The Shape of New Zealand's Defence - A White Paper (November 97)
Chapter VII (Seven) - Building A Force Structure
Introduction
Chapters II, III and IV showed that the NZDF needs a range of capabilities suitable for a broad spectrum of military operations including conventional war, peace support operations, the support of friends and peaceful uses of military capabilities. In this chapter these broad characteristics are given a sharper focus. Each of the force structure elements is described, both in generic terms and in terms of the specifics of what is necessary to meet New Zealand's security requirements. When put together these building blocks will provide a force structure for the future that will meet the demands of New Zealand's defence policy.
Naval Combat Force
Generic Military Capability: New Zealand needs maritime surface capabilities to detect, locate, track, identify and deal with unarmed or lightly-armed surface vessels in peacetime, and warships and submarines should a more serious threat emerge. For such threats, the capability must also have self-defence against air, surface and sub-surface weapons, and it must be able to operate as part of a collective force. The capability should also be able to constitute a stand-alone New Zealand contribution to collective defence efforts, including peace support operations.
New Zealand is a maritime nation. Our hemisphere is almost all water. We are three times as dependent on external trade for our income as Japan, and 98% of that trade is carried by sea. Equally, the Asia Pacific region is a maritime region. The sea routes around the Pacific Basin sustain the greatest intensity of trade in the world (including 75% of New Zealand's), and this depends on the freedom of the seas. Naval power is the key to the security of the region; no-one can attempt any major operation without control of the sea. Since the Battle of Midway in 1942, that control has rested with the United States Navy.
Maritime security has increasingly become a regional concern. The United States will remain engaged, but it will do so from choice and not from the demands of rivalry. It will also continue to press its allies and friends to share the defence burden. Countries in the region recognise that what is done by choice can be changed by choice. They understand the need to share the burden and to do more for their own security.
The facts of geography make it clear that New Zealand's forces must include maritime force elements. Without them New Zealand would be gambling, betting that future contingencies which may affect its interests will not occur at sea. Whatever the risks for the future, such a gamble has immediate costs, affecting our standing in the region and thus our ability to influence other issues of concern to us. Neither Australia nor our defence partners in the Asia Pacific would feel much obligation to a country which declined to carry its share of the common burden and was happy to leave the upkeep of its maritime security to others.
The need for a naval combat force has been accepted by all New Zealand Governments this century. Its tasks as defined in our current defence policy are: to conduct maritime operations in support of the defence of New Zealand, including the protection of our EEZ and our interests in the Southern Ocean; to respond to low-level contingencies in the South Pacific; to contribute to the security of the region including Australia; and to contribute to collective security efforts, including peace support operations. Its capabilities must include: surveillance and presence; anti-surface and anti-submarine operations; fire support of land forces; and protection of shipping. With these capabilities it can also help with search and rescue, disaster relief, surveillance of the economic zones of New Zealand and other South Pacific countries, and support of foreign policy aims through port visits.
These tasks require the following inherent characteristics.
- Long range, good sea-keeping, and endurance. New Zealand's EEZ is the fourth largest in the world and it, as well as the Southern Ocean, includes some of the roughest seas. The farthest part of the Cook Islands, for which we have defence responsibilities, is 4,000 km from New Zealand. To deploy to, patrol, and return from the north west Australian coast is a journey of 14,700 km. To and from the South China Sea (where the FPDA exercises are held every year) is a voyage more than half-way around the world.
- Flexibility. Likely tasks include: patrolling our EEZ and possibly the Southern Ocean, dealing with unarmed or lightly armed surface vessels in peacetime; blockades and the enforcement of United Nations sanctions; and operating in a hostile environment as part of a coalition force. This rules out, for example, submarines, which have a high value in war but which are of much less use in peace support operations and of no use in showing the flag.
- Utility. When operating with other naval forces, our vessels must be able to provide a worthwhile naval capability against air, surface or submarine threat. At the same time, they must be able to defend themselves without imposing any additional burden on the rest of the fleet.
- Credibility. Any contribution will be judged by the signals it sends about New Zealand's willingness to support the common interest. The adequacy of any such contribution will be assessed by others, not by us. New Zealand's ships are seen in this way, for example, when they participate in the annual FPDA exercises in South-East Asia.
Various types of offshore patrol vessels have been suggested as the answer to New Zealand's maritime needs. They would certainly meet most of the demands of the first part of the triad of New Zealand's defence policy: the defence of New Zealand against low-level threats. By their nature they are suitable for fisheries protection. But this is only one of our maritime needs. For the other two parts of our policy - contributing to regional stability and international peacekeeping - patrol vessels are of little value.
