The Shape of New Zealand's Defence - A White Paper (November 97)
Chapter VIII (Eight) - Meeting the Challenge
With no threat of invasion and surrounded by a vast belt of ocean, New Zealand might be thought to enjoy the luxury, or bear the burden, of an exceptional range of defence choices. But this is not so. Each possibility has to be measured against our geographic situation, our external interests, what we want to achieve and the rules of military effectiveness. A wider range of capabilities would offer more choice, but the country’s economic capacity limits the choice to what is affordable. The practical possibilities are not large.
The present policy framework still meets the country’s requirements: there is no need for a new defence policy. But New Zealand is becoming increasingly dependent on the Asia Pacific region for both its well-being and its security. So there will be a resulting increase in demand on the Defence Force’s presence and capabilities to support our interests there, as well as to play our part as a good international citizen. Meeting these demands calls for a high level of military effectiveness. It also requires a sustained development programme to stay interoperable with our friends.
This does not mean a larger defence force. The country would be best served by retaining and developing the current force structure which has served New Zealand well. Major changes would take more than ten years (and considerable expenditure) to become effective and there is nothing in the present strategic situation to indicate that this is necessary. Given New Zealand’s narrow range of capabilities and the small size of the force, it is not possible to do away with a major capability and still have a militarily effective defence force able to support the Government’s present policy in a credible fashion.
The recently completed Defence Assessment examined possible force structure options that could be sustained with funding around or less than the present fiscal baseline. This showed that funding at these levels would require New Zealand to abandon a major capability, reduce major capabilities below their critical mass, or both. While these options would lower costs, they would mean losing important capabilities. Such losses would be perceived as a serious diminution in New Zealand’s concern with regional security, or with the common defence of Australia and New Zealand.
Such a signal would be entirely at odds with the stake New Zealand has in the Asia Pacific region. It would be seen to be shrinking from its share of the common security task, and at a time when the economic outlook is good. The plain fact is that, if New Zealand is going to meet its current defence policy, an increase in defence spending is required. It is not a dramatic increase; the efficiencies locked in over the past few years mean there is no need to return to the budgetary levels of 1990/91. The proportion of the country’s wealth devoted to defence will remain steady, and the balance between defence spending and other Government priorities will be preserved.
The decisions the Government has taken will give New Zealand a structure that can fully support its defence interests. These decisions will improve military effectiveness. The increases planned for operating expenditure will eliminate the present "operating sag"; the three services will be able to train the full number of hours required to maintain military proficiency. The decisions are a recognition of the Government’s commitment to give New Zealand’s sailors, soldiers and airmen and women the tools they need to meet the challenge of defending New Zealand and its interest.
The outcome will strengthen New Zealand’s ability to contribute both to peacekeeping and to other collective security operations. It will rectify the most pressing deficiencies in those capabilities likely to be needed for any early deployment - the Army’s mobility and communications, air transport, and maritime surveillance - while preserving the Defence Force’s other capabilities against a less predictable future. The rebuilding will give a clear signal of New Zealand’s resolve to play its full part in supporting the stability of the region.
