The Shape of New Zealand's Defence - A White Paper (November 97)

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Chapter II (Two): The International Setting

Introduction

This chapter sets out the Government’s views on the international security environment now and in the future. This provides the backdrop against which New Zealand’s security requirements and the shape of its future defence effort can be determined.

The Global Security Setting

The 1990s has witnessed the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union which together brought an end to the strategic balance that had prevailed for more than forty years. The certainty of the global security framework that characterised the Cold War has been replaced by rapid changes in the relationships among the major powers in response to shifts in economic and, to a lesser extent, military power. We are in a time of transition and may be for some time yet.

While a nuclear confrontation between the major powers is now highly unlikely, the removal of constraints imposed by the superpowers has brought security concerns closer to home for many countries. Longstanding local and regional tensions have re-emerged. As a result, conventional warfare remains possible over the next ten years, but at a regional rather than a global level. Conflicts within states, however, look like being the most distinctive form of contemporary conflict. The essential interests of other states may not often be involved, but the danger of spillover and escalation, as well as humanitarian concerns, may result in the involvement of others.

Only the United States at present possesses the full panoply of state power and influence. This will change, but only slowly. For the next decade and beyond, the United States will be the only country able to take the lead in major security problems. In most cases though it will wish to act in concert with others and to have a mandate from (or at least the blessing of) the United Nations.

Meanwhile, today’s security arrangements still largely reflect yesterday’s balance of interests. The mixed fortunes of the United Nations illustrates the difficulty of adapting existing institutions based on the Cold War to the new world realities. It will be even more difficult to develop new security arrangements. The United Nations is likely to remain the focal point for managing conflict.

The end of the Cold War removed the constraints on the Security Council’s ability to act. This has led to a considerable increase in peacekeeping operations as the United Nations was able to respond to the surge of ethnic disturbances and state failures that have characterised the post-Cold War period. This in turn placed heavier demands on the traditional contributor nations, such as New Zealand. Since 1990 New Zealand has taken part in as many operations in this period as it did in the whole of our previous peacekeeping history. The demands for peacekeeping will fluctuate from year to year, but such operations will be the most likely reason for deployment of New Zealand forces over the next few years.

The peacekeeping achievements of the United Nations have been patchy, ranging from substantial successes in El Salvador and Mozambique, through to more mixed outcomes in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. Earlier hopes that intervention by the United Nations could solve problems everywhere has given way to a more realistic appreciation of the practical limits imposed by budget constraints and the marshalling of political will. These factors, as well as the complications of administering forces through the United Nations Secretariat, have led to the use of "coalitions of the willing", mandated but not led by the United Nations. These have often centred on NATO forces led by the United States. The Gulf War and the current Stabilisation Force in Bosnia are examples.

The Asia Pacific Region

The Asia Pacific region is geographically huge and diverse, with Australia and New Zealand its southern anchor. It has only recently begun to develop a regional identity as a result of the combined effects of trade, investment and travel. With this, there is increasingly a sense of a common future, and so an increasingly common interest in regional stability and security.

Economic prosperity and the interdependence it has created may make future wars less likely. It is too soon to say whether this will actually be the case. But a generation of peace has made the region’s remarkable economic growth possible. The costs of any future trouble will be high, and the new interdependence of interests means that these costs will be carried not just by the countries who are in dispute. Like their security, the prosperity of each country is no longer a purely national concern. The security of each country has become that of the region as a whole.

The principal new element in the region’s strategic equation is the rapid rise in the economic importance of the Peoples Republic of China. China’s return to the region as a major power is impressive and welcome, but it will require an adjustment in the existing structure of regional relationships. States in the region are increasingly working closely with China to ensure that its aspirations and new weight are accommodated as smoothly as possible. The scope or the importance of this task should not be underestimated.

Working out the relationships among China, Japan and the United States will, more than anything else, determine the levels of confidence and security in the region. Japan has reaffirmed its continuing security alliance with the United States and is cautiously accepting a greater role in peace support and regional security that is consistent with its constitution. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the rapid economic development of China have altered the relationship between the United States and China. Establishing a comfortable and durable relationship between these two countries is crucial to the comfort of the rest of the region. It is also important that China and Japan continue with a process of constructive engagement.