Offshore patrol vessels lack the necessary size for lengthy overseas deployments and could not operate in the severe sea-states which are routinely encountered around New Zealand and in the Southern Ocean. They are less expensive because they are built to commercial rather than military specifications. This means they have a shorter life and lack the defensive systems to provide adequate protection for the crews in combat situations. They represent the upper spectrum of vessels that can perform fisheries protection and presence tasks in the South Pacific, but they cannot be used where there is any risk of combat. They cannot meet all of our requirements and they are thus costly for what they can do.
The minimum size of vessel which meets the criteria is a frigate. It is the smallest size warship capable of independent action during conflict - although they are not intended to deploy as a stand alone capability and would usually operate as part of a larger coalition force. While larger vessels such as destroyers and cruisers would meet the requirements of range, flexibility and utility, they are well above New Zealand's needs.
Frigates are adaptable: they can police New Zealand's waters and contribute credibly to the defence of Australia and to the security of our ASEAN and other regional partners; and they permit New Zealand to participate as part of a coalition under United Nations auspices to deter or repel aggression. This adaptability accounts for the growing number of frigates in the world's fleets. A recent study by the UK Ministry of Defence estimates that seventy new frigates will have been acquired within the Asia Pacific region by 2010.
New Zealand requires the ability to deploy one ship to a distant-water operation, such as a crisis in the region or peacekeeping, for example, the recent blockade duties in the Gulf, and to sustain it for up to a year. At the same time, a ship should be continuously available at home for deployment around New Zealand, in its EEZ or in the South Pacific.
The complexity of modern naval capabilities means that maintenance of propulsion, weapons systems, and software takes a significant part of the ship's year. The harder the equipment is worked on deployments, the greater the maintenance required; and the smaller the fleet, the greater the impact of unavailability due to maintenance.
Modern weapons systems and data handling require a high level of training - when the ship may have only a few seconds warning time of a threat, everyone must have practised their response intensively. Post-maintenance training during which equipment is fully tested (the "shake-down"), and bringing the ship's company up to operational standards ( the "work-up") are periods when a ship will not be available for deployment. Training cannot be carried out on a ship which is on operations because semi-trained personnel may pose a risk to the ship and its task. Additionally, in a volunteer military force like that of New Zealand, considerations such as leave, family and career affect availability for time at sea.
These factors enable some judgments to be made on numbers. Two ships would enable the deployment of one on operations for only a limited period, say six months, but the deployment could not be sustained beyond this. After the initial deployment, the competence of the crews would degrade to the point where the ship would not be operational. It is the view of the Government's defence advisers that the only practical way a two-frigate force could be supported would be if it was operated as an integral part of the Australian fleet. Therefore, three ships are in practice the minimum required for a self-sustaining naval combat force to meet the Government's current policy. This will allow the deployment and sustainment of a ship on regional or other operations for up to a year. It will also enable essential training to continue. There is a risk though in "concurrency" - that is, if a distant deployment coincided with urgent tasks at home. If one ship was deployed, and if that deployment was to be sustained, one would be available to deal with low-level security challenges in New Zealand or South Pacific waters for only about half of the year.
Maritime helicopters are an integral part of the naval combat force. No modern frigate can operate without a helicopter. Moving as much as a hundred nautical miles ahead of a ship and with modern radar and forward-looking infrared surveillance systems, they greatly extend the ship's area of control, and thus its safety when faced with a threat. Armed with stand-off anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, they also considerably enhance the surface vessel's ability to engage surface and sub-surface targets. After careful consideration New Zealand has chosen to equip its ships with the Kaman Seasprite SH-2G, as have the Australians. The present contract is for four aircraft, two for outfitting the two ANZAC frigates currently ordered plus two more for training and maintenance. An additional helicopter will be acquired to outfit a third ship.
Naval Support Force
Generic Military Capability: Other maritime surface capabilities required include military sealift, a maritime mine counter-measures unit, naval control of shipping organisation, a replenishment-at-sea capability for long deployments, a hydrographic service, and an oceanographic research capability.
Modern armed forces have a large logistical tail. Troops can be moved by air but their kit and supplies must come by sea. New Zealand has not traditionally maintained a military sealift capability. Instead, it has relied on others, most recently the United Nations, to provide transport for our heavy equipment. The risks of continuing to do so are rising. The demands of the Gulf War taught everyone the value of having a dedicated sealift capability for rapid deployment and subsequent sustainment. Coalition operations mean that everyone is likely to be preoccupied with their own needs and there is less opportunity for others to borrow a lift, or to get prompt access to chartered ships. For this reason all of our FPDA partners, for example, are acquiring military sealift vessels.
