift ship for most maritime patrol tasks.
The hull design can make these ships unsuitable for safe employment in the Southern Ocean or Ross Sea. A sealift ship can be a valuable contribution to a multinational effort in its own right. A sealift ship could have been gainfully employed for the operations in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands.
A dedicated sealift ship would be available to the NZDF for immediate tasking for 90% of the year. In the absence of an operational deployment the military requirement for exercises and other tasks would amount to about 80-105 sea days per year.
The key considerations in determining how best to meet New Zealand’s sealift requirement are:
- Availability to meet the requirement for a timely deployment.
- Sufficient capacity for strategic sealift of a battalion group size land force, with supporting helicopters and national support elements.
- The degree to which an over the beach capability and tactical sealift is required and its affordability.
- The utility for other tasks.
The Options
Four options were considered for providing sealift: 1) reliance on commercial chartering arrangements; 2) acquisition of a used military sealift ship; 3) purchase of a new purpose built ship; and 4) modification of CHARLES UPHAM.
The purchase and conversion of another used RO-RO vessel and the acquisition of a new modified design RO-RO vessel were also examined. Both of these possibilities were found to have no significant advantage over the modified CHARLES UPHAM and carried significantly higher costs and risks.
Chartering
This was the approach taken for Bosnia and East Timor and it is the cheapest option. It has two drawbacks. One drawback is that there can be no guarantee a suitable ship will be available when there is a need for a rapid response. Previous studies have shown that ships available for charter are usually operating at long distances from New Zealand. This potentially prolongs the time taken to deploy a New Zealand contingent. The other drawback is that commercial ships come as they are. They cannot provide any tactical sealift capability. This can limit choices in responding to a security event. The limitation could be significant for situations where there is a requirement for New Zealand to be independent in its response.
In the case of Bosnia the charter arrangement was unsatisfactory, both because of availability and because the shortcomings of the ship required vehicles to be stowed on open decks. In the case of East Timor the charter arrangement was satisfactory.
Acquisition of a Used Military Sealift Ship
Military sealift ships being offered for sale are usually older generation specialist amphibious landing ships nearing the end of their useful life. The initial capital cost of these second hand landing ships can be low but the work necessary to modify and maintain military specification ships is usually significant, costly and technically more difficult than for commercial specification ships because of greater complexity and heavier build standards. Many older military sealift ships require a large crew (200 for the Newport class acquired by Australia versus 50 for CHARLES UPHAM). Through life cost penalties can completely offset advantages of a low initial purchase price.
Recent conversions of ex-USN Newport class amphibious ships by Australia required a considerable amount of restorative maintenance and significant modernisation to tailor to Australian needs. The final conversion cost price was about A$200M per ship.
Although this option provides a good over the beach capability, given the high conversion and operating costs, it is unlikely to offer any significant advantage over modification of a commercial vessel.
Purchase of a Purpose-Built Ship
The concept of using a multi-role ship to perform sealift tasks and also a range of tasks such as resource protection to reduce loading on the frigate fleet requires a wider study than could be completed within the time constraint for the completion of the Phase I review. Issues such as trade-offs in frigate availability, crew combat training, sustainability, and logistics support are complex. In catering for the differing roles in a multi-role design, each role will invariably be compromised to some extent. This is a possible option, however. A ship purpose built for tactical sealift could also be designed to carry out tasks such as disaster relief, EEZ surveillance and patrol, search and rescue, and presence. It could support service assisted evacuations of nationals, provide a command and control facility for land force operations, and provide a host platform for peace talks. When suitably modified, CHARLES UPHAM could do some of these tasks under certain conditions, although it could not operate a helicopter while underway. Lack of armament may be a limitation for some surveillance, response and emergency evacuation missions.
Both the Royal Navy and Republic of Singapore Navy have new tactical sealift ships which have utility in other roles - HMS OCEAN and RSS ENDURANCE. HMS OCEAN’s capabilities exceed the NZDF requirement. The RSS ENDURANCE, however, presents a compromise that could meet many of the NZDF’s requirements. Its design emphasises the tactical sealift role ahead of strategic utility. The vessel could transport and offload heavy vehicles up to LAV III size without port access. It has two on-board helicopter operating positions, and can operate helicopters at sea. The RNZN Seasprite could be operated on such a ship and the decks are capable of taking larger helicopters operated by other nations. It has a troop carrying capacity in excess of the New Zealand requirement.
This class of ship is better suited for patrol and surveillance tasks than the CHARLES UPHAM, in that it can carry its own helicopters and operate them at sea. It also carries a 76mm gun. The tactical unloading facility comes at the expense of lift capacity. RSS ENDURANCE has only half the strategic lift capacity of a modified CHARLES UPHAM. This option therefore only partially meets the strategic lift requirement, while it fully meets the tactical requirement.