ASEAN, the grouping of nine South-East Asian states, has become an important player, exercising increasing diplomatic influence like a fourth power in the region. That influence has been felt by other regional powers on issues as varied as the South China Sea, Cambodia, and human rights. Potential new major players include Russia, with its huge resources in its far east, and a unified Korea.

Relationships among the regional actors are in one way or another changing, and the speed is propelled by the pace of economic change. The emerging shape of these new relationships is not yet clear. A rebalancing is inevitable, but a time of rebalancing is a time of uncertainty. This explains the region’s interest in security issues at a time when it has never been more peaceful.

The rash of guerrilla movements following the Second World War which threatened to enfeeble several states has all but vanished. Most regional states feel secure within their own borders and their focus has shifted to external challenges. While the trends are favourable, there are a number of underlying tensions and disputed boundaries, and there could be more if and when the pace of economic growth slows. In most cases they ought to be manageable by wise diplomacy even though they may remain unresolved for some time yet. The immediate exception is Korea where there is an unpredictable risk of war in the short term (though any military adventure could hardly be prolonged). The longer term issue is Taiwan. Like New Zealand, most countries in the region regard Taiwan as an inseparable part of China, but the region has a strong interest in a peaceful reunification process.

Modernisation of Military Forces in the Region

Prosperity has made possible the modernisation of many armed forces in the Asia Pacific region. It is the only region where arms spending is increasing, although the pace of economic growth means that defence spending has been falling as a proportion of GDP in every country except North Korea. The spending is a result of the re-balancing of forces once structured for internal security, but it also reflects doubts about what the future may bring. The trend is away from large and often poorly-equipped land forces towards air and maritime forces with a growing, though still limited, ability to project power beyond their national boundaries.

Modern ships, aircraft, submarines and sophisticated weapons including air and surface missiles are being acquired. The focus of acquisition is on new technologies for early warning and surveillance, survivability, and risk reduction. These technologies are not just for the major powers – many are relatively inexpensive and available to anyone. It will take some years to integrate this equipment into orders of battle, and some countries may have difficulty in supporting all of it. But over time, forces in the region will acquire significant military capabilities.

Modernisation Trends of Asia Pacific Military Forces

These increases in capabilities do not constitute an arms race - there is little sign in the region of the acute rivalries that an arms race implies. But, by shrinking reaction time, the increase in capabilities could shorten the fuse in any future crisis. If arms spending were to take on a momentum of its own, it would raise the stakes of crisis management. New Zealand’s wider interests would be adversely affected if these developments undermined the maintenance of regional stability.

Regional Institutions

Unlike Europe, Latin America or Africa, this region has no inheritance of institutions to build confidence and manage crises. Now, as its sense of identity strengthens, it is beginning to develop a range of multilateral forums. ASEAN is the oldest and best established. The eighteen nation grouping for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is more recent and in a few short years it has not only charted a path to regional free trade, but it has also provided an opportunity for the region’s leaders to gather for an annual regional summit.

The most recent forum is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which provides a means for regular consultation about the region’s security. It provides a network for building relationships and contacts, setting out to replicate ASEAN’s own successful technique. It has made a good start as a platform for dialogue and confidence building. Further evolutionary progress can be expected, provided we do not burden it too soon with overly-high hopes of hands-on conflict management. For some time to come though, regional members will continue to rely on tighter communities of interest such as long-standing bilateral alliances with the United States and multilateral partnerships like the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

New Zealand’s Stake in the Region

Our stake in the maintenance of a secure and stable region is greater than it has ever been, and it will continue to grow. About 40% of our merchandise exports now go to East Asia, a figure which has trebled in a generation. The Asia Pacific region is also the source of most of our foreign students, many of our immigrants, an increasing volume of investment, and a rapidly growing number of visitors. The result is that New Zealand’s continued prosperity will depend on the maintenance of stability and security in the Asia Pacific region.