New Zealand has acquired HMNZS CHARLES UPHAM, a roll-on roll-off merchant vessel which, when converted to a military sealift ship, will provide New Zealand with adequate sealift to deploy an Army force and a greatly improved capability to assist with disaster relief in the South Pacific. It could also be a possible contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations. (In both Somalia and Cambodia, the United Nations had a very large requirement for shipping). The Government will consider whether to convert HMNZS CHARLES UPHAM in about two years time.
The threat of sea mines is not a current concern, but New Zealand, with its heavy dependence on shipping from a few harbours, is especially vulnerable to this threat. Mining the approaches to New Zealand's harbours would be cheap, unobtrusive and deniable. A few mines laid covertly or even the threat or claim to have laid them would divert shipping and send up freight and insurance rates. This is why almost every nation considers it necessary to maintain a counter-mine capability. In New Zealand's case, we do not need deployable minehunters to clear large areas; but rather inshore vessels with remote mine clearing systems to ensure that the approaches to our harbours can be kept clear of mines. This capability is the responsibility of the Royal New Zealand Naval Volunteer Reserve (as is the naval control of commercial shipping at a time of crisis).
HMNZS ENDEAVOUR provides an excellent replenishment-at-sea capability, and it does not need replacement for twenty years. The diving support vessel HMNZS MANAWANUI should also meet the mine-clearance and other diving needs for another fifteen years.
The Navy currently has a contract from Land Information New Zealand to undertake hydrographic survey and the production of nautical charts. For this, the Navy has recently acquired HMNZS RESOLUTION and also operates a number of smaller inshore survey craft. HMNZS RESOLUTION can also be used for military-related oceanographic research. Any spare capacity can be made available to others for research work through a coordinating mechanism known as the Research Vessel Committee.
Land Forces
Generic Military Capability: General purpose land forces are required to deal with low-level contingencies, such as protecting vital installations and, in the event of a more serious threat, to operate as part of a combined effort in the conduct of conventional land combat operations. They must be able to deal with the full range of peace support roles, including peace enforcement.
The determining factors of land force planning are deployability and readiness. Army contingents will be deployed overseas and our geography means that this will always be over long distances. As a small force, it must be able to move at short notice to be of value. While this calls for a high state of readiness that can only be achieved with regular forces, part time reserves are important as the source of trained volunteers from which any prolonged deployment might be sustained. They are also a most important link between the armed forces and the community which they serve.
Army troops may be deployed in any number from individuals to formed units, but the basic building block for contributions to a coalition is the battalion group. To have the ability to deploy and sustain a battalion group size force (an infantry battalion with attached combat support and combat service support elements) New Zealand requires two regular force light infantry battalions, one ready to deploy at short notice and the second to replace it for commitments longer than six months. The battalions need to be maintained within the framework of a brigade structure that contains the necessary combat and combat service support elements. The Territorial Force provides a source of trained personnel to draw from to supplement the regular forces. This is especially important for prolonged deployments.
The brigade framework based on both the regular and territorial forces enables the Army to be expanded if a serious threat to New Zealand's or Australia's security were to emerge. The current requirement calls for a brigade ready to deploy with 180 days notice. In current circumstances, a longer period of readiness would be more appropriate for New Zealand to commit a force of this size. If there was a need, for example in the defence of Australia, there would be a long period of warning of such a major change in New Zealand's strategic circumstances. This does not imply the Territorial Force has become less important. It will still play the vital role of preserving a force structure to build on should a serious security challenge emerge.
Infantry battalions like those of New Zealand normally have four rifle companies in order to carry out a wide range of tasks. Our battalions at present have only three rifle companies each. They are still operationally viable but with limitations on their usefulness. To overcome these limitations a fourth rifle company will be added to each battalion.
The need for rapid deployment calls for lightly equipped forces, as opposed to mechanised forces with tanks and self-propelled artillery. New Zealand will therefore continue to base its Army on light infantry, but they must have sufficient fire power, mobility and protection to cope with the type of warfare that could occur within the Asia Pacific region, as well as the changing spectrum of peace support operations.
Major upgrades to some of the Army's equipment will be undertaken. These include armoured vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles, tactical communications, surveillance equipment, and longer range weapons for the infantry. This will overcome deficiencies that impair our Army's effectiveness in conventional military operations and the more demanding peacekeeping assignments. This upgrade will also improve interoperability with key partners, such as the Australian or United States forces. As the deployment of land forces on peace support operations is the most likely task to be assigned to the NZDF in the short term, these upgrades are a top priority in the investment plan.