No data is available for the cost of a new multi-role capable sealift ship designed specifically for New Zealand. Using RSS ENDURANCE as an example, the marginal cost of a multi-role ship over modifying CHARLES UPHAM is expected to be around $400m. However, if this ship also replaces CANTERBURY, the marginal cost would largely disappear. A more detailed study would be required to assess the economic benefit of a single multi-role ship meeting both the sealift requirement and some of tasks currently assigned to the naval combat force, i.e. as a replacement for both CHARLES UPHAM and CANTERBURY. A suitable ship could not be acquired before 2005.
Modification of CHARLES UPHAM
When modified for its role as a sealift ship, CHARLES UPHAM will have the capacity to meet the NZDF requirement for strategic sealift and will have a limited tactical sealift capability with deck cranes, on board LCVPs and, when anchored, the ability for helicopter sling loading from the deck. It can carry a small company of troops with their equipment, giving the ability to position forces close to a potential trouble spot. The modified CHARLES UPHAM will not have the ability to unload, over the beach, the LAV IIIs, heavy trucks or heavy engineer plant equipment.
The modifications envisaged will enable the vessel to undertake disaster relief and humanitarian operations. It will have the capacity to supply fuel and water supplies over the beach, provide emergency short-term shelter and evacuate a large number of people.
The design for the modification is partially done and can be completed within six months. The modification work can be undertaken following a worldwide competitive tender, or by a shorter directed tender process for New Zealand industry. The earliest the modified ship could enter service is January 2003. Conversion is technically simple, the basic ship structure can easily accommodate it, and the condition of the ship’s structure is well known through the extensive assessment conducted within the Lloyds class survey. Based on the design and specification work done to date, it is assessed that conversion of CHARLES UPHAM is a low risk option and the ship would have a 15-year post-conversion life. The estimated cost of the conversion is $35-40 million.
Conclusion
A summary of the four options is shown in the table below.
Acquiring a used military ship is costly and risky and is unlikely to offer any significant advantage. The modified CHARLES UPHAM has some shortfalls in off-loading cargo where ports are not available, but this is not assessed as presenting a significant military risk. It also has limitations in its suitability to undertake other tasks when not used for its primary sealift function. A ship like the Singaporean ENDURANCE class has a better over the beach capability and is more versatile. It has only half the strategic lift capacity of CHARLES UPHAM, however, and it costs significantly more – in the region of $440 million as opposed to an additional $35-$40 million to modify CHARLES UPHAM. It may, however, be a viable single platform replacement for both CHARLES UPHAM and CANTERBURY. The cheapest option is to sell CHARLES UPHAM and rely on chartering. A modified CHARLES UPHAM is the most cost effective option for meeting the core requirement for assured strategic sealift.
Summary - Sealift Options
| Charter | Used Military Sealift Ship | Purpose Built Ship | Charles Upham | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Availability | Uncertain | High | High | High |
| Strategic Sealift Requirement | Uncertain but probable | Partial | Partial | Meets fully |
| Tactical Sealift Requirement | None | Meets fully | Meets fully | Partial |
| Utility for Other Tasks | N/A | Moderate | Better | Moderate |
| Capital Acquisition Cost (Incremental) | Nil | $260 million | $440 million | $35-40 million |
| Annual Operating Costs | Unknown, but low cost | $40 million | $54 million | $13 million |
| Earliest In-Service Date | N/A | 2005 | 2005 | 2003 |
| Life of Type | N/A | 20 years | 30 years | 15 years |
| Overall Risk | ||||
| -Operational | Highest | Moderate | Moderate | Lowest |
| -Financial | Lowest | High | Highest | Low |
Box 1 – New Zealand Security Environment
The External Assessments Bureau report Strategic Assessment 2000 (SA2000) identified the key features and trends of New Zealand’s security environment, both immediate and regional, as well as those at the global level which are of particular relevance to New Zealand from a security and defence perspective. SA2000 acknowledged that New Zealand is not directly threatened militarily by any other country and is unlikely to be involved in any widespread armed conflict within the next five years. Despite this, SA2000 noted that New Zealand is nevertheless likely to be confronted over the next five years by a number of security challenges. In the Asia-Pacific region, 2 it envisaged the following challenges:
For the rest of the world, SA2000 identified these security challenges:
SA2000 also foreshadows the possibility of peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, the Indian sub-continent, and the Korean Peninsula. |
- A battalion group consists of an infantry battalion and supporting elements from other units to provide long-range fire support and additional logistic, medical, engineer and communications support.
- For the purposes of SA2000, the “Asia-Pacific” was defined as comprising the countries of Asia from Mongolia and China south to Indonesia, with Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. It was noted that South Asia, Russia, North America and Latin America all impinge on this region and they were included in SA2000 in specific contexts.