As a beneficiary of a stable and secure environment New Zealand also must bear some of the responsibility and cost of keeping it that way. But over time, the rising technological and professional levels of our regional partners may diminish the value they see in our existing capabilities. Failure to keep pace and pull our weight could have a negative impact on our wider relationships within the region.

The continued stability of South-East Asia is one of our most important security goals. It is second only to the common security of Australia and New Zealand. As the only land bridge through which Australia and New Zealand could be threatened, South-East Asia has periodically been of concern to us since the 1920s. For the past twenty years, though, the stable governments and rapid growth among the ASEAN members have strengthened New Zealand’s bonds with these countries, and a breakdown of security in South-East Asia would impact directly on our economic well-being.

New Zealand’s formal security obligation in South-East Asia is the FPDA, linking us with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and the United Kingdom. While it is a legacy of the decolonisation period, it has taken on new life in the 1990s, with Singapore and Malaysia leading moves to adapt it for a continuing future. It is important for New Zealand, not just as our only formal security link with the region, but because of the value the NZDF gains from FPDA exercises and other military exchanges.

In addition, Singapore and Malaysia are interested in developing bilateral defence cooperation with New Zealand. Within the past two years, Defence Coordinating Groups have been set up with both countries, and the New Zealand and Singapore forces in particular have begun to train much more extensively together. The Philippines and Brunei are interested in closer cooperation and the NZDF already exercises from time to time with Thailand and Indonesia. This wider cooperation will improve interoperability among the military of the region and it will help build confidence.

North-East Asia has been more distant from our security concerns - even though, as a legacy of the Korean War, New Zealand remains a member of the United Nations Command and is, therefore, involved in the stability of the Korean peninsula. Now, however, the nations in the region are major trading partners for New Zealand and any disruption of trade flows would have a significant impact on us. The interests of four major powers (China, United States, Japan and Russia) converge in North-East Asia, making it the security core of our region.

Although they are growing, New Zealand’s bilateral defence links with the countries in North-East Asia are not extensive. Development of a security dialogue is important, especially with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, to give us the best possible understanding of events there. We have had such a dialogue with Japan for some years, and a longer history of ship visits and other exchanges. We have made a beginning with China and the Republic of Korea. In addition to high level exchange visits, resident defence attachés will shortly be appointed in both Beijing and Seoul; and a first bilateral military exchange took place with Korea this year.

Australia

Australia is energetically pursuing defence and security relationships in the Asia Pacific region where its interests are increasingly centred. It has given strong support to the establishment of multilateral dialogue in APEC and the ARF. It has reaffirmed its close alliance with the United States and it has negotiated a security agreement with Indonesia. In addition, Australia is strengthening its network of security and defence ties with most East Asian countries.

Australia is also paying close attention to the modernisation of its forces. While defence spending has decreased since 1993/94, it remains a Government priority. (Defence was exempted from the expenditure cutbacks instituted by the Howard Government shortly after it took up the Treasury benches.) Combat capabilities are being enhanced, and additional reach and sustainment are being added. Command and control arrangements have been upgraded to provide Australia with its own theatre-level campaign capabilities. Interoperability and combined operations requirements, including those with New Zealand, are receiving close attention.

Australia is New Zealand’s closest and most important security partner. The alliance with Australia, born of the Canberra Pact and formalised in ANZUS, remains central to New Zealand’s defence policy. The weakening of our defence relationship with the United States has increased our reliance on Australia. Since 1991, cooperation has been reinforced by a multitude of links as part of Closer Defence Relations (CDR).

The Common Defence Effort

Australia
New Zealand

Cooperative Activities Under Closer Defence Relations

Defence cooperation between New Zealand and Australia is perhaps best known for the ANZAC Frigate programme and the basing of RNZAF Skyhawk aircraft in Nowra to assist the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in Fleet Air Defence training. However, the relationship is more wide ranging. The following Closer Defence Relations (CDR) activities are planned for the 1997/98 financial year.

The United States of America

Despite earlier fears that the end of the Cold War would see a drawdown in the American presence in East Asia, it is clear that the United States remains the underwriter of the region’s security and will retain that role for some time to come. Among the major powers it alone has the military resources, political will and regional acceptance to do so. Its forward presence is welcomed by most regional states and it is the principal source of military technology and doctrine. In any significant defence contingency affecting New Zealand or Australia, the response of the United States will be critical.