Maritime Air Patrol
Generic Military Capability: A maritime air patrol capability with the range and endurance to patrol New Zealand's EEZ, and a suite of sensors to detect, locate, identify and track unarmed or lightly armed surface vessels in peacetime, and warships should a more serious threat emerge. Also required is an ability to deal with sub-surface targets that would be part of a more serious threat.
Effective maritime surveillance is particularly important for New Zealand. We have large fisheries to protect, and we also need to be able to monitor our oceanic approaches in times of tension or conflict. Maintaining a capability for maritime surveillance is one of the basic requirements of the defence of New Zealand. New Zealand performs the same tasks for South Pacific countries and, given the maritime nature of our region, can provide useful reinforcement to Australian or other regional capabilities.
Maritime surveillance must be done from the air. Satellites cannot yet provide the continuous coverage of particular parts of the ocean that is required to track and, if necessary, target possible intruders. For the past thirty years New Zealand has used P3 Orion aircraft. The Orion alone has the endurance to meet our needs - it can stay aloft for more than fourteen hours - and it can range far to the south or the north of New Zealand.
For maritime surveillance, the baseline requirement is maintaining a continuous aircraft presence over a point 700 nautical miles from an Orion operating base for up to seventy-two hours. The 700 nautical miles radius enables surveillance coverage of most areas of ocean within our EEZ and those of our South Pacific neighbours, and within the New Zealand portion of the maritime approaches between New Zealand and Australia. Seventy-two hours is the time required for a surface vessel to reach such areas of interest and relieve the Orion of its surveillance task. A fleet of six Orions provides a reasonable assurance of meeting this base requirement.
New Zealand's Orions have been worked harder than those of any other defence force and they have now well exceeded their manufacturer's estimated service life. Recent studies, however, have revealed no more suitable aircraft. Joint feasibility studies with Lockheed Martin established that rewinging our aircraft was practicable and this programme - a first for the aircraft type - is now well advanced. It is estimated that with new wings and horizontal stabilizers our Orions can serve for at least another twenty years.
Maritime surveillance encompasses both surface and sub-surface tasks and any maritime air patrol contribution to a collective security operation would be expected to operate in both roles. It is generally accepted that New Zealand needs to maintain its surface surveillance capabilities, but it is equally important to preserve anti-submarine capabilities in order for New Zealand to play a useful role in maritime surveillance in the Asia Pacific region. (There are already 160 submarines in the region). Once lost, these skills will take at least twelve years to recover.
There are serious deficiencies in the Orions' sensor suite that impair its ability to carry out both surface and sub-surface surveillance tasks. These will be addressed (Project Sirius) as one of the most urgent priorities in the rebuilding of the NZDF's capabilities.
Air Combat Force
Generic Military Capability: We require an air combat capability to deal with surface threats and be capable of providing air support for both ground and naval forces. It must be capable of operating as part of a larger force, either in support of New Zealand naval and land forces, or as part of a combined air force as a New Zealand contribution to collective defence.
Advances in technology and the information revolution are enabling air forces to deliver decisive blows with pinpoint accuracy, as the Gulf War and the NATO operation in Bosnia showed. Smaller numbers of aircraft can carry out missions that in the past would have needed more aircraft and would not have been as successful. There is thus a trend to make more use of air combat assets in both general warfare and peace enforcement operations. They can be brought to bear more quickly, and disengage with relative ease. There is a lower risk of casualties (including non-combatants), greater flexibility in the weapons which can be selected, and much greater assurance of their accuracy. New Zealand's air combat force concentrates on maritime strike and ground attack roles. In addition to protecting our naval and land forces, it provides a potent defence for our maritime approaches. It also permits us to make a contribution to collective security operations that is valued by our partners.
Our air combat force is a key part of our Closer Defence Relationship with Australia, which relies on our maritime and ground attack capabilities for its fleet air defence training. For Singapore and Malaysia (and their ASEAN partners) it is one of the most visible signs of New Zealand's engagement with the region. Every year they see New Zealand aircraft on exercise in South-East Asia, helping test their air and naval defences.
New Zealand's air combat capability consists of 19 A4K Skyhawk aircraft - effectively one squadron, though it is divided into two to allow a detachment to be based at Nowra in New South Wales to work with the Royal Australian Navy. The aircraft are old but sturdy. They have been rewinged and seven years ago were given a major upgrade. They have sufficient life left to perform effectively into the next decade.