The dispute over ship visits in the mid-1980s ended the longstanding pattern of security cooperation based on the ANZUS treaty, although the Clinton Administration has improved relations by restoring personal contacts and high-level visits. In multilateral peacekeeping, New Zealand forces have worked alongside the United States military in operations such as the Multinational Interception Force which is monitoring United Nations sanctions against Iraq.

Given the common interests of New Zealand and the United States in this and other parts of the world, and the practical benefits of better cooperation, it is in the interests of both sides to work together as closely as possible. But the United States has difficulty with defence contacts, such as exercises, that imply or could be perceived as part of a United States security umbrella while New Zealand legislation prohibits some ships of the United States Navy from visiting New Zealand ports. The continuing constraints on exercising and access to American technology pose problems for New Zealand’s defence capabilities, and for interoperability with the United States. These restrictions cause practical difficulties for some of our other partners. Australia in particular incurs inconvenience and additional costs in order to keep its exercise activities with New Zealand separate from those with the United States.

The United States has neither the power nor the inclination to be the sole guarantor of the region’s security. It expects others to carry a proportionate share of the burden. New Zealand’s defence relationship with the United States will be enhanced by this country’s ability to continue playing a useful role in security matters.

The United Kingdom and France

Over the last thirty years the United Kingdom has significantly lessened its military presence in Asia. Nevertheless, the British have retained significant security commitments in the region; in particular, they remain an important member of the FPDA. New Zealand welcomes the opportunity this provides to supplement other defence contacts with our oldest ally. The value of this relationship was vividly demonstrated by the ease with which Kiwi Company took its place as part of a British battalion in Bosnia. The Government is appreciative of the excellent help, cooperation and friendship extended by Britain to our soldiers.

France remains an influential power in the South Pacific with military forces in both New Caledonia (New Zealand’s closest neighbour) and French Polynesia. Although there is no formal military arrangement between New Zealand and France, the ending of the French nuclear weapon testing programme in our region has permitted the restoration of defence links in areas such as maritime surveillance and disaster relief.

South Pacific

The security of the Pacific Island states will continue to be concerned chiefly with non-military challenges such as economic vulnerability, environmental threats, population growth, ethnic tensions, and national stability. Conflicts are most likely to remain internal and localised. Nonetheless, the long-running dispute on Bougainville demonstrates that security problems of a more traditional character may also occur.

New Zealand is linked to the South Pacific by strong bonds of geography, family, history and culture. We have a substantial interest in the stability and prosperity of the region, its good governance, aid, disaster relief and the protection of natural resources. We have constitutional obligations for the defence of Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands, and a Treaty of Friendship with Samoa. We exercise with the defence forces of Fiji, Tonga, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, and provide military and development assistance to a number of other countries.

Because of the limited capacity of these small states, it is important that New Zealand retain a capacity to undertake a number of military tasks in the South Pacific in response to emergencies such as terrorist threats, disaster relief, and search and rescue. Pressure on the world’s fisheries and the effort to manage them under international law mean that the provision of fisheries protection and maritime surveillance assistance by New Zealand and Australia will be of increasing importance in the South Pacific.

Antarctica and the Southern Ocean

New Zealand’s EEZ extends well into the Southern Ocean, some 200 nautical miles south of the Campbell Islands. There are resources in these areas which remain largely untapped. Infringements are already occurring in areas in the South Ocean under Australian and French jurisdiction. Our military must have the capabilities required for monitoring and protecting the resources in areas that are under New Zealand jurisdiction.

New Zealand has important interests in the Ross Dependency. While we would wish to benefit from the exploitation of the untapped resources in the Antarctic, any such exploitation must be sustainable and must not result in any environmental damage. A capability for surveillance and protection will become increasingly important for the preservation of the marine resources of the Ross Sea, either in support of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, or under national jurisdiction through the Law of the Sea Convention. Air transport and helicopter support are important elements in New Zealand’s Antarctic programme, as is hydrographic work done by the Royal New Zealand Navy.

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