The air combat capability will be retained. For the time being it will consist of the current fleet of Skyhawks, but consideration will need to be given to what might be required for future air combat capabilities, including, for example, the role of attack helicopters.
To capitalise on our past investments in the Skyhawk fleet and ensure they will be fully effective over the next few years, some further improvements are planned. The central processor in the aircraft will be upgraded to exploit the possibilities offered by new weapons. As well, the acquisition of a laser designator will provide precision guidance for weapons delivery, while the purchase of a longer-range anti-ship missile will allow the missile to be released at a safer distance from the target. These improvements could be transferred to a replacement aircraft.
Air Transport
Generic Military Capability: New Zealand needs an air transport capability that can undertake tactical roles within New Zealand and the South Pacific, and support forces committed to regional and global security efforts. It must be capable of strategic airlift to deploy and re-supply forces given the long distances which may be involved.
The current capability consists of five C-130H Hercules and two Boeing 727 aircraft. This mix of tactical and strategic airlift has provided a good flexible air transport capacity to meet the country's needs. The short take-off and landing Andover fleet has reached the end of its useful life. They will not be replaced as it is more economical to concentrate on the greater capacity and longer range of the Hercules, supplemented by faster jet transport for moving light cargo and personnel.
The Hercules are approaching thirty years of age. They were rewinged some time ago and, bearing in mind the inevitable uncertainties surrounding old airframes, have about another decade of economic life remaining. The Ministry of Defence has taken an option on up to eight of the new J Model Hercules as part of an Australian contract with Lockheed Martin. The option must be exercised by December 2002.
Eight aircraft would be required for an all-Hercules fleet. There are, however, risks where speed of deployment or withdrawal is important (as for example in the evacuation of New Zealand nationals in a crisis) and where longer distances are involved. It is therefore preferable to acquire five of the new Hercules in due course, and to retain a fast jet transport capability.
The Boeing 727s can be kept in service for some years at relatively little increase in cost, but their usefulness will gradually erode as more airfields impose noise restrictions that they cannot meet. A possible replacement is a new version of the B737 which has a much longer range than current models, as well as military light cargo, passenger and VIP configurations.
Helicopters
Generic Military Capability: A vertical lift capability is required to provide tactical lift for land forces. It is also needed to provide assistance to the civil authorities for such tasks as search and rescue.
This capability calls for a general purpose helicopter like the UH-1H Iroquois. New Zealand already has fourteen of these. This is sufficient to meet the basic requirement of providing air mobility support for the Army when deployed, and have some helicopters available for local tasks, such as search and rescue and disaster relief.
The existing helicopters have been in service for over thirty years. Nevertheless, the Iroquois continues to provide a credible capability and hence there is no need for it to be replaced. A programme to extend its life and to assure its ongoing supportability is planned within the next five years.
A Force Structure to Meet New Zealand's Security Needs
Our security needs require a defence force that is able to undertake a wide array of tasks; ranging from non-military situations, such as assistance to the community during civil emergencies, through to the ability to take part in conventional military operations. The NZDF must have sufficient breadth to respond to all likely contingencies, and sufficient depth to sustain our commitment. These needs will be met with a force based on the following components.
Navy
- A naval combat force of at least three surface combatants equipped with maritime helicopters. This provides New Zealand with the capacity to deploy and sustain at least one ship to take part in regional security and peacekeeping efforts such as the Multinational Interdiction Force in the Gulf. The ships can also patrol within New Zealand's EEZ and the Southern Ocean.
- Naval support forces to provide: "at-sea" replenishment; mine clearing to keep shipping lanes and our main harbours open; military sealift to support the Army and provide humanitarian relief in the South Pacific; and hydrographic survey services.
Army
- A land combat force consisting of two regular force light infantry battalions, each with four rifle companies. The battalions will be maintained within a brigade framework, consisting of both regulars and territorials, to provide the support capabilities needed to deploy and sustain up to an infantry battalion group as part of a collective security effort or a peace support operation. This structure will provide the capacity to build up the Army should a serious change in New Zealand's security situation develop at some time in the future.
- Special Air Services to provide a capability for special tasks, including counter-terrorism.
Air Force
- An air combat force to support the Navy and Army, and able to deploy and sustain a squadron as part of a collective security effort.
- A maritime long range patrol force that is able to monitor our EEZ and the Southern Ocean, assist our South Pacific neighbours control their EEZs, and contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Asia Pacific region.
- An air transport force that is able to provide both strategic and tactical airlift support for committed forces, as well as undertake other tasks such as humanitarian assistance and VIP air service.
- Utility helicopters to support the Army and perform other essential tasks such as search and rescue missions.